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PRECLUSION IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Tobias Barrington Wolff *
Despite the intense focus trained upon class litigation for the last
twenty-five years, a central feature of the class proceeding has received no
sustained attention:  the preclusive effect that a class judgment should have
upon the nonclass claims of absentees.  The omission is a serious one.  If
claim and issue preclusion were to operate in their normal mode when a
claim is certified for class treatment, the proceeding could compromise the
high-value claims of individual absentees.  Such a threat, in turn, can create
ex ante conflicts of interest within a class that can prevent certification if left
unresolved.  Those few courts that have recognized the problem have thrown
up their hands in helplessness, refusing to certify potentially beneficial classes
for fear of the preclusive consequences.  Worse, most courts have entirely
failed to address the problem.  It is not merely a lack of diligence that has
produced this state of affairs.  The reluctance of courts to address preclusion
during certification has resulted from a deep confusion about the positive law
foundations of a judgment’s preclusive effects.
This Article offers the first systematic examination of these issues.  It
explains the threat that claim and issue preclusion can pose to class members
when those doctrines are applied, unaltered, to class litigation.  It then offers
a more careful account of the positive law foundations of a judgment’s
preclusive effect, marking out the path that will allow courts to reclaim their
proper role in constraining the preclusive effects of the class proceedings that
they shepherd to judgment.
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INTRODUCTION
For years, courts and commentators have engaged in a fierce debate
over the circumstances under which a class action judgment should have
binding effect upon absent class members.1  Despite this intensity of fo-
1. Much of that debate has focused on the availability of collateral attacks where
adequate representation was arguably lacking in an initial proceeding.  See, e.g.,
Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257–61 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting “future
claimant” to escape effects of class settlement due to inadequate representation in initial
proceeding), aff’d by an equally divided Court, in part, and vacated on other grounds, in
part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003); Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein II), 126 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that representation that is actually inadequate will prevent class action
from binding absentees), vacated, Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein III), 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding that collateral attack is never available provided that procedures were
in place to ensure adequacy of representation in initial proceeding); State v. Homeside
Lending, 826 A.2d 997, 1007–18 (Vt. 2003) (permitting Vermont residents to bring suit,
despite Alabama judgment purporting to resolve all claims in nationwide class action, for
reasons of inadequate representation and lack of personal jurisdiction); Marcel Kahan &
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cus, the related question of exactly what preclusive effect such a binding
judgment should have on the claims of those absentees has remained
largely unexamined.2  The omission is a serious one.  The preclusive ef-
fects of a proposed class proceeding, considered ex ante, can sometimes
have a dramatic impact upon the certification calculus.  Nonetheless, in-
sofar as courts have taken note of preclusion questions at all in consider-
ing requests for class certification, they have most frequently avoided any
serious engagement with the issue by placing broad reliance upon the
ubiquitous maxim, aptly stated by Justice Ginsburg in the Matsushita case,
that “[a] court conducting an action cannot predetermine the res judi-
cata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested only in a subsequent
action.”3  The Court further entrenched this maxim in the Semtek case,
where it placed a construction upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b) that limited the operative effect of a dismissal “upon the merits”
Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions:  A Critique of
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 765, 774 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Silberman,
Inadequate Search] (criticizing Epstein II and arguing that opportunities to opt out at
certification and settlement provide adequate protection to class members); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class
Members, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1148, 1162–78 (1998) (arguing that collateral review of
adequacy is necessary where forum’s only basis for exercising personal jurisdiction is
provision of notice and opportunity to opt out, which assumes minimal participation by
absentee).  The requirements of notice, personal jurisdiction, and opt-out rights have also
been the focus of much attention.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
809–12 (1985) (establishing notice and opt-out requirements for out-of-state absentees in
damages class action where forum would otherwise lack personal jurisdiction); Twigg v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1226–29 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that class
member is not bound to class action judgment because notice was insufficient to alert him
that his interests would be compromised); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process,
and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1057 (2002)
[hereinafter Issacharoff, Preclusion] (discussing certification standards and due process
limitations on binding litigants to different types of class proceedings).
2. The best discussion of the issue is to be found in Wright, Miller, and Cooper, which
does a good job both in identifying some of the areas of class litigation where preclusion
doctrine requires careful attention and in offering commonsense solutions.  See 18A
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4455, at 448–94 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2004).  Even so, the volume’s treatment
of the issue is succinct and undertheorized (of necessity, given the nature of the treatise
format).  There has been no comprehensive treatment of the issue in any law review article
and only occasional mention of it in the context of other discussions.  The best partial
treatment of which I am aware can be found in Richard Nagareda’s discussion of the class
action as a mechanism for regulating the “market” among defendants in obtaining claim
preclusive repose.  See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure
of the Class Action, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 149, 159–81 (2003).  Nagareda does not purport to
offer a comprehensive treatment of claim and issue preclusion in aggregate litigation, but
is attentive to the importance of the problem, which is rare.  Some courts have attempted
to grapple with the nuances of preclusion in class litigation, as I discuss at length below,
but no satisfying judicial approach has emerged.
3. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 7B Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note
2, § 1789, at 245). R
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under that provision to the federal court in which the dismissal is actually
issued.  “[I]t would be peculiar,” the Court reasoned in explaining that
result, “to find a rule governing the effect that must be accorded federal
judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the internal pro-
cedures of the rendering court itself.”4  Relying uncritically upon these
tenets, courts regularly take it as a matter of course that the preclusive
effect of a judgment is not a subject with which a rendering court should
concern itself but, rather, is a feature of a judgment that can only be
determined with certainty—and should only receive serious attention—
in a subsequent proceeding.  As with most frequently intoned proposi-
tions, this one does embody some truth.  But the broad and imprecise
fashion in which courts and commentators have deployed this preclusion
maxim in class proceedings has led to serious error.  The time for a sys-
tematic inquiry into the proper treatment of preclusion in class action
litigation—and for a reexamination of the ubiquitous preclusion maxim
that has pretermitted that inquiry—is long overdue.
There are some preclusion questions that a rendering court cannot
answer with finality—that much is accurate.  Will a subsequent attempt by
a litigant to obtain a remedy in another proceeding constitute an alterna-
tive legal theory on the same claim, rather than an analytically and tran-
sactionally distinct prayer for relief?5  Will a contested issue be essential to
the final judgment, and will it remain the “same” issue over time, such
that it could serve as the basis for a later estoppel?6  When questions
about the extent of a judgment’s future preclusive effect depend upon
events that lie outside the rendering forum’s knowledge or control, their
likely outcome can be a matter of legitimate and serious ex ante dispute.
In such cases, litigants must compare the likely benefit of a lawsuit as
4. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001); see also id. at
505–06 (construing provision).  Rule 41(b) reads:
Involuntary Dismissal:  Effect Thereof.  For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant.  Unless the court in
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
5. See, e.g., Herendeen v. Champion Int’l Corp., 525 F.2d 130, 134–35 (2d Cir. 1975)
(adopting more formalistic definition and permitting lawsuit for pension benefits to
proceed, even though plaintiff had previously filed unsuccessful lawsuit for same benefits,
because second suit based cause of action on different contract and hence constituted
distinct “claim”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982) (offering pragmatic
definition of series of transactions).
6. The Restatement provides:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether
on the same or a different claim.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27.
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presently conceived with the risk that a judgment will produce adverse
consequences in the future.  The inability to answer such questions with
certainty until a subsequent proceeding, and the risk that a litigant will
choose unwisely, are basic structural features of preclusion doctrine.7
In the context of individual litigation, such risk is manageable.  Just
as an individual litigant in a civil proceeding does not enjoy any right of
adequate representation that could enable him to escape the effects of a
judgment, and hence assumes the risk that his lawyers will make bad liti-
gation choices on his behalf, so a litigant assumes the risk that the judg-
ment that results from a lawsuit may compromise other important inter-
ests that he possesses.8  We trust individual litigants to make the necessary
choices in navigating these risks.  When litigants make bad choices, or
when they fail to consider the preclusive consequences of a lawsuit at all,
we consider it an appropriate expression of litigant autonomy to bind
them to the result.
In a class action, however, these observations cease to be merely pro-
saic.  There is a deep tension between the doctrine of preclusion as it is
frequently applied in individual litigation and the conditions that serve to
limit the use of the class action device.  When absent class members are
bound to a judgment, they are bound by virtue of the commonality of
interest that makes it possible to find individual plaintiffs who will serve as
proper representatives for them all.9  A court’s evaluation of factors like
adequacy of representation, typicality, and superiority requires it to com-
pare the respective interests and incentives of all the members of the
class.10  When a court conducts such an evaluation, it must do so not only
with respect to the likely course of the litigation currently before it, but
7. Professor Burbank makes reference to this dynamic in calling for an approach to
preclusion in the federal courts that will minimize the risk associated with such
uncertainty:
Preclusion rules affect litigation strategy.  It is therefore important that litigants
know what the rules are.  Before filing a complaint asserting federal rights in a
federal court, or in response to the successful removal of such a case to federal
court, the plaintiff should be able to predict with considerable assurance the rules
of claim preclusion that will govern a judgment.
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law:  A General Approach, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 733, 767 (1986) [hereinafter
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion].
8. I mean here a right that might qualify the effect of the judgment upon the
individual litigant.  Of course, a litigant may possess a right to recover against incompetent
counsel under the law of malpractice.
9. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–45 (1940) (finding that Due Process Clause
prohibits binding class members to judgment without adequate protections for
representation of their interests); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985) (reiterating requirement that interests of class members be adequately
represented).
10. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (requiring showing of typicality of lead plaintiff’s claims
in comparison to those of class, and ability of lead plaintiff and class counsel to represent
the class adequately); id. 23(b)(3) (requiring showing that class action is superior to other
forms of relief).
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also with respect to the likely future impact of a judgment upon the inter-
ests of class members.  In other words, a court must assess, early in the
proceedings, what the likely preclusive effect of a judgment will be upon
members of the class it has been asked to certify.
Introducing preclusion doctrine into the certification inquiry can
present two complications.  The first is a time-frame problem.  The type
of early prognostication inherent in class action procedures is at odds
with the retrospective posture that courts often treat as a necessary fea-
ture of preclusion analysis, calling for a degree of certainty about the
likely effect of a judgment in subsequent proceedings that the preclusion
maxim quoted above appears to foreclose.11  The second is a doctrinal
problem.  Even leaving considerations of timing to one side, if the doc-
trines of claim and issue preclusion that are associated with individual
litigation were to apply unaltered to class proceedings, the preclusion in-
quiry would sometimes reveal significant obstacles to class certification,
often in the form of conflicts among the interests of class members in
their incentive to settle an action rather than litigate to judgment.
No court can legitimately rule on a request for certification in a class
action—at least, a class action that may proceed to a litigated out-
come12—without achieving a clear understanding of the likely preclusive
effect that a judgment in the case would have upon the members of the
class and the options that the court has at its disposal for altering or con-
straining those effects.  Nonetheless, many courts regularly proceed with-
out achieving any such understanding.  Some flatly refuse to certify a class
when preclusion obstacles become apparent, complaining that the time-
frame problem prevents any resolution of the issues in the initial forum
and concluding that there is an unmanageable “risk” that absentees will
suffer adverse preclusion consequences in future proceedings.  Others—
most others—simply fail to address the matter at all, creating the possibil-
ity that the interests of absentees will be improperly compromised in fu-
ture cases.  The first approach is inadequate and may prevent socially de-
sirable class actions from being certified.  The second constitutes a form
of judicial malfeasance.  The fact that most certifying courts have not
11. In one of its few statements on the issue, the Court alludes to this problem in the
closing passages of the Cooper decision, stating, “Rule 23 is carefully drafted to provide a
mechanism for the expeditious decision of common questions.  Its purposes might well be
defeated by an attempt to decide a host of individual claims before any common question
relating to liability has been resolved adversely to the defendant.”  Cooper v. Fed. Reserve
Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 881 (1984).  I discuss the Cooper decision at length infra
Part I.A.
12. Settlement-only class actions may greatly diminish preclusion-based problems.
Indeed, the resolution of preclusion may provide an important example of a “relevant”
feature of a settlement-only class action in the certification process.  See Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (“Settlement is relevant to a class certification.”).
I discuss these issues infra Part II.A.3.
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been mindful of preclusion issues in the past cannot authorize further
inattention.13
Several steps are required to address this problem.  The first is to
understand it with precision.  To that end, Part I of this Article discusses
the different types of preclusion problems that can arise at the outset of a
class proceeding.  Foremost among these are potential conflicts of inter-
est.  When members of an otherwise cohesive class possess different con-
figurations of factually related claims beyond those presented for class
certification, the threat of claim and issue preclusion can give them
starkly different incentives to prosecute or settle the action.  Still other
preclusion problems can affect the entire class uniformly.  Strategic litiga-
tion choices—like a decision to eschew a federal cause of action in order
to stay in state court, or a failure to request a particular form of injunctive
relief when seeking institutional reform—raise questions about the limits
of the representational role in a class proceeding.  Part I takes up these
issues in detail.
The next step is to develop more precise tools for discussing preclu-
sion in general and, in particular, for challenging the pervasive and un-
critical reliance upon the view that preclusion questions can only be ad-
dressed in any meaningful way in a subsequent proceeding.  As Part II
explains, preclusion questions embrace three distinct inquiries:  (1) a de-
termination as to the exercise of positive legal authority undertaken by
the rendering forum; (2) an inquiry into the actual course of the pro-
ceedings in the rendering forum; and (3) an inquiry into the relationship
between the matters resolved in the first lawsuit and the claims or issues
raised in a subsequent proceeding.  Contrary to the familiar maxim, only
the third of these inquiries lies entirely outside the knowledge or control
of the rendering forum.  As to the first two, the initial court can exert
considerable influence on the future preclusive effects of its own judg-
ment, and often does.  This is especially the case when a court seeks to
impose constraints upon the preclusive effect that its judgment will have
in subsequent proceedings, rather than seeking to predetermine the
judgment’s affirmative consequences.  Part II offers a more precise posi-
tive law account of preclusion doctrine and then explores the tools of
limitation that are available to a rendering forum in controlling the fu-
ture preclusive effect of its own judgments.
With these tools in place, the final step is to determine the proper
roles of both the rendering and the recognizing courts in navigating
these preclusion issues.  In the case of the initial forum, the fact that the
court has the power to overcome barriers to certification through the
“negative” or constraining use of preclusion doctrine does not mean that
exercising that power always represents the preferred course.  When a
13. Cf. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547, 547
(1996) (challenging received view that “ordinary choice-of-law practices should yield in
suits consolidating large numbers of claims”).
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diligent court identifies potential preclusion problems at the outset of a
class proceeding, it should determine the steps that it can take to avoid
those problems, but it should also assess the impact of those steps upon
other adjudicatory values like fairness to the defendant and the integrity
of its own judgments.  It is necessary, in other words, to determine
whether joinder policies or preclusion policies should predominate when
analyzing the propriety of class certification in such a case.  As Part III
explains, although many class actions could be certified despite what
might first appear to be intractable preclusion problems, not all should
be.
In the case of a recognizing forum, the primary task will most fre-
quently be to determine the proper response to an initial tribunal’s com-
plete inattention to preclusion problems.  The number of courts that
have even attempted to address preclusion issues at the initial stages of a
class proceeding remains small, and the poor track record of some courts
in observing other certification requirements suggests that the failure of
the rendering forum to address the preclusive consequences of certifica-
tion will continue to be a serious problem in class litigation.  Part IV con-
cludes by arguing that a recognizing court has an appropriate role to play
in enforcing constraints upon the preclusive effects of prior class action
judgments through a less disruptive application of the adequacy of repre-
sentation principles that have heretofore been associated with full-scale
collateral attacks.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
It is necessary, before commencing an in-depth examination of the
role of preclusion in class action litigation, to address the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.14 Cooper is
the only occasion on which the Court has purported to speak in any de-
tail about the operation of preclusion doctrine in class litigation, and the
Court articulated a deceptively simple set of postulates in that case to
arrive at the outcome that it produced.  The meaning and import of the
resulting decision are often misunderstood.  Unsurprisingly, Cooper has
proven inadequate as a framework for the analysis of subsequent preclu-
sion disputes.  I preface my examination of the conflicts of interest and
representational problems that claim and issue preclusion can generate
in a class proceeding with a discussion of the limited usefulness of Cooper
in moving that analysis forward.
A. The Cooper Case
The dispute in Cooper centered around claims of race and gender
discrimination at a branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond lo-
cated in Charlotte, North Carolina.  The case was initially filed by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which charged
14. 467 U.S. 867.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 9 28-MAR-05 13:53
2005] PRECLUSION IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 725
the bank with a “pattern or practice” violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 for refusing to promote black and female workers.
Four employees later intervened, each asserting the same pattern or prac-
tice claim under Title VII along with a claim of individual discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which authorized the award of more extensive
damages than Title VII did at the time.15  The district court certified the
intervenors as representatives of a class consisting of all employees within
a specified time period who had been “discriminated against in promo-
tion, wages, job assignments and terms and conditions of employment
because of their race.”16  The district court issued a ruling in favor of the
class on the pattern or practice claim and in favor of two of the four class
representatives on their individual claims of discrimination, but the court
of appeals reversed on the merits and ruled in favor of the bank in all
respects.17
A second group of employees also sought to intervene in the trial at
a later point in the proceedings, but the district court denied their re-
quest.  These employees then filed separate, individual claims of discrimi-
nation against the bank.  The court of appeals found that the judgment
in the class proceeding, as modified by its own reversal on the merits,
precluded the unsuccessful intervenors from maintaining their individual
claims of discrimination.  It was on this portion of the Fourth Circuit’s
ruling that the Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
The Court’s ruling on the preclusion question, and the attendant
propositions for which Cooper is most frequently cited, comes in two parts.
First, as a general matter, the Court issued a broad statement in which it
purported to hold that the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion oper-
ate with full force in class action proceedings:
There is of course no dispute that under elementary principles
of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class
action is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation.
Basic principles of res judicata (merger and bar or claim preclu-
sion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) apply.  A judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff class extinguishes their claim,
which merges into the judgment granting relief.  A judgment in
favor of the defendant extinguishes the claim, barring a subse-
quent action on that claim.  A judgment in favor of either side is
conclusive in a subsequent action between them on any issue
15. Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII only provided
equitable relief and section 1981 was the primary vehicle for obtaining compensatory
damages for racial discrimination in private employment contracts.  See George
Rutherglen, The Improbable History of Section 1981:  CLIO Still Bemused and Confused,
2003 Sup. Ct. Rev. 303, 338–39 & nn.125–137 (describing remedial history of Title VII and
section 1981).
16. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 869–70 & n.3.
17. EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 638, 669–70, 671–73 (4th
Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Cooper, 467 U.S. 867.
18. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 873 n.6.
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actually litigated and determined, if its determination was essen-
tial to that judgment.19
Note the sequence of the reasoning here.  The passage begins with
an observation about the binding effect of class actions—a “properly en-
tertained class action is binding on class members”—that is little more
than a tautology.  While the capacity of representative litigation to bind
absentees is a relatively recent development in our adjudicatory tradi-
tion,20 that capacity is now well established, and the assertion that class
actions are binding when “properly entertained” tells us little.  This re-
minder of a class action’s binding effect is followed by a series of broad
statements about the consequent applicability of “basic principles” of pre-
clusion doctrine.  The implicit suggestion is that the application of “ba-
sic” preclusion principles, in full force, must follow naturally from a de-
termination that a judgment is binding upon class members.  This logical
fallacy exemplifies one of the pervasive sources of imprecision that this
Article seeks to correct, and it is no coincidence that the error makes a
prominent appearance in the Court’s major statement on the issue to
date.
The second proposition in Cooper concerns the relationship between
a “pattern or practice” claim and a specific allegation of discrimination by
an individual.  Reversing the appellate court’s dismissal of the discrimina-
tion claims brought by the second group of intervenors, the Court held
that an adverse finding on a pattern or practice claim is not logically in-
consistent with a finding of isolated instances of disparate treatment
within a business.  While the two types of claim might be expected to
share significant areas of factual overlap, the Court explained, it is possi-
ble for the one to exist in the absence of the other.21  As an observation
about evidentiary findings and logical relationships between claims, this
holding is obviously correct.  How that observation translates into the ac-
tual holding on preclusion doctrine that Cooper embodies, however, is a
different question.  Mapping that translation requires careful attention to
19. Id. at 874 (citations omitted).
20. The authoritative account of the historical evolution of class suits in this respect is
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849 (1998).
21. The Court put the point in these terms:
Proving isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts by the employer is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination; rather it
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence that “racial
discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure—the regular
rather than the unusual practice.”
. . . .
. . . Given the burden of establishing a prima facie case of a pattern or
practice of discrimination, it was entirely consistent for the District Court
simultaneously to conclude that Cooper and Russell had valid individual claims
even though it had expressly found no proof of any classwide discrimination [in
the relevant segments of the business].
Cooper, 467 U.S. at 875–76, 878 (citations omitted).
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the posture of the claims on appeal, an issue as to which the Court’s opin-
ion is inattentive.
First, there is some tension between the Court’s assertion that “basic
principles of res judicata (merger and bar or claim preclusion) . . . apply”
in a class action and the actual holding of the case.  Under “basic princi-
ples of res judicata,” a litigant is ordinarily required to assert all the claims
for relief that relate to a given transaction or series of transactions in a
single proceeding.  If the litigant fails to satisfy this requirement, the
maintenance of her claims need not be “logically inconsistent” with the
prior action for a merger or bar to apply.  A party attempting to split two
requests for relief on the same claim into separate proceedings, or at-
tempting to assert two related claims in successive lawsuits, will ordinarily
face a preclusion defense regardless of whether the relief she requests in
the second suit would be logically consistent with the result in the first.
Nonetheless, the Cooper Court permitted the individual class members to
assert their discrimination claims in a subsequent proceeding, even
though those claims arose out of the same series of transactions as did the
class claim—their termination or nonadvancement within the workplace.
The Court’s opinion does not give a careful account of the preclusion
reasoning that led it to this conclusion.  Rather, the opinion simply an-
nounces the limited effect of the class judgment as if claim preclusion
self-evidently required the result:
[The class judgment] (1) bars the class members from bringing
another class action against the Bank alleging a pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination for the relevant time period [i.e. reassert-
ing the class claim] and (2) precludes the class members in any
other litigation with the Bank from relitigating the [issue]
whether the Bank engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimi-
nation against black employees during the relevant time period.
The judgment is not, however, dispositive of the individual
claims the . . . petitioners have alleged in their separate action.22
While this result may represent the correct rule in a Title VII class
action, it does not flow inevitably from an application of basic claim pre-
clusion principles.
Second, the Court did not deal at all with any impact that the antici-
pated preclusive effects of the judgment might have had upon the propri-
ety of the initial class certification in this case.  There is a good reason for
this omission.  Not only was the issue of certification not raised on appeal,
but it was not even contested below.  The class in Cooper was certified on a
“consent order”—an unusual procedure when a class action is certified
for trial rather than settlement.  The Supreme Court did not discuss this
fact at all in its opinion, and the Fourth Circuit mentioned it only in
passing.23  Thus, there was never any opportunity in Cooper to consider
22. Id. at 880.
23. See EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 637 (4th Cir. 1983)
(“The petition [of the four lead plaintiffs] to intervene was allowed and the intervenors
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the ex ante impact that preclusion effects might have upon the propriety
of certifying the class, and the Supreme Court’s opinion clearly cannot be
read to speak to the issue.
Third, even leaving aside the unusual circumstances surrounding the
certification ruling, the preclusion question decided by the Court in
Cooper was a limited one in other respects.  The case presented only a
federal question claim for employment discrimination.  The federal
courts were thus free to shape substantive preclusion policy in administer-
ing this action in ways that might not have been available in a suit encom-
passing state law claims.  Moreover, the particular type of federal claim at
issue in the case—an allegation of a pattern or practice of discriminatory
behavior by an employer—posed a claim preclusion question that was
exceptional.24
were, by a consent order, certified as the class representatives . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Cooper,
467 U.S. 867.
One must return to the original record in the case to uncover the sequence of events
that led to this certification by consent.  The complaint was filed against the bank by the
EEOC and alleged discrimination on the basis of both race and sex for a twelve-year period
beginning in July 1965, shortly after Title VII took effect.  See Joint Appendix Petition for
Writ of Certiorari Filed August 4, 1983 Certiorari Granted October 31, 1983 at 24a–26a,
Cooper (No. 83-185) [hereinafter Cooper Record] (copy of consent order).  When the four
individual plaintiffs intervened to seek class certification, they agreed to narrow the
complaint in two important respects:  They dropped the classwide allegations of sex
discrimination and limited the time frame for the race discrimination claim to a period
beginning in January 1974, just three years before the action was filed.  Id. at 26a–27a.
(One of the named plaintiffs, Sylvia Cooper, retained the right to pursue her individual sex
discrimination claim in the action.  See id. at 27a.)  The court’s order suggests that the
bank agreed not to contest the certification of the class in exchange for this reduction in
its potential exposure.  See id. at 26a (“The plaintiff-intervenors and the defendant have
agreed upon a designation of the class to include all black persons who worked for the
defendant at any time since January 3, 1974.  The plaintiff-intervenors no longer seek to
raise in this action any issues of sex discrimination.”).  As a consequence, the district court
issued its certification ruling on consent and offered no analysis in support of its order,
merely reciting the requirements of Rule 23 and announcing in a conclusory manner that
those requirements were satisfied.  See id. at 27a–29a.
The district court can perhaps be forgiven for this lax procedure.  The independent
obligation of trial courts to ascertain the propriety of class certification even in the face of
agreement by the parties, set forth definitively in Amchem, was not clearly established in
1978 when the court issued its order.  Even so, perfunctory analysis by district courts
remains pervasive, even in contested certification proceedings, as a recent article by
Professor Robert Klonoff demonstrates.  See Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed
Application of Rule 23’s “Adequacy of Representation” Requirement, 2004 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 671, 673–74 (conducting empirical study and concluding that “the vast majority of
courts conduct virtually no gate-keeping function and approve class representatives and
class counsel with little or no analysis”).
24. The Cooper plaintiffs raised only disparate treatment claims.  The Supreme Court
formally recognized disparate impact claims in 1971, six years before the original
complaint in Cooper was filed.  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–34 (1971)
(concluding that legislative intent behind Title VII was to deal with consequences of
allegedly discriminatory employment practices and not merely motivation).
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A pattern or practice claim is a gestalt cause of action.  As the Court
put it in General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, such a claim alleges
“the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury” of
discriminatory treatment, revealing a “policy of . . . discrimination [that]
is reflected [throughout the defendant’s] employment practices.”25
Thus, the assertion of a pattern or practice claim encompasses allegations
of a series of individual instances of discrimination, any one of which
might itself serve as a basis for relief in an individual lawsuit.  As a conse-
quence, it is not merely the case that pattern or practice claims are well
suited to classwide treatment, as is the case with many civil rights suits;26
they call out for such treatment.  An individual who has suffered discrimi-
nation could ordinarily obtain complete relief in an individual action,
making a separate pattern or practice claim redundant.  And an individ-
ual who has not suffered discrimination would have no standing to raise a
pattern or practice claim by invoking the injuries of others, any more
than she would be an appropriate representative for such a claim in a
class proceeding.27  The question of what preclusive effect to attach to a
pattern or practice claim is thus most appropriately addressed in the class
action context, and the Cooper Court used the dispute before it to set
forth the appropriate policy on the litigation of such claims.  The opin-
ion’s almost exclusive reliance upon Title VII precedents, with only the
most perfunctory mention of preclusion doctrine, is an accurate reflec-
tion of the issues to which the Court addressed itself.28
Finally, there was a much simpler ground available for a ruling on
the issue of preclusion, had that been the Court’s true concern:  The dis-
trict court itself had authorized the intervening class members to proceed
with their individual claims with no preclusion bar.  Recall that it was the
second group of claimants—the “Baxter intervenors”—whose dismissal
on claim preclusion grounds gave rise to the appeal in Cooper. The dis-
trict court had denied the request of those class members to intervene in
the remedy phase of the original action and press their individual claims
25. 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 (1982); see also Cooper, 467 U.S. at 877–78 (pattern or
practice claim alleges “‘a companywide practice’” or “a consistent practice within a given
department” (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159)).
26. The oft-cited Advisory Committee’s Note on the 1966 amendment to Rule
23(b)(2) makes this point with respect to civil rights actions generally, offering as its
principle illustration “various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with
discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of
specific enumeration.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note on 1966
amendment.
27. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157–59 (describing requirements of adequacy and typicality in
pattern or practice class claim).  For an individual who has suffered disparate treatment, a
pattern or practice claim might nonetheless be attractive as a way of expanding the scope
of the evidence that will be available at a trial.  Even so, it would constitute a redundant
remedy.
28. The entirety of the Court’s discussion of preclusion precedent and theory is
contained in a single paragraph, part of which is quoted above, that simply offers a string
cite of the “usual suspects” on the subject.  See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 874.
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because they were not employed at the pay grades as to which the district
court had found a pattern of discrimination during the liability phase.29
The court denied their motion “without prejudice to any underlying
rights the intervenors may have,” however, and went on to state its belief
that nothing in the class proceeding would prevent the would-be inter-
venors from pursuing their individual claims:
The pendency of this action has apparently tolled the rights
of the would be intervenors to file separate individual actions
preceded by claims filed with the EEOC as to Title VII rights,
and it has also apparently tolled their rights to file suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1981.
I see no reason why, if any of the would be intervenors are
actively interested in pursuing their claims, they cannot file a
Section 1981 suit next week, nor why they could not file a claim
with EEOC next week.  More pertinently, since the EEOC is a
party to this case and seems to have an active interest in seeing
that the claims of the four intervenors are pursued, I see no
reason why all formalities of processing the claim and the subse-
quent proceedings of conciliation and mediation could not be
accomplished in very short order, like two weeks or less, so that
this whole question could become moot in a few weeks.30
On the strength of these statements, the class members did not ap-
peal the denial of their motion to intervene in what was at that point a
successful pattern or practice suit, and instead filed a separate action to
pursue their individual claims.  In something of a judicial bait and switch,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding for the class on the
pattern or practice claim and then found that claim preclusion barred
the Baxter intervenors from maintaining their individual claims in a sepa-
rate suit, despite the obvious intention of the district court to avoid that
result, dismissing the portions of the district court’s order quoted above
as “plain dictum.”31  In a final confirmation of the true nature of its focus
in the case, the Supreme Court failed to analyze these aspects of the pro-
ceedings, referring only briefly to the district court’s “pointed[ ] refus[al]
to decide the individual claims of the Baxter petitioners” in holding that
the decision whether to join such claims under Rule 23 was “a matter of
judicial administration that should be decided in the first instance by the
District Court.”32
Cooper, in short, is a Title VII opinion, not an opinion about the
preclusive effects of class action judgments.  The Court confronted a lim-
ited question—whether plaintiffs automatically lose their ability to raise
individual claims of employment discrimination when a pattern or prac-
29. Cooper Record, supra note 23, at 287a–88a (copy of order denying motion for R
leave to intervene).
30. Id. at 288a–89a.
31. EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 673–75 (4th Cir. 1983),
rev’d sub nom. Cooper, 467 U.S. 867.
32. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 881.
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tice claim fails—and it offered an answer informed primarily by Title VII
policy, making no attempt to explain its result with reference to general
preclusion principles.  While the opinion may have some elements of pre-
clusion doctrine embedded in its holding, it provides little guidance for
the array of preclusion problems that can arise—and that courts have
begun to confront—in the increasingly diverse range of class action
litigation.
B. Conflicts of Interest
The potential for conflicts of interest within a putative class is the
most acute problem that preclusion doctrine poses to class litigation.
Such a conflict most commonly arises when different groups within a
class possess different configurations of claims relating to the same trans-
action.  Suppose, for example, that a class was certified on behalf of all
purchasers of an automobile containing a design defect that reduced the
car’s resale value.  Suppose further that some subset of the class had suf-
fered an additional harm as a result of the defect—say, an automobile
accident—giving rise to a factually related claim for relief that was unsuit-
able for class treatment.  If the common claim for economic damages was
certified and litigated on behalf of the entire class, the resulting judg-
ment may have adverse preclusive effects on the related accident claims.
Only those members of the class who possessed the accident claim will be
subject to such adverse preclusive effects.  As a result, a conflict of interest
arises between the two groups of claimants as to the risks and benefits of
litigation.
Claim preclusion and issue preclusion implicate this conflict in re-
lated but distinct fashions.  In the case of claim preclusion, the potential
for conflict arises from the prohibition on the “splitting” of claims.  That
doctrine ordinarily prevents a plaintiff from asserting two related claims
in successive proceedings, even if the first claim is successful.  If an indi-
vidual is a member of a class that has litigated the economic damages
claim in our example, and then that same individual seeks to assert her
accident claim in a subsequent, individual proceeding, merger (if the
plaintiff class prevailed) or bar (if it failed) may prevent recovery.  Under
this scenario, some members of the class in the initial proceeding are
asked to sacrifice their related claims in order to permit the class claim to
move forward.
In the case of issue preclusion, the potential for conflict arises from
the overlap of factual or legal issues among the multiple claims.  If there
is a sufficient overlap of issues between one claim that is common to an
entire class and other claims possessed only by some class members, an
adverse determination of key issues in the common claim could preclude
absentees from establishing the required elements in their related claims.
This is so, of course, even where claim preclusion would not impose an
absolute barrier to recovery.  Thus, in our example, suppose that the
plaintiff class loses on its claim for economic damages because the finder
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of fact concludes that the automobiles in question were not defective.  If
the members of the class with accident claims seek to maintain individual
lawsuits for their personal injuries, they may be estopped from relitigat-
ing the issue of defect and hence unable to recover.  Under this scenario,
some members of the class are asked to assume a greater risk when they
participate in the class proceeding, since an adverse finding on key issues
in the resolution of the common claim may fatally undermine their abil-
ity to recover on their individual claims.
Some of these preclusion problems may seem to beg simple re-
sponses.  Where claim preclusion is concerned, perhaps an individual
claim that is unsuitable for classwide treatment is best described as one
that “could not have been brought” in the class proceeding and hence
should not be subject to claim preclusion.  Similarly, established limita-
tions on issue preclusion like those making reference to the ability and
incentives of litigants to contest or appeal an issue might sometimes miti-
gate the potential for conflict within the class.33  Such responses may ulti-
mately correspond to defensible doctrinal solutions in some instances.
That is not always the case, however, and the apparent simplicity of these
responses is deceptive.
Class certification and preclusion both entail inquiries that are diffi-
cult to discuss in the abstract.34  In embarking upon a discussion of the
intersection of these two doctrines, it will be useful to have a vocabulary
of claims, claimants, and facts to draw upon for reference.35  I begin with
an overview of two of the areas of class litigation in which courts have
begun to confront the potential conflicts of interest created by preclusion
doctrine most directly:  Title VII suits in the wake of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, and tort class actions in the wake of Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor.36
1. Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. — Perhaps the highest
profile area of class litigation where preclusion problems have begun to
appear is in the Title VII arena.  The problems arise out of the 1991
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and an attempt to expand the
33. See 18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 465 (“[I]t may be R
appropriate to reduce the complexity of class litigation by imposing special limits on the
basic transactional approach to defining a claim or cause of action.”); see also Restatement
(Second) of Judgments §§ 28–29 (1982) (setting forth broadly worded qualifications to use
of issue preclusion in an F2 proceeding); 18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, R
§ 4455, at 490 (offering example of class action relating to economic damages and
concluding that prosaic limitations on issue preclusion would militate against any estoppel
in individual action by class member for personal injury).
34. Professor Cooper’s plaintive footnote in his report from the front lines of the
Advisory Committee, where he despairs of providing a concise explanation of Amchem, is
emblematic where class actions are concerned.  See Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy)
Future of Class Actions, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 923, 925 n.2 (1998).
35. See David L. Shapiro, Civil Procedure:  Preclusion in Civil Actions 22–24 (2001)
[hereinafter Shapiro, Preclusion] (offering a simple factual scenario as a frequent point of
reference in subsequent discussions of preclusion doctrine).
36. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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relief available to aggrieved plaintiffs that has produced unforeseen
complications.
Under the original version of the Civil Rights Act, the principal rem-
edies available to a plaintiff in a Title VII case were injunctive or declara-
tory relief and equitable restitution in the form of back pay.  With the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress significantly expanded the range of
remedies under Title VII, authorizing plaintiffs who suffer from inten-
tional discrimination to request compensatory damages for emotional or
other harms, punitive damages, and a jury trial for the resolution of these
claims.37  Though crafted as a pro-plaintiff reform, the 1991 Act has had
the unforeseen consequence of throwing into doubt the amenability of
Title VII claims to class certification.  This doubt has unfolded in two
stages.  The first concerns the proper treatment of these expanded Title
VII actions under Rule 23(b) and is the issue that has received the lion’s
share of attention.  The second, which implicates preclusion doctrine,
has resulted from associated attempts by class counsel to circumvent
these Rule 23(b) problems.
When the relief available in a Title VII action was primarily injunc-
tive in nature, with restitutional damages occupying only a subsidiary
role, Rule 23(b)(2) served as the principal vehicle for the prosecution of
employment discrimination claims.  Proceeding under (b)(2) enabled
plaintiffs to certify a class without satisfying the additional requirements
of predominance and superiority and freed them from providing the
costly notice and opt-out rights that Rule 23(b)(3) would demand.  When
Congress expanded the relief for intentional discrimination to include
compensatory and punitive damages, a question arose as to whether
(b)(2) treatment remained appropriate for these suits.38  As a purely doc-
trinal matter, the scope of Rule 23(b)(2) may not extend to suits in which
compensatory damages constitute a substantial portion of the relief re-
quested by the class.39  As a constitutional matter, notice to class mem-
bers and an opportunity to opt out may be required for multistate class
actions that involve the adjudication of substantial monetary claims, even
when those claims are admixed with an overarching request for injunc-
tive relief.40
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
38. As Judge Easterbrook recently wrote, “the statutory authorization in 1991 of
damages recoveries for employees in Title VII cases has complicated what used to be an
almost automatic class certification in pattern-or-practice cases.”  Allen v. Int’l Truck &
Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2004).
39. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendment (“The
subdivision does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively
or predominantly to money damages.”); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121
(1994) (per curiam) (suggesting possibility that class action seeking substantial money
damages can only be certified under (b)(3) and dismissing writ of certiorari for review of
constitutional question as improvidently granted).
40. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (establishing
notice and opportunity to opt out as minimal requirements for establishing personal
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The most dramatic response to this change in the Title VII landscape
has come from the Fifth Circuit in its much-noted decision in Allison v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp., which upheld a district court’s denial of certification
in a run-of-the-mill employment discrimination suit because of the com-
plications introduced by the 1991 Act.41  The plaintiffs in the case had
raised both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims against a
Citgo plant, seeking both injunctive and monetary damages, and the dis-
trict court refused to certify on the grounds that the addition of the dam-
ages claims made certification under Rule 23 impossible.  The Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Rule 23(b)(2) unavailable for the certification of the hybrid injunctive
and monetary claims in the case, and it strongly suggested that (b)(2)
might never be available for Title VII claims that include requests for
substantial monetary damages.42  It also affirmed the lower court’s find-
ing that this hybrid action—and, the court implied, almost any such ac-
tion—could not satisfy the requirements of superiority and predomi-
nance under Rule 23(b)(3).43  These two holdings—both part of the
“first stage” of the doctrinal response to the 1991 Act as that term is used
above—have placed significant limitations on the ability of any plaintiff in
the Fifth Circuit to maintain a Title VII action for classwide relief that
includes a request for damages.  The Seventh Circuit has followed the
Fifth in its Rule 23(b) holding44 (though the Second Circuit has declined
to45), and the cases have been the subject of much controversy.46
jurisdiction in class suit for damages); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897–99
(7th Cir. 1999) (assuming that due process requires these procedures when substantial
monetary claims are at stake).  The constitutional issue is a bit more complicated, as
explained infra Part II.B.3.b.
41. 151 F.3d 402, 410–26 (5th Cir. 1998).
42. Id. at 417–18 & n.13.
43. Id. at 418–20.
44. See Ingersoll, 195 F.3d at 897–99.
45. Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162–67 (2d Cir. 2001)
(rejecting uncompromising rule of Allison and Ingersoll in favor of “ad-hoc approach”).
46. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit:  Mandatory Class Actions in the New
Millennium and the Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 177, 207–14
(criticizing ungenerous approach of Allison and Ingersoll); Brad Seligman & Jocelyn D.
Larkin, Lessons in Class Certification, Trial, Oct. 2001, at 36, 36–37 (describing impact of
Allison and its progeny on Title VII litigation).
Subsequent decisions by the Fifth Circuit have blunted some of the more far-reaching
consequences of Allison’s Rule 23(b) holding.  The court has held that a court’s
certification inquiry must proceed on a “claim-by-claim” rather than an “holistic” basis in
order to preserve the ability of Title VII plaintiffs to pursue class actions whenever possible.
See Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating an approach
to framing the analysis that I scrutinize infra Part III).  It has adopted more forgiving
standards for determining when Title VII damages calculations may be made consistently
with the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), see In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408,
416–20 (5th Cir. 2004), and, in an unpublished opinion, one panel has authorized
certification of an “inconsistent adjudications” Title VII suit under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) to
avoid Allison problems, see Smith v. Crystian, 91 F. Appx. 952, 954–55 (5th Cir. 2004).
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After issuing these core holdings, the Allison court went on to reject
several alternative strategies offered by the plaintiffs by which they hoped
to utilize a bifurcated action to finesse the certification problem.  In each
of these strategies, plaintiffs proposed to litigate only the portions of the
case that could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in the initial phase of
the suit and to leave the resolution of the damages claims for later in the
proceeding.47  The appellate court rejected these attempts on the
strength of an aggressive reading of the Seventh Amendment.  The
Amendment requires factual questions that overlap claims for damages
and equitable relief in a single action to be submitted to a jury for resolu-
tion.48  The court found that the region of overlap between disparate im-
pact and pattern or practice claims was so great that it would require the
empanelling of a jury in any initial, equitable resolution of the disparate
impact claims.49  That being so, the court went on to find, later juries
empanelled to decide damages claims in the succeeding phase of litiga-
tion would inevitably run afoul of the Reexamination Clause by making
independent findings on those overlapping issues.50  The Fifth Circuit
thus concluded that the difficulty of avoiding Seventh Amendment
problems prevented the use of bifurcation to litigate both the equitable
and the monetary Title VII claims in a single class action proceeding.
Finally, as if tying up a loose end, the Fifth Circuit added the follow-
ing sentence at the close of its Seventh Amendment analysis:  “Nor may
[the damages claims] be advanced in a subsequent class action without be-
ing barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, because all of the com-
mon factual issues will already have been decided, or could have been
decided, in the prior litigation.”51  It is this part of the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion, addressing the second “stage” of the doctrinal response to the
1991 Act, that is relevant for present purposes.
47. There was some confusion as to whether the plaintiffs proposed litigating both the
disparate impact claim and the liability portions of the disparate treatment claim in such a
bifurcated action, or instead sought to litigate only the disparate impact claim.  The Fifth
Circuit concluded that the district court had discretion to reject either scenario.  See
Allison, 151 F.3d at 420–26.
48. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472–73 (1962) (holding that right to
jury trial on legal issues applies regardless of whether legal claims are “incidental” to
equitable claims); Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959)
(holding that “only under the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims”).
49. Allison, 151 F.3d at 422–25.
50. This finding was a debatable one, as the dissent pointed out.  See id. at 433–34
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (arguing that issues to be determined during proposed stages of
litigation “are separate and distinct and the second jury will not reexamine issues decided
by the first jury”).  Indeed, the opinion is rather vague in its Seventh Amendment analysis
and does not make this last step in its reasoning explicit, see id. at 423–25, leaving it to the
dissent to spell out the steps of the majority’s logic by way of refuting them, see id. at 433
(Dennis, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 425 (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Nilsen v.
City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 559–64 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc)).
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For reasons that should be obvious, the court’s perfunctory state-
ment about the preclusive consequences of conducting two separate pro-
ceedings was wrong in several ways at once.  Issue preclusion never ap-
plies to issues that “could have been decided” in a prior litigation; it
requires actual litigation of issues that were necessary to a prior judg-
ment.52  And claim preclusion does not necessarily operate to preclude
litigation of factually related claims in subsequent class proceedings, as
Cooper itself made clear in construing an earlier version of the same stat-
ute that was at issue in Allison. Perhaps the court was proceeding on
some misguided instinct that it should not be possible to accomplish
through successive lawsuits what the Seventh Amendment would prevent
a court from doing in a single, bifurcated proceeding.53  (This instinct
was misguided, of course, because the Supreme Court had already re-
jected that proposition some twenty years earlier.54)  Whatever its
thought process, the majority should have realized that it was traveling a
confused path when it produced this convoluted misstatement on preclu-
sion.  But it did not, and Allison has produced confusion over the preclu-
sive effect that the certification of a (b)(2) class action for equitable relief
52. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or
law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”); id. § 27 cmt. e (“A
judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to issues which might have been but
were not litigated and determined in the prior action.”).
53. Professor Woolley examines a similar proposition in his article discussing Judge
Posner’s opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), and the
role of the Reexamination Clause in the certification of “issue classes.”  See Patrick
Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83
Iowa L. Rev. 499 (1998) [hereinafter Woolley, Reexamination Clause].  Woolley concludes
that the Seventh Amendment should be interpreted in a dynamic and nonrigid fashion
that would permit the use of issue classes, bifurcation, and other mechanisms involving
overlapping issues, provided that doing so will not create undue confusion for juries.  See
id. at 517–42.
54. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333–37 (1979), in which the Court
authorized the limited use of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in federal question
cases, presented a Seventh Amendment situation similar to this “shadow” question in
Allison.  Parklane involved two proceedings, the first an enforcement action brought by the
government and tried before the bench in equity, the second a damages action brought by
a class of stockholders and tried before a jury.  The plaintiffs sought to benefit from a
finding in the earlier enforcement action that Parklane had issued a false and misleading
proxy statement.  Parklane argued that applying an estoppel in a damages action would
violate its right to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment.  The Court disagreed,
finding that “if an issue common to both legal and equitable claims was first determined by
a judge, relitigation of the issue before a jury [in a separate action] might be foreclosed by
res judicata or collateral estoppel,” even if a different result would obtain if the two claims
were joined in the same action.  Id. at 334.
Thus, to the extent that Allison’s statement about preclusion relied upon a belief that
any limitation imposed by the Seventh Amendment in the structuring of a single,
bifurcated action must be replicated by preclusion doctrine in successive actions, that
belief was mistaken.
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will have upon plaintiffs’ subsequent attempts to recover on individual
damages claims in a Title VII case.55
And indeed, though Allison’s own statement on the preclusion issue
is somewhat nonsensical, the 1991 Act does give rise to issue preclusion
consequences that require close attention.  A court’s resolution of a dis-
parate impact claim in a stand-alone proceeding will often involve issues
of fact that overlap the elements of an intentional discrimination claim.
An unfavorable result in the equitable proceeding therefore threatens to
preclude class members from litigating their damages claims in individual
suits, since an adverse finding on an overlapping issue might prevent a
class member from establishing an element of his claim.56  A victory in
the equitable proceeding, however, would not offer the concomitant ben-
efit of a guaranteed victory in the damages claims, since a plaintiff in a
disparate treatment claim will always have to establish additional facts re-
lating to her individual circumstances:  causation, the absence of a non-
pretextual explanation for the adverse employment action, and so
forth.57  Given these risks, are the interests of the class well served by
authorizing class counsel to litigate the equitable claim?
If only some members of the class have viable damages claims for
individual discrimination, as will usually be the case, the problem be-
comes more acute.  The plaintiffs whose high-value damages claims are
placed in jeopardy by the potential issue preclusive effects of the equita-
ble action will likely be risk averse, willing to settle the (b)(2) action for
modest structural reforms in order to avoid endangering their damages
claims.  The plaintiffs who have no hope of substantial monetary recov-
ery, in contrast, will be more interested in going for broke in seeking a
litigated outcome, since they have no adverse preclusion consequences to
fear.  If issue preclusion operates in its normal mode in such cases, an ex
ante conflict can arise between the incentives of class members with via-
ble damages claims and those without in any (b)(2) action, even if those
damages claims are neither litigated in the action nor directly threatened
through an application of claim preclusion.
55. See George Rutherglen, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Major Issues in the Federal Law of
Employment Discrimination 98–99 (4th ed. 2004), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/EmplDis4.pdf/$file/EmplDis4.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“The overall effect of the [Allison] decision certainly is not to increase the availability of
class actions in Title VII cases, and the ironic consequence is that the expanded remedies
created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 might restrict the procedures formerly available to
victims of discrimination.”).
56. The Supreme Court makes a related point in Cooper in discussing the factual
relatedness of classwide and individual discrimination claims.  See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve
Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984) (“[T]he prior adjudication [of the classwide
pattern or practice claim] may well prove beneficial to the Bank in the [individual
discrimination] action.”).
57. Professors Silver and Baker offer a useful discussion of these potentially divergent
incentives in employment litigation.  See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose:
The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1465,
1491–94 (1998).
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In one post-Allison decision, Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Produc-
tion, Inc., a district court that apprehended some of these potential con-
flicts proclaimed itself powerless to guard against the “very real possibility,
if not . . . probability, that another court of competent jurisdiction could
determine that the proposed class members would be barred from bring-
ing individual actions for damages” if it were to certify a class for injunc-
tive relief.58  Invoking the ubiquitous maxim that a court “cannot conclu-
sively determine the res judicata effect of [its own] decision,” the district
court concluded that its only option was to “assess the risk of such a deter-
mination and weigh it in the consideration of the certification of a
class.”59  The court then denied certification altogether, explaining that it
was unable to assure itself that a Title VII action could be structured in a
way that would serve the interests of the class.60
Thus, following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, litigation of Title VII
cases presents a series of preclusion-related problems.  There is a claim
preclusion question:  Does the decision to assert only claims for injunc-
tive relief on behalf of a class of employees require the plaintiffs to sacri-
fice (or “risk” sacrificing) their individual damages claims outright?  It
presents an issue preclusion question:  Would an adverse result in an in-
junctive suit have issue preclusive effects that could sound the death knell
for individual damages claims, and how does that risk affect the suitability
of the action for class treatment?  It presents a question about conflicts of
interest:  If only some members of the class have damages claims to lose,
whether through claim or issue preclusion, is it possible to accommodate
the interests of both groups of employees in a single injunctive action?
And it presents a question about the desirability of class treatment in the
first instance:  If the use of a class action to litigate claims for equitable
relief will inevitably entail a serious risk of sacrificing the damages claims
of class members, does that risk call into question the propriety of pro-
ceeding under Rule 23?  Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s precipitous con-
clusion in Allison, it is entirely possible to answer these questions in a
fashion that enables plaintiffs to pursue the forms of relief contemplated
in the 1991 Act, as Parts II and III explain.
2. Tort Class Actions. — The range of preclusion problems that arises
out of the bifurcated litigation typical of Title VII cases has also begun to
find more general expression in class actions involving tort claims.  This
has been particularly true following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Amchem, which imposed strict constraints on the certification of personal
injury claims and has encouraged a concomitant change in the character
58. 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
59. Id.
60. See id. at 244–45 (“The class members the Plaintiffs seek to represent must be
given the opportunity to pursue intentional discrimination claims and seek monetary
damages, and certifying this class may very well deny them just that chance.”).
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of tort class actions.61 Amchem did not produce an appreciable reduction
in the rate at which class action lawsuits are brought to federal court
(other than a short lived blip that surrounded the decision itself).62  Even
so, the constellation of claims asserted in these suits appears to be shifting
as plaintiffs’ attorneys attempt to craft class proceedings that will satisfy
the new restrictions.63  If this trend continues, preclusion issues promise
61. The most immediate impact of Amchem has been felt in the federal courts, as the
holding of the case related only to Rule 23.  Since many states have chosen to track the
Federal Rules closely and view federal decisions construing those rules as authoritative, the
Court’s ruling has also had a doctrinal impact upon state class litigation.  See, e.g.,
Hoffman v. Cohen, 538 A.2d 1096, 1097–98 (Del. 1988) (noting that rules of procedure in
Delaware were patterned after Federal Rules and so cases construing Federal Rules are
persuasive authority); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 294 A.2d 7, 11 (N.J. 1972)
(describing New Jersey’s class action provision as “a replica of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as amended in 1966”).
62. In 2002, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules commissioned the Federal
Judicial Center to perform a comprehensive study aimed at determining the effects of
Amchem and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), on federal class actions.  See
Bob Niemic & Tom Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Effects of Amchem/Ortiz on the Filing of
Federal Class Actions:  Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Sept. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/AmChem.pdf/$file/AmChem.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter FJC Filing Rate Report].  The study
examined the rates at which class actions were brought to federal court (through original
filing or removal) from January 1994 to June 2001 and used a time series regression model
in an attempt to identify significant causal relationships between the changes in filing rates
and the Supreme Court’s two major opinions on certification.  See id. at 4–5 (describing
contents of database used in study); id. at 34–35 (describing methodology employed in
data analysis).
The rate at which class action lawsuits were brought to federal court increased steadily
over the course of the study period.  The only significant deviation from this trend was a
decrease in the filing rate of nonsecurities class actions immediately following the Court’s
decision in Amchem, followed by a renewal of the upward trend in the wake of Ortiz. See id.
at 6–10 (describing overview of findings).  While it is difficult to draw robust conclusions
about the causal effect of a single Supreme Court decision on a decision as complex as
whether and where to file a class action lawsuit, the study tentatively concluded that the
correlation between Amchem and the brief decrease in filing rates was not purely
coincidental.  See id. at 1–2 (summarizing findings).  The increase in filing rates following
Ortiz is counterintuitive, since the decision imposed further limitations upon the use of
alternative class action strategies to circumvent the holding of Amchem. To the extent that
the two are causally linked, the upward trend might best be explained by the fact that Ortiz
clarified the doctrinal landscape following Amchem and ended a period during which
plaintiff attorneys may have refrained from filing new class actions while they reassessed
the best strategies to employ.
63. It is difficult to offer any comprehensive assessment of the breadth and scope of
class action lawsuits, particularly since reliable data often are not available from state court
systems.  See FJC Filing Rate Report, supra note 62, at 3 (excluding rates of state filings R
from class action study due to lack of available data).  Nonetheless, there is good reason to
think that the profile of class action lawsuits is undergoing a change.  Some key state
jurisdictions have begun to impose and enforce Amchem-like restrictions on the use of
omnibus class actions, see, e.g., S.W. Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 433–36 (Tex.
2000) (requiring strict enforcement of predominance and superiority requirements in
damages class action), and federal courts have been turning away nationwide class actions
that attempt to sweep a broad array of claims into a single proceeding, see, e.g., In re
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to figure prominently in the assessment of these more tailored tort
classes.
One of the most notable trends among tort class actions has been a
shift toward proceeding under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), rather than (b)(3),
even when class members possess substantial damages claims.  In a move
paralleling some of the core issues that played out in Allison, class counsel
in a broad range of cases have either sought to characterize damages
claims as appurtenant or subordinate to equitable claims when the dam-
ages claims might be suitable for class treatment, or else to carve damages
claims out of a suit entirely and litigate only equitable claims when class
treatment of the damages claims is clearly not possible.64  Courts con-
fronting such efforts in the posture of a recognizing forum—that is, in an
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone/Firestone I), 288 F.3d
1012, 1018–21 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting nationwide class action in product defect case due
to serious predominance and manageability problems created by divergent choice of law
rules); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323,
343–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (refusing to certify multistate class action where need for
individually tailored environmental remediation for every class member made certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) inappropriate).  The most noteworthy exception in the federal courts
to this recent trend—the massive nationwide class action settlement being administered in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to address the heart valve damage inflicted by the diet
drugs commonly known as Fen-Phen—has been a spectacular failure that will not likely
invite emulation.  See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine)
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1023, Civil Action No. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (granting certification for nationwide settlement-only class action
encompassing approximately six million consumers with potential heart valve injuries);
Class Counsel’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Joint Motion by Wyeth, Class Counsel,
and the Seventh Amendment Liaison Committee for the Entry of an Order Preliminarily
Approving the Seventh Amendment to the Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement
and for the Entry of Related Orders:  (1) Directing the Resumption of the Parallel
Processing Program; (2) Approving a Procedure for Resolving Outstanding Post-Audit
Determination; and (3) Approving the Eighth Amendment to the Settlement Agreement
at 38–39, In re Diet Drugs (MDL No. 1023, Civil Action No. 99-20593) (describing
settlement as hovering on brink of complete collapse).
More broadly, class counsels’ decisions about where to file a lawsuit and how to
structure the action will always be influenced by their assumptions about the reception that
they are likely to receive from the certifying judge—a common sense proposition to which
the Federal Judicial Center recently lent credence with an attorney survey seeking to
quantify the criteria that class counsel use in choosing between a federal and a state forum.
See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Attorney Reports on
the Impact of Amchem and Ortiz on Choice of a Federal or State Forum in Class Action
Litigation 5–10 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
AmOrt02.pdf/$file/AmOrt02.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter FJC
Forum Choice Report] (summarizing results of attorney survey, which found strong
tendency to seek out most hospitable forum).  Although the study found that Amchem and
Ortiz were not foremost in the minds of most attorneys selecting between federal and state
fora, the decisions have had some effect.  See id. at 6.  As more omnibus class actions are
rejected on the authority of those two decisions, one can expect that class counsel will
attempt to pare down their lawsuits in order to satisfy the newly imposed standards.
64. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 805,
820–24 (1997) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Conflicts] (describing pre-Ortiz attempts to use the
limited-fund class action to get around notice, opt-out, and predominance requirements).
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F2 proceeding where a defendant seeks to rely upon an F1 judgment for
a preclusion defense—are fairly consistent in their reactions, generally
rejecting expansive claim preclusion defenses but entertaining issue pre-
clusion arguments more seriously.65  When courts confront these issues
in an initial proceeding, however—that is, as an F1 forum—they fre-
quently repeat the complaint of powerlessness heard above in the Zachery
decision and profess themselves unable to protect the rights of class
members against possible preclusion in the future.
A recent decision from the Southern District of New York, In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liability Litigation,66 is typical
of the latter trend.  In 2000 and 2001, property owners around the coun-
try brought suit over the contamination of their well water by MTBE, a
gasoline additive.  Collectively, these plaintiffs named an enormous
group of oil companies as defendants, comprising every producer of
MTBE that they could identify.  The suits were consolidated by the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and transferred to Judge Shira
Scheindlin’s court,67 where the plaintiffs asked to be certified as class rep-
resentatives for a suit encompassing all property owners in Florida, Cali-
fornia, New York, and Illinois whose well water was contaminated by de-
65. See, e.g., Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1290–94 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying
Alaska law to deny claim preclusion defense of prison officials in civil rights suit initiated by
a prisoner alleged to be precluded by consent decree in an earlier suit); In re Jackson
Lockdown/MCO Cases, 568 F. Supp. 869, 891–93 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (disallowing claim
preclusion defense but entertaining issue preclusion defense in individual suit by prisoner
following class action); Jahn ex rel. Jahn v. ORCR, Inc., 92 P.3d 984, 985 (Colo. 2004) (en
banc) (adopting “absolute” rule that suits for injunctive relief filed under state rule
23(b)(2) never have claim preclusive effect on damages claims).  Some courts have
precluded individual claimants for failure to intervene in a class action and assert their
individual claims, but most such opinions are sufficiently old as to have limited continuing
relevance.  See, e.g., Int’l Prisoners’ Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806, 809–10 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (barring prisoner who received notice of class proceeding but failed to intervene
and raise individual claims from pursuing claims in subsequent suit).
To the extent that such opinions rely upon a general duty of class members to appear
and intervene when they have notice of a suit, they are undermined by Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 762–65 (1989), which disclaimed any general duty to intervene on the part of
affected individuals with notice of a pending action.  The particular intervention issue
decided by the Court in Martin was one of the topics that Congress addressed in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, reversing portions of the Court’s holding.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(n)(1)(B) (2000).  Even that statutory imposition of a duty to intervene was controversial
at the time it was enacted.  Respected commentators expressed the view that the provision
might violate the due process rights of interested nonparties, and Congress was sufficiently
concerned to insert a (redundant) proviso foreclosing any application of the statute that
would violate the Constitution.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(2)(D) (stating that nothing in
the subsection shall be construed to “authorize or permit the denial to any person of the
due process of law required by the Constitution”); Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of
Individualism, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 965, 971–72 (1993) (discussing majority opinion in Martin
as articulating a “right of participation” that appears to have constitutional stature).
66. 209 F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
67. Id. at 328–30 (recounting procedural history of case).
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tectable levels of MTBE.68  The plaintiffs proceeded under state tort
theories along with a claim for failure to notify under the federal Toxic
Substances Control Act, seeking injunctive relief to remediate each of
their individual cases of contamination.  Various unnamed class mem-
bers, from whom class counsel obtained declarations in support of certifi-
cation, made clear that they also had claims for individual damages that
they wanted to preserve,69 even though the lead plaintiffs apparently ac-
knowledged that such claims could not be litigated on a classwide basis.70
There were more than a few obstacles to this multistate, multi-inci-
dent, multidefendant omnibus class action, and the court denied certifi-
cation on many different grounds.71  It addressed the question of preclu-
sion under the rubric of adequacy of representation.  As with the Title VII
examples discussed above, this request for purely injunctive relief raised
both claim and issue preclusion concerns for the related damages claims.
In the case of claim preclusion, it raised the possibility, albeit one usually
rejected in F2 courts, that the maintenance of an injunctive class action
would bar individual class members from pursuing damages claims, even
if those claims could not have been asserted in the class proceeding.  In
the case of issue preclusion, the suit raised the more serious concern that
adverse findings on the request for injunctive relief might preclude the
property owners from establishing the elements of their damages claims
in subsequent individual proceedings.
One might have expected the court to conclude that it could resolve
the concern over claim preclusion rather easily, given the willingness of
most F2 courts to entertain individual claims that could not have been
litigated on a classwide basis in an earlier proceeding.72  This conclusion
68. Id. at 334–35 (stating class definition).
69. The declarations were filed in support of the argument that the MTBE problem
was widespread.  As the court explained, “Plaintiffs also provide declarations from other
residents from New York, Florida, California and Illinois to illustrate the extent of the
MTBE problem as well as the proliferation of MTBE-related lawsuits.  Many of the
declarants seek to recover for personal injuries allegedly caused by MTBE.”  Id. at 334.  As
the court later explained, those damages claims were potentially lucrative:  “[S]everal
declarants—who are class members by definition—have already . . . [employed tort
lawyers, on a contingency basis,] and have achieved results . . . .”  Id. at 350.
70. The plaintiffs only sought injunctive relief before Judge Scheindlin, see id. at
328–29, though they did attempt to fit their injunctive claims under Rule 23(b)(3) as an
alternative method of proceeding, see id. at 349–51.
71. See, e.g., id. at 337–38 (denying certification because class members did not meet
typicality requirement); id. at 342–45 (describing impropriety of class treatment due to
necessarily individualized nature of injunctive relief); id. at 348–49 (denying certification
due to impossibility of binding absent plaintiffs to adverse result, since time when MTBE
contamination occurs usually cannot be determined).
72. Wright, Miller, and Cooper are in accord:
The basic effort to limit class adjudication as close as possible to matters common
to members of the class frequently requires that nonparticipating members of the
class remain free to pursue individual actions that would be merged or barred by
claim preclusion had a prior individual action been brought or the relief
demanded in the class action. . . . [A]n individual who has suffered particular
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might not hold true in all cases, as the next subparts discuss, but it would
often provide a sufficient ex ante answer to claim preclusion problems,
leaving only the need to scrutinize the issue preclusive implications of the
proceeding.  And issue preclusion did raise some legitimate concerns in
the MTBE litigation.  The levels of contamination alleged by members of
the class varied widely, suggesting that only some members of the class
(and perhaps only a small number) had substantial, positive-value claims
for monetary damages.73  The potential for adverse issue preclusive ef-
fects was patent here, as would be true in almost any tort case where class
counsel proposes to pursue only a limited form of classwide relief, since
the elements necessary to establish liability would be the same regardless
of the form of the remedy requested.  The primary focus of the MTBE
court’s attention should have been issue preclusion.
But the court did not discuss issue preclusion at all.  Instead, it based
its preclusion ruling entirely on concerns over claim preclusion.  While it
acknowledged the significant number of cases in which F2 courts have
rejected claim preclusion defenses based upon earlier injunctive class ac-
tions, the court dismissed those cases as “alleging civil rights violations”
(primarily on behalf of prisoners), rather than tort claims.74  Even if
“most [F2] courts” would probably embrace the treatment of claim pre-
clusion embodied in the civil rights precedents, the district court con-
cluded, it “could not ensure” that the MTBE plaintiffs would be able to
pursue their damages claims in subsequent actions.75  In support of this
proposition, the court pointed to several cases in which other F1 courts
had found class representatives to be inadequate because of their willing-
ness to forgo damages claims in the hope of satisfying the requirements
of certification—a slightly different issue, as Part III explains.  Invoking
the ubiquitous preclusion maxim for good measure, the court concluded
that the risk of adverse claim preclusion consequences in future cases was
unmanageable, rendering the named plaintiffs inadequate to represent
the class.76
Judge Scheindlin was not venturing into unoccupied terrain in issu-
ing this ruling.  A growing number of other courts, while failing to ana-
lyze the potentially significant conflicts of interest that issue preclusion
might produce in class proceedings, have placed dispositive weight on the
injury as a result of practices enjoined in a class action should remain free to seek
a damages remedy even though claim preclusion would defeat a second action
had the first action been an individual suit for the same injunctive relief.
18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 461–62. R
73. In re MTBE, 209 F.R.D. at 338–39 (embracing finding that only “few absent class
members” have sufficient levels of contamination to support substantial damages claims).
74. Id. at 339.  The court did not explain how this difference in the underlying claim
might bear upon the preclusion analysis, though the instinct that it might be relevant was
not entirely unwarranted as infra Part III explains.
75. Id. at 339–40 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 340 (“[O]nly subsequent courts will determine the res judicata effect of any
judgment . . . .” (citing 7B Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 1789, at 245 & n.16)). R
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specter of claim preclusion.  Although there are very few reported deci-
sions in which an F2 court has actually recognized a claim preclusion
defense preventing a plaintiff from recovering on a claim not litigated in
an earlier class proceeding,77 many F1 courts still refuse to allow class
actions to proceed on the basis of a vague apprehension of “risk” that
such a parade of horribles might nonetheless result for the hapless plain-
tiffs currently before them.78
This is not an acceptable way to administer an adjudicatory system.
We would ordinarily be unsatisfied if a court refused to provide relief on
the basis of its own professed “uncertainty” as to the proper resolution of
a legal question.79  The few situations in which we formally recognize un-
certainty as an appropriate basis for refusing to proceed—usually under
the rubric of abstention—are exceptional in nature, frequently impelled
by concerns over comity between sovereigns, and generally accompanied
by the promise of comparable relief in an alternative forum.80  The deni-
77. I am aware of only one such decision—Int’l Prisoners’ Union v. Rizzo, 356 F.
Supp. 806, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1973)—and that case placed significant reliance upon a finding
that the plaintiff had notice of the earlier suit, had an opportunity to intervene in that
action and assert his individual claim, and made a considered choice not to do so.
78. See, e.g., Clark v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A.8:00-1217-24, 2001 WL
1946329, at *3–*4 (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2001) (stating that offering only some claims for class
certification when other, more lucrative claims could not be certified “defeats adequate
representation since it places absent class members at the risk of having other claims
forever barred by res judicata”); Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 550–51
(D. Minn. 1999) (refusing to certify because the “possible prejudice to class members”
resulting from claim preclusion in the future “is simply too great”); Feinstein v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to certify class action
for economic losses where plaintiffs also had personal injury claims because of “significant
risks” that class members would “later [be told] that they had impermissibly split a single
cause of action”); Millett v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. Civ.A. CV-98-555, 2000 WL 359979, at *9
(Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000) (explaining that asserting claims for injunctive relief while
leaving personal injury claims unraised places class members at risk of subsequent claim
preclusion defense); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 593, 601–02 (App. Div.
1998) (stating that paring down class claims to avoid certification problems creates
impermissible “risk” of adverse preclusive effects).
A substantial number of courts do continue to resist the siren song of this diffuse, risk-
based argument when considering class actions outside the “civil rights” context.  See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64, 79–84 (M.D. Tenn. 2004)
(considering many of these authorities and distinguishing or rejecting them); Jahn ex rel.
Jahn v. ORCR, Inc., 92 P.3d 984, 987–91 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (adopting restrictive
interpretation of state Rule 23(b)(2) for all types of action).
79. There is, of course, an ongoing discussion of the virtue of judicial passivity when it
comes to the constitutional review of legislative enactments in contentious areas of social
disputation.  See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 875, 892–95 (2003) (summarizing and critiquing debate over “passive virtue” of
restraint in judicial review, most frequently associated with James Thayer and Alexander
Bickel).  The principles of political theory that motivate that debate obviously are not
implicated here.
80. The Court has considered and rejected the suggestion that uncertainty as to the
proper resolution of state law claims might offer a sufficient basis for a federal court to
decline to exercise its diversity jurisdiction.  See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,
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als of certification discussed above have none of these mitigating quali-
ties,81 and they rely upon a declaration of uncertainty that is no less dis-
quieting for its attenuated quality.  These courts have said, in effect, “I
know that you have proposed a class action that may be properly main-
tainable, but I won’t allow you to proceed because I must protect the
absentees from the possibility that a subsequent court might misapply my
judgment.”  This is abdication masquerading as diligence.
But it would be inappropriate to single these courts out exclusively
for criticism.  These are, after all, the rare judges who have taken time at
the certification stage to recognize and consider the preclusive effect of
their judgments upon class members.  That fact alone distinguishes them
from the great majority of trial courts, which pass over the issue com-
pletely.  These judges have been operating from a presumption—a
flawed presumption, as Part II explains, but one with a formidable pedi-
gree in the form of the ubiquitous preclusion maxim—that it is impossi-
ble for a rendering forum to resolve preclusion problems in any mean-
ingful fashion, leaving the rights of class members always contingent
upon the whims of a future, recognizing forum.  Given the appalling state
of class litigation in some courts,82 one can sympathize with the desire of
these judges not to yoke the class members under their supervision to an
uncertain fate.83  Even so, the solutions that these courts have produced
234–37 (1943) (“[W]e can discern in [Congress’s diversity jurisdiction policy] no
recognition of a policy which would exclude cases from the jurisdiction merely because
they involve state law or because the law is uncertain or difficult to determine.”).  Where
other public policy concerns militate in favor of abstention, and an adequate remedy exists
in another forum, the Court has left the door open for declining jurisdiction, id., though it
has viewed such arguments with skepticism.  A good discussion of this line of cases may be
found in Lewis Yelin, Note, Burford Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
1871, 1883–93 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2000) (recognizing “novel[ty]” of
state law claim as appropriate basis for declining to exercise court’s discretionary
supplemental jurisdiction).
81. Indeed, if Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Bridgestone/Firestone II finds general
acceptance, these courts’ professions of uncertainty might also bind others that do not
share their reticence.  See In re Bridgestone/Firestone Tires Prods. Liab. Litig.
(Bridgestone/Firestone II), 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003) (issuing injunction to prevent
any trial court from certifying nationwide class that Seventh Circuit had previously held
uncertifiable).
82. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which gained passage immediately before
this Article went to press, includes findings in which Congress expressed particularly harsh
criticism toward the negligent and manipulative use of the class action in some courts.  See
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § (2)(a)(1)–(4), 119 Stat. 4, 4–5.
Indeed, even if the courts in the cases discussed above realize that their vague gestures
of “uncertainty” and “risk” are less than satisfying as explanations for a denial of
certification, one can imagine them casting their gaze over the rocky landscape of class
litigation created by some of their sister courts and borrowing from Alfred Hitchcock’s
Mother Sebastian in assuring themselves that they will be safe from censure:  “The
enormity of your stupidity protects us.”  Notorious (RKO Radio Pictures 1946).
83. Professor Burbank captures a similar sentiment in rejecting the argument that the
preclusive effect of federal diversity judgments should be determined by the legal
standards of the recognizing forum, rather than those of the rendering forum:  “From the
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 30 28-MAR-05 13:53
746 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:717
are entirely inadequate, at once conjuring obstacles to certification from
claim preclusion that might be unnecessary, and failing to address issue
preclusion problems that might create actual conflicts within an other-
wise cohesive class.
C. Representation and Strategic Litigation Choices
Not all claim preclusion problems arise out of attempts to pare a
class action down to a certifiable core, nor do they all lend themselves to
the response that contested claims in a subsequent proceeding “could
not have been brought” in the original forum.  Class counsel may have
strategic objectives that require them to choose between more than one
viable approach in structuring a class action, and the choice between
those different approaches may have claim preclusive implications for the
class.  Scenarios of this description do not necessarily create intraclass
conflicts like those explored above.  Rather, they present questions about
the limits of class counsel’s authority to bind absentees to costly decisions
in a class proceeding.
1. Stay-in-State-Court Suits. — Class counsel sometimes perceive a stra-
tegic benefit in pressing only certain legal arguments in their request for
relief, deliberately choosing to forgo potentially meritorious claims.  An
important example of such “argument splitting” is the decision to plead
only state grounds for relief and forgo federal claims in order to keep an
action in state court.  Avoiding a federal forum through such selective
pleading may redound to the benefit of the plaintiffs for a variety of
reasons.
Some class counsel employ this technique simply because they as-
sume that state courts will offer greater judicial flexibility, or lesser judi-
cial diligence, in the supervision of class litigation—to be blunt, they as-
sume that they can get away with more in state court than in federal
court.84  There are certainly many accounts of notorious state court sys-
tems that provide particularly hospitable homes for plaintiffs’ attorneys,85
and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) that was recently signed into
law includes findings that would support some broader generalizations
perspective of litigants, . . . a system of preclusion rules for diversity judgments keyed to the
locus of subsequent litigation would be hopeless, either because it would be unpredictable
or because it would be, functionally, a sham.”  Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion,
supra note 7, at 797. R
84. See Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship:  Is There
Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1709, 1712–19 (2000)
[hereinafter Mullenix, Abandoning the Ship] (describing plaintiffs’ increased reliance
upon state fora on the assumption that state courts will be more receptive to their claims).
85. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va.
L. Rev. 1051, 1057–68 (1996) (criticizing Alabama state courts for inadequate supervision
of class members’ interests in home mortgage lending cases); Mullenix, Abandoning the
Ship, supra note 84, at 1756–58, 1767 (concluding that Florida remains a strongly pro- R
plaintiff jurisdiction but that Texas and Louisiana have begun cracking down on lax
certification standards).
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about the relative merits of these fora.86  One variation on this forum
manipulation that has received a great deal of attention occurs when one
attorney files a nationwide class action on a federal claim and others then
file parallel proceedings in state court, on state law claims, commencing a
rush to settlement in hopes of securing generous fees with the promise of
a global release.87
But not all efforts to stay in state court have a nefarious ring to them.
In a dispute of national scope, for example, class counsel may perceive a
strategic benefit in bringing many statewide class actions, instead of a sin-
gle nationwide proceeding.  While conventional wisdom holds that plain-
tiffs’ attorneys have an incentive to sweep as many plaintiffs as possible
into a single proceeding in order to raise the stakes (and hence their
fees), this tenet does not always hold true.  If the stakes in a dispute are
sufficiently high, even a statewide class action can be a “bet the company”
lawsuit for the defendant, with potential exposure that exceeds its insur-
ance coverage and could jeopardize its viability.  It may give class counsel
a stronger hand to bring multiple statewide suits in such a case, rather
than initiating a single, nationwide proceeding that could be resolved,
and potentially dismissed, all at once.88  If nonmutual offensive issue pre-
clusion is available, of course, bringing multiple statewide actions may
strengthen plaintiffs’ hand even further.  The distinctive tools that a fed-
eral cause of action offers in a federal forum—nationwide service of pro-
cess, consolidation of multidistrict litigation—may work against the plain-
tiffs’ interests here, making relinquishment of the federal claim an
86. See § (2)(a)(1)–(4), 119 Stat. at 4–5.
87. This is a simplified description of the course of events in the Matsushita litigation.
See Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein II), 126 F.3d 1235, 1251–55 (9th Cir. 1997) (recounting
history of proceedings).  Similar races to judgment in parallel proceedings—sometimes
exhibiting the appearance of collusion between class counsel and defendants—have been
common.  See, e.g., In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 200 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir.
2000) (holding that global release in settlement of nationwide class action in Alabama state
court does not require dismissal of exclusively federal claims in parallel proceeding due to
jurisdictional competency requirement in Alabama law).
88. Professor Issacharoff describes a related phenomenon in discussing the
disincentives that sometimes exist to the filing of legitimate and socially desirable class
settlements.  See Issacharoff, Conflicts, supra note 64, at 817–20.  Some courts have R
effectively required, as a prerequisite to approval of a settlement-only class proceeding,
that the parties stipulate that the class could also have been certified for litigation.  See id.
at 817–18.  In a class action aimed at the effects within a single state of a claim with
national implications, Issacharoff points out “[t]he problem . . . that this stipulation may
carry estoppel effects elsewhere. . . . The defendant may rightfully fear that conceding the
certifiability of a litigation class in one state may preclude a defense to class certification in
another state.”  Id. at 818.  Issacharoff appears to be confusing the doctrines of issue
preclusion and judicial estoppel here, however, as traditional issue preclusion would not
be available in a case where certification is conceded, rather than adversarially contested.
See Linda J. Silberman, Allan R. Stein, & Tobias B. Wolff, Civil Procedure:  Theory and
Practice 31–33 (Supp. 2004–2005) (describing difference between doctrines of judicial
estoppel and issue preclusion); see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)
(embracing doctrine of judicial estoppel for federal courts).
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attractive option.  Along similar lines, some states have standards for certi-
fication and notification that are more permissive than their federal
counterparts, making state court the only forum in which a class action
can occur.89
In civil rights cases and other forms of impact litigation, plaintiffs
may also forgo federal claims and a federal forum in order to minimize
the harm associated with a bad outcome.  This strategy has been the hall-
mark of much of the constitutional litigation on behalf of gay men and
lesbians in the past twenty years, particularly as it concerns relationship
rights and sexual privacy.  Since 1993, when the Hawai‘i Supreme Court
held that the state’s exclusion of gay couples from civil marriage required
strict judicial scrutiny,90 a significant number of cases, including some
class actions, have been filed seeking to secure equal access to marriage,
or to the legal and economic benefits that attach to the institution, for
gay and lesbian couples.91  In a reversal of the strategy that led to the
issuance and implementation of Brown v. Board of Education,92 most of
these cases have been filed in state courts and have sought relief only on
the basis of state constitutions, deliberately eschewing the argument that
the U.S. Constitution invalidates discrimination against gay couples.93
Civil rights attorneys who litigate in this field have long been apprehen-
sive about the reception that federal constitutional arguments relating to
89. Compare, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175–76 (1974) (holding
that class action filed under Rule 23(b)(3) must provide individualized notice to
identifiable class members, even when doing so renders lawsuit impracticable), with, e.g.,
Cartt v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381–88 (Ct. App. 1975) (distinguishing Eisen
and applying more permissive standard under California law for notification of class
members in negative-value consumer class action).
90. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).  On remand, the Hawai‘i trial court
found that the state could not meet its burden and ordered that gay and lesbian couples
receive equal access to marriage.  Before that decision could go into effect, however, the
people of Hawai‘i amended their constitution and removed the substantive basis for the
original decision.  See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (unpublished table
decision), available at http://www.hawaii.gov/jud/20371.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (detailing history of case on remand and dismissing following enactment of
state constitutional amendment).
91. See, e.g., Clinton v. California (Marriage Cases), No. CGC-04-429548 (Cal. Super.
Ct. filed Mar. 12, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (seeking equal access to civil
marriage for same-sex couples).
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), enforced, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
93. See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743,
at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding that Alaska constitution requires that gay
couple enjoy equal access to civil marriage), superceded by Alaska Const. art. I, § 25 (“To
be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one
woman.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that Massachusetts constitution requires that same-sex couples enjoy equal access to civil
marriage); Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (finding
that same-sex couples are entitled to equal employment benefits from state employers
under Oregon constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that
Vermont constitution requires state to afford same-sex couples the same rights and
benefits that are available to opposite-sex married couples).
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marriage might receive if they were to reach the Supreme Court of the
United States, fearing that they might provoke another Bowers v. Hard-
wick.94  Given the significance that would attach to a ruling by a federal
appellate court that the Constitution gives same-sex couples an equal
right to marry, there is good reason to think that the Supreme Court
would grant review of any such decision.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs in
these suits have avoided the U.S. Constitution.
The decision to disclaim any federal grounds for relief can, of
course, have a real impact on a plaintiff’s prospects for recovery.  In the
case of parallel statutory causes of action, federal law may have fewer de-
fenses or offer more extensive damages than state law.  In civil rights liti-
gation, state charters may impose special barriers to the recognition of
certain constitutional claims, particularly where the rights of gay couples
are concerned.95  And, unlike the scenarios examined in Part I.B, these
stay-in-state-court suits all involve the abandonment of claims that could
be raised in an initial class action proceeding.  The strategic decisions in
these cases aim to maximize the plaintiffs’ expected outcome or serve
some larger social purpose, not to eliminate claims that would prevent
class certification.
2. Unpled Equitable Claims. — The failure to raise significant claims in
a class proceeding is not always part of an elaborate litigation strategy.
Class counsel may decide not to raise a claim if she believes it to have
limited significance or little chance of success, simply as a matter of re-
source allocation, or she may omit claims through inattention or negli-
gence.  Once again, when such claims could have been brought in an
initial proceeding, a serious question arises as to the response that class
members should encounter if they attempt to assert them in subsequent
lawsuits.
94. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79
(2003).  In Bowers, the Court rejected a gay man’s argument that private consensual sexual
activity between two gay men fell within the penumbra of constitutional privacy protected
by the Due Process Clause, despite the apparent holdings of the Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 407 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that similar sexual activity between heterosexual partners was
protected.  The language employed by the Bowers Court in explaining its holding was
notoriously derisive, as the Supreme Court forthrightly admitted when it repudiated the
decision seventeen years later.
95. In a recent Alaska case, for example, a group of same-sex couples in committed
relationships brought suit under the Alaska constitution requesting the same employment
benefits from state employers that were available to married couples.  The Alaska
constitution expressly forbids same-sex couples from marrying, see Alaska Const. art. I,
§ 25, imposing a potential obstacle to any state law claim to equal treatment.  Even so, the
plaintiffs have declined to raise federal constitutional claims, arguing instead that the
equality provisions of the state constitution give them a right to equal employment benefits
despite their inability to marry.  See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska (AkCLU), No. S-
10459 (Alaska filed May 22, 2002).  The author served as co-counsel for the plaintiffs in the
AkCLU case from its initiation.
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A prison litigation case from the Ninth Circuit, Hiser v. Franklin,96
offers a useful illustration.  In 1981, a group of plaintiffs initiated a state
court class action on behalf of all present and future inmates in the
Alaska prison system, alleging civil rights violations.  The suit ended in a
1990 consent decree that addressed a broad range of issues, including the
impact of confinement conditions upon prisoners’ access to the courts.
Some months later, Timothy Hiser, who was not incarcerated when the
initial class settlement was approved, brought suit against Alaska prison
officials, claiming that they were denying him reasonable access to the
courts by preventing him from photocopying documents.  Hiser re-
quested damages and individual equitable relief for the denials and also
sought to maintain a claim on behalf of all inmates to have the photo-
copying policy reformed throughout the prison.  The district court cited
the consent decree and dismissed all of Hiser’s claims on claim preclu-
sion grounds, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in full and allowed him to
proceed, finding that Alaska preclusion law would not bar the action.97
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow Hiser to proceed with his indi-
vidual claims for relief is not difficult to justify under a straightforward
application of claim preclusion rules, since the factual predicate for his
claim—the prison’s denial of photocopying services to him—did not exist
at the time of the earlier judgment.  Indeed, the certification of a class
that includes future inmates would now warrant particular scrutiny under
Amchem insofar as the suit purported to settle or compromise claims for
damages.98  The classwide challenge to the prison’s photocopying policy,
however, presented a different kind of question.  The policy, and hence
the factual predicate for the claim, predated Hiser’s incarceration and
could have been made a part of the original litigation.99  Whether the
omission of photocopying from the broader court access claim was a stra-
tegic choice or an oversight in the first suit, class counsel did not raise the
issue when they could have, and they brokered a consent decree without
making a classwide challenge to photocopying polices a part of the nego-
tiating mix.  The argument for applying the “could have been raised”
doctrine of claim preclusion to an unpled equitable claim of this type is
strong, as the Ninth Circuit recognized.  In permitting Hiser to proceed
with his class claim nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit did not question the
applicability of this form of merger in representative litigation, and in-
stead relied upon a finding that merger was not implicated in the case
before it because the claim did not arise out of the same series of transac-
96. 94 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 1996).
97. Id. at 1289–90.
98. Amchem rejected a settlement-only class action that sought to resolve the damages
claims of future victims of asbestosis, ruling that the trial court had not employed
safeguards adequate to protect the interests of that diffuse group and expressing
skepticism about the certification of any class action in which some class members did not
yet exist as such.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–29 (1997).
99. See Hiser, 94 F.3d at 1292.
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tions as the broader access-to-court claims litigated in the original
proceeding.100
Both stay-in-state-court suits and unpled equitable claims raise ques-
tions about the limits of lead counsel’s representational role in class liti-
gation.  In individual litigation, strategic decisions about the claims that
counsel will raise in structuring a complicated case are an accepted and
inevitable part of the representational relationship—as are oversights and
mistakes, within reasonable parameters.  The autonomy that affords a liti-
gant such wide discretion in choosing how to structure the lawsuit in an
adversarial system also offers the primary justification for binding the liti-
gant to the result.  In a class proceeding, where absentees have little or no
opportunity to approve the decisions of their lawyers, the court’s inde-
pendent duty to ensure the adequacy of class counsel’s representation
serves as the principal substitute for litigant autonomy.  From Hansberry v.
Lee onward, the bulk of the attention in adequacy analysis has focused on
conflicts of interest, whether among class members or between absentees
and class counsel.101  On occasion, courts and commentators have also
explored the standards that should govern an adequacy challenge based
on lack of competence or diligence.102  The preclusion problems ex-
plored in this Part demonstrate the need for a third mode of adequacy
analysis that speaks to the extent of class counsel’s authority to make
purely strategic decisions on behalf of absentees.
Before addressing that issue, however, it is necessary to articulate a
more coherent approach to the structure of preclusion analysis than has
been evident in class action litigation thus far.  Any resolution of the pre-
clusion problems discussed in this Article will only be enduring if it rests
on a firm foundation.
100. See id. at 1292–93.  This finding may have been something of a stretch, and one
member of the panel dissented from this portion of the ruling.  See id. at 1294 (Rymer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), established the absence of conflicting
interests between a representative plaintiff and absentees as a constitutional requirement
in class litigation.  For subsequent judicial treatments of the issue, see, for example,
Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting collateral
attack to Agent Orange settlement by claimants whose injuries did not manifest during
settlement period and who were thus denied relief, on grounds that their interests were
adverse to those of the rest of the class in the original action), aff’d by an equally divided
court, in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973)
(permitting collateral attack on adequacy grounds where representation afforded class
member in first action was hostile and adverse).
102. See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein II), 126 F.3d 1235, 1251–55 (9th Cir.
1997) (detailing inadequate course of representation offered by class counsel in state
action while parallel federal proceeding was pending), vacated, Epstein v. MCA, Inc.
(Epstein III), 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF PRECLUSION ANALYSIS
My principal aim in this Part is to unseat the hegemony of the maxim
that “[a] court conducting an action cannot predetermine the res judi-
cata effect of the judgment.”103  The important but limited core of de-
scriptive truth that this maxim embodies has metastasized throughout the
law of preclusion, crowding out the vital contributions of the rendering
forum in superintending the preclusive implications of the lawsuits that it
shepherds to judgment.  In a class action, where a court’s authority to
determine the scope of the litigation is especially conspicuous and its re-
sponsibility to supervise the course of the litigation at its maximum, this
denuded conception of the rendering forum’s role in determining the
future impact of its judgment is especially pernicious.  The most basic
reform that is needed in this arena is for rendering fora to recognize and
claim their proper role as expositors of positive law in assessing and con-
trolling the preclusive effects of their own judgments.104
A. A Positive Law Account of Preclusion Doctrine
Much of the confusion that surrounds the analysis of a judgment’s
prescriptive scope—particularly the confusion surrounding the time-
frame problem that the ubiquitous preclusion maxim purports to de-
scribe—stems from a failure to think carefully about adjudication as an
exercise of positive legal authority.  Indeed, rendering courts sometimes
seem to treat the future preclusive effects of their own judgments as a
species of “brooding omnipresence”:105  a system of legal rules that is
mysteriously unconnected to the exercise of sovereign authority—the
court’s own judgment—to which those rules will later be applied.  One of
the important conceptual lessons of Erie106 is that courts serve as well-
springs of positive legal authority, just as legislatures do.  That lesson is
most frequently identified with the broad rules of decision that courts
issue as expositors of common law principles.  But it has equal application
103. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 7B Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note
2, § 1789, at 245). R
104. The cognitive problem here is as widespread as the one that Walter Wheeler
Cook took aim at when he leveled his challenge to the a priori approach to choice of law
analysis, which predominated through the first half of the twentieth century.  See Walter
Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 6–8 (1942) (describing
traditional method of conflicts analysis, which attempted to derive solutions from “the
general or essential nature of law and legal rights”).  Indeed, the problem is more serious
in some respects.  According to Cook, common law courts were aware that “the absurd and
socially bad result” produced by the a priori method in some cases “[was] not due to
inherent lack of power on the part of our states, but merely to the operation of certain
rules of positive law.”  Id. at 13.  Cases like those discussed in the previous sections lead me
to conclude that this realization has not taken root in the analysis of preclusion doctrine by
most rendering courts.
105. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
106. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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to the more specialized rules of decision that the preclusive effect of a
court’s judgment attaches to the parties to a dispute.
1. Preclusion as a Rule of Decision. — When a court issues a judgment,
that sovereign act has two different types of impact upon the parties:  its
mandate and its preclusive effect.  The “mandate” consists of a judg-
ment’s immediate and executory impacts upon the persons and property
of the parties.  A judicial mandate transforms the parties’ rights and re-
sponsibilities—it imposes an executory obligation to pay money, obliges
the parties to take or refrain from taking certain actions, or transforms
their civil status.  When a court spreads the mandate of its judgment, that
action attaches a new set of obligations and entitlements to the parties.107
The “preclusive effect” of a judgment does not exert any such imme-
diate or executory impact.  Rather, a judgment’s preclusive effect
prescribes a rule of decision for the resolution of future disputes:  It pro-
claims one or more elements of a cause of action to be satisfied, provides
an affirmative defense to the assertion of transactionally related claims, or
establishes a rule of evidence for the resolution of factual disputes.108
The specialized rule of decision bound up in the preclusive effect of a
judgment is much more limited in its prescriptive scope than the rules of
decision generally issued by legislatures.  A judgment’s rule of decision
can only be invoked against the parties bound by the proceeding, or their
privies, and it relates only to a specific, temporally bounded set of issues
or transactions.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. General Motors
Corp. contains its most nuanced discussion of the positive law foundations
of preclusion law in this respect.109  In addition, determining the con-
tents of a judgment’s prescriptive scope may depend upon the actual
107. As the Restatement points out, when enforcement of a judgment is sought across
territorial jurisdictions, this “coercive” effect of the mandate can only be realized through
the cooperation of a subsequent forum.  See Restatement (Second) of Judgments ch. 2
introductory note at 23 (1982) (“[O]utside the territorial limits of a court’s jurisdiction,
the coercive effectiveness of its judgment depends upon the judgment’s being given
recognition by the authorities of another government, under a principle of comity or by
virtue of legal provisions such as the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.”).
108. Burbank makes a similar observation, in passing, in his article on
interjurisdictional preclusion.  See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 7, at R
771 (“Claim preclusion includes defenses to rights asserted under the substantive law.”).
109. 522 U.S. 222 (1998). Baker involved an attempt by General Motors to take an
injunction obtained against a former employee that prohibited the employee from
testifying about certain product defect issues and to apply that prohibition against
subsequent claimants who had no involvement in the earlier proceeding.  Id. at 226–31.
The Court rejected this attempt, holding that only litigants who were parties to the earlier
proceeding could be bound, as a matter of preclusion law, to the evidentiary issues
determined therein.  Id. at 237–39.  As to all other litigants, the Court found, subsequent
courts were entitled to determine for themselves what role the earlier injunction should
play in constraining the evidence available at trial, free from the unyielding mandate of
Full Faith and Credit.  Id. at 234–36, 238–41.  In explaining the principles that required
this result, the Baker Court offered an analysis of the limits of the prescriptive scope of the
rule of decision bound up in the disputed injunction.  The passage nicely captures the
relationship between the parties to the action and the prescriptive scope of the judgment
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course of the proceedings giving rise to the judgment, a type of inquiry
that has no analog in determining the scope of a legislative enactment.110
Despite this narrowness of scope, however, a judgment’s preclusive effect
still operates as a rule of decision—an element, defense, or rule of evi-
dence—in adjudicating a claim for relief made in a subsequent lawsuit.111
Indeed, the very reason for specifying a legal category to describe a judg-
ment’s “preclusive effect,” as distinct from the judgment’s “mandate,” is
to distinguish between those features of a judgment that operate as rules
of decision in subsequent adjudications and those that have immediate or
executory impacts upon the rights and obligations of the parties.
and, by implication, the distinction between the judgment’s rule of decision and its
mandate:
Michigan’s judgment . . . cannot reach beyond the Elwell-GM controversy to
control proceedings against GM brought in other States, by other parties,
asserting claims the merits of which Michigan has not considered.  Michigan has
no power over those parties, and no basis for commanding them to become
intervenors in the Elwell-GM dispute.  Most essentially, Michigan lacks authority
to control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by strangers
to the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves what witnesses are
competent to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search
for the truth.
Id. at 238 (citation omitted); see also id. at 239 n.12 (“If the Bakers had been parties to the
Michigan proceedings and had actually litigated the privileged character of Elwell’s
testimony, the Bakers would of course be precluded from relitigating that issue in
Missouri.”).
110. The Supreme Court resolved early on, in Fletcher v. Peck, that it would not permit
challenges to the scope or validity of a law based upon a detailed inquiry into the process
giving rise to that law.  10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130–31 (1810).  But this decision was a
matter of constitutional policy, not metaphysical inevitability.  There is no logical or
analytical impediment to an analogous inquiry into “legislative due process” that would
ask, for example, whether a law can be applied to a segment of the population that was
denied an opportunity to be heard on the matter (through disenfranchisement), or, in the
case of a ballot initiative, whether the public received adequate notice of the meaning and
effect of a ballot initiative before being asked to vote.  See, e.g., Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d
839, 855–63 (9th Cir. 1997) (exploring these issues in challenge to California ballot
initiative on term limits for elected officials), rev’d en banc, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997).
111. The Court has used the language of evidence and jurisdiction in drawing this
distinction between a judgment’s mandatory and prescriptive features.
[The Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing act] establish a rule of
evidence, rather than of jurisdiction.  While they make the record of a judgment,
rendered after due notice in one State, conclusive evidence in the courts of
another State, or of the United States, of the matter adjudged, they do not affect
the jurisdiction, either of the court in which the judgment is rendered, or of the
court in which it is offered in evidence.  Judgments recovered in one State of the
Union, when proved in the courts of another government, whether state or
national, within the United States, differ from judgments recovered in a foreign
country in no other respect than in not being reexaminable on their merits, nor
impeachable for fraud in obtaining them, if rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 291–92 (1888); see also Baker, 522 U.S. at 242
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (reiterating this language in discussing enforcement of
out-of-state injunctions).
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Choice of law analysis offers a useful guide to developing a more
precise positive account of preclusion law, since both doctrines address
the application of sovereign authority across jurisdictions in prescribing
rules of decision.  In choice of law analysis, the source of sovereign au-
thority is legislative and regulatory, and the jurisdictional line is territo-
rial.  A conflicts regime provides an approach for identifying situations
where more than one sovereign wishes to apply its regulatory authority to
a state of affairs in the world—that is, it identifies when a “true conflict”
exists—and then offers rules for determining which sovereign’s authority
should predominate—that is, it directs how to resolve the conflict.  The
first task is interpretive, requiring a determination as to what extraterrito-
rial scope the legislature intended its laws to have.  The second task is
normative, requiring a set of principles for assessing competing regula-
tory claims.  Larry Kramer offers the most precise account of these struc-
tural features of the choice of law process.  He describes the first, inter-
pretive task of conflicts analysis in the following terms.
A lawsuit with multistate contacts is still just a lawsuit:  the plain-
tiff still alleges that because something happened he or she is
entitled to relief; the court still must determine whether the
facts alleged are true and whether, if they are true, some rule of
law confers a right to recover.  Making this determination is still
a problem of interpretation.  The only difference is that some of
the facts are connected to different states, and the court must
determine if that affects whether the law or laws at issue confer a
right.  While this determination may sometimes be difficult, it
does not alter the nature of the problem confronting the court,
which remains to decide what rights are conferred by positive
law.112
In the absence of express statements about a law’s intended extraterrito-
rial effect—the usual case—a state’s choice of law regime “establishes the
state’s rules of interpretation for questions of territorial scope.”113
Preclusion doctrine shares important structural parallels with choice
of law analysis.  Preclusion, too, addresses the application of sovereign
112. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 290 (1990)
[hereinafter Kramer, Rethinking]; see also Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 979, 1005 (1991) [hereinafter Kramer, Renvoi] (reproducing this passage as a
predicate to describing proper treatment of another state’s choice of law rules in conflicts
analysis).
113. Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 112, at 982.  There are plenty of smart people in the R
field who take issue with Kramer’s account of the structure of choice of law analysis.  Lea
Brilmayer is well known for her broad attack on the capacity of positive accounts of choice
of law to say anything useful or “objective” about the purposes underlying a law and the
interests that the law serves.  See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws §§ 2.5.1–.5 (2d ed.
1995).  Kim Roosevelt, though embracing a positivist approach, questions Kramer’s
assertion that a choice of law regime provides default rules for the territorial scope of
legislation.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law:  Rethinking Conflicts, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 2448, 2480–81 (1999).  I do not view either type of criticism as detracting
from the purposes to which I put Kramer’s analysis in the discussion that follows.
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authority across jurisdictional lines.  The source of sovereign authority
here is judicial rather than legislative, and the relevant jurisdictional line
marks the boundary between different adjudicatory proceedings within a
given court system.114  These differences in the form of the authority be-
ing exercised call for a different interpretive focus in assessing a judg-
ment’s prescriptive scope.  But the judgment of a court still serves as a
sovereign source of prescriptive authority:  It sets forth a specialized rule
of decision for future disputes involving the parties bound by a particular
proceeding.  That specialized rule of decision can produce a “conflict of
laws” with a general rule prescribed by legislation, just as with two legisla-
tive enactments in a classic choice of law problem.  When a prior judg-
ment is one of the competitors in such a conflict of prescriptive authority,
however, the method for resolving that conflict is much simpler than
would be true of an ordinary choice of law problem.  With few excep-
tions, a court will apply the rule of decision bound up in a jurisdictionally
sufficient judgment, to the exclusion of any conflicting legislative rule.
The same holds true when a judgment is given effect across territorial
lines, as will frequently be the case in successive lawsuits in which class
actions are involved.  While federal law is generally silent on the resolu-
tion of conflicts between state legislative enactments, and the Constitu-
tion allows for a diversity of choice of law regimes, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and its enforcement statute establish a uniform policy for
the interjurisdictional treatment of state court judgments115 under which
a valid judgment’s rule of decision (1) must be given the same effect that
it would receive in a court of the rendering state, and (2) always trumps a
legislative rule when domestic preclusion law would require that result.116
The burden of the analysis in preclusion doctrine thus resides in the first,
interpretive task described above:  determining whether the rule of deci-
sion established by the earlier exercise of sovereign authority—the judg-
ment—has application in a subsequent dispute.
Where ordinary choice of law analysis is concerned, the authority of
a legislature to specify the interjurisdictional reach that it intends for its
114. I use the terms “legislative” and “legislation” here to denote the exposition of
general laws of liability allocation and conduct regulation.  Of course, courts often serve as
the sole source of such laws when they interpret the common law.  My characterization of
the structure of choice of law analysis is meant to describe such general rules, whether
judicial or legislative in origin—a common convention in choice of law discussions.  See,
e.g., Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 112, at 1005–06 (employing hypothetical concerning R
“legislative” scope that combines common law and statutory elements).
115. For ease of reference, I will use state court judgments and the full faith and
credit requirement in discussing preclusion doctrine between jurisdictions.  In the case of
federal judgments, the recognition requirement arises from federal common law.  See
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001).
116. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 232–33 (describing obligation of states to enforce intended
claim and issue preclusive effect of valid judgments from other states); id. at 233–34
(rejecting any “public policy” exception for enforcement of judgments, in contrast to
recognition of statutory enactments in choice of law analysis).
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laws is a matter of common understanding.117  The problem is that legis-
latures exercise that authority only rarely,118 requiring courts to develop
methods of interpretation for divining, or imputing, the interjurisdic-
tional application that the legislature intended for its law.119  Where pre-
clusion doctrine is concerned, the situation is essentially reversed.  A ren-
dering court has the opportunity that is usually denied to a legislature to
focus its attention on a narrow, defined set of circumstances in assessing
and controlling the prescriptive scope that any rule of decision resulting
from its exercise of sovereign authority will have in the resolution of fu-
ture disputes.  Even so, courts rarely exercise this power.  Although the
positive role of courts as expositors of common law principles has long
since become a transparent part of our conceptual vocabulary, the power
of courts to play a positive legal role in determining the prescriptive
scope of their judgments’ preclusive effect remains poorly understood.120
This failure of understanding is all the more striking in the class ac-
tion context, where the opportunity for a court to determine whether
and to what extent its judgment will establish a rule of decision for absent
class members is so conspicuously on display.  The certification hearing
represents a singular concentration of attention by the court and the par-
ties on the future preclusive effect of the court’s judgment.  Even so, the
ubiquitous preclusion maxim continues to dissuade rendering courts
from recognizing the opportunity that the certification process offers for
shaping that preclusive effect.121
117. See Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 112, at 1006–08 (describing role of legislature in R
prescribing multistate elements of its laws and observing that need to interpret these
features of a law in conducting choice of law analysis is “uncontroversial”).
118. As Kramer has put it:
Sometimes a law will specify what elements of a claim must be connected to or
located in the state for the law to apply.  With such laws, the court need not look
beyond the face of the statute to determine prima facie applicability.
Unfortunately, the great majority of laws are silent with respect to extraterritorial
reach, and determining their prima facie applicability is more difficult.
Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 112, at 293. R
119. See Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 112, at 1008 (“[D]etermining whether a law R
applies in a multistate case requires interpreting it in a way that is not qualitatively different
from other legal problems [and] the proper method of interpretation looks to
purposes.”); Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 112, at 294 (“Since the legislature’s failure to R
specify the statute’s extraterritorial reach is an oversight, the court must infer what limits—
if any—there ought to be on the extraterritorial reach of the law.”).
120. Professor Burbank has made a similar observation in his discussion of the federal
rulemaking process, where he has criticized the “literature specific to the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence” for “obscuring the distinction between power and prudence in court
rulemaking.”  Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1015, 1022 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank, Rules Enabling Act].
121. Wright, Miller, and Cooper, despite their otherwise sophisticated and thoughtful
treatment of preclusion in class litigation, themselves contribute to this problem in the
closing passages of their discussion on the issue, writing:
These limitations on preclusion by a class judgment are wrapped up with the
general proposition that “the court conducting the action cannot predetermine
the res judicata effect of the judgment.”  Even though a court hearing a class
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2. The Components of Preclusion Analysis. — When a recognizing fo-
rum is called upon to determine the impact that a prior judgment will
have upon the resolution of a current dispute, there are three distinct
types of inquiry that it must perform.  The first is to assess the exercise of
positive legal authority that the initial forum undertook in rendering the
judgment, an inquiry that will itself consist of several components.  The
court must determine what claims and transactions were placed in issue
in the pleadings of the prior action.  It must take stock of the preclusion
doctrines that would have applied in the rendering forum—the availabil-
ity of nonmutual issue preclusion, the approach to defining a transaction
or series of transactions, the treatment of a statute of limitations dismis-
sal, and so forth.  And it must determine whether the rendering forum
placed any constraints upon the preclusive effect that its judgment should
have in subsequent proceedings.  Second, the court must inquire into the
actual course of proceedings in the rendering forum to determine, for
example, whether a contested issue was actually litigated and determined,
or whether the parties were afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate
a contested claim.122  Third, the court must examine the relationship be-
tween the matters that were resolved in the initial proceeding and the
claims or issues presently before it in order to decide how the rules of
decision embodied in the first judgment should apply to the current dis-
pute—whether the current claims are part of the same series of transac-
tions that were adjudicated by the rendering forum, for example, or
whether an issue resolved by the rendering forum is identical to an issue
raised in the present lawsuit in all pertinent respects.
The core of truth contained in the ubiquitous preclusion maxim de-
rives primarily from the third of these inquiries.  As a descriptive matter,
action may at times undertake to reject an assertion that the judgment will not be
binding on nonparticipating class members, final enforcement of preclusion
ordinarily occurs only with the decision of the court hearing a later action.  The
class-action court can easily defeat preclusion, however, either by adopting a
narrow class definition to ensure adequate representation or by decertifying the
class at the close of trial or on appeal on the ground that the class was not
adequately represented.
18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 493–94 (citations omitted).  While R
technically correct, the assertion that “final enforcement of preclusion” ordinarily must
wait for a recognizing forum simply perpetuates the fallacy of the ubiquitous preclusion
maxim by overstating its significance.  It implicitly suggests that the only tools available to a
rendering court in addressing preclusion are a narrow class definition, which rendering
courts have already proclaimed to be insufficient in giving them confidence that their
judgments will not be misinterpreted, or decertification of the class at the close of the
proceedings, an extreme and disruptive step that rendering courts cannot be relied upon
to undertake.
122. This requirement is captured in the Restatement’s allowance for the use of
extrinsic evidence in determining the prescriptive scope of a prior judgment.  See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. f (1982) (“If it cannot be determined from
the pleadings and other materials of record in the prior action what issues, if any, were
litigated and determined by the verdict and judgment, extrinsic evidence is admissible to
aid in such a determination.”).
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it is obviously not possible for a rendering forum to conduct an analysis of
claims and issues that have not yet been raised, in a lawsuit that has not
yet been filed.  To employ more formal language, it is not possible for the
rendering forum to predetermine how the specialized rule of decision
embodied in its judgment will come to be interpreted and applied in
future disputes.  The relevant body of information for this final step in
the preclusion inquiry lies outside the rendering court’s knowledge and
experience.  Indeed, insofar as the phrase “predetermine the res judicata
effect of a judgment” implies some control over the mandate of a future
court as well as the application of the judgment’s rule of decision, such
an action would lie outside the power and jurisdiction of a rendering
court as well as its knowledge and experience.123
This observation is at once consequential and trivially true.  It identi-
fies an important feature of the manner in which sovereigns exercise
power, but one that is neither novel nor limited to preclusion analysis.
On an analytical level, the assertion that a court cannot “predetermine”
the effect of its judgment in this limited sense of the term is no different
from the observation that a legislature cannot predetermine how a rule
of decision in one of its laws will come to be applied in future disputes.
These observations do not reveal any profound limitations on the power
of a rendering forum.  They constitute a prosaic statement about the
manner in which the prescriptive force of a rule of decision becomes
actualized in particular cases, a statement that applies with equal force to
legislative enactments.124
Clarifying the limited import of the preclusion maxim in this respect
allows for a clearer analysis of a rendering court’s capacity to exert influ-
ence over those elements of the preclusion inquiry that do lie within its
ambit—in particular, the extent of the positive legal authority that at-
123. This is the import of the distinction that the Court draws between the substantive
content of a judgment and the method for its enforcement in Baker v. General Motors Corp.:
Full faith and credit . . . does not mean that States must adopt the practices
of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing
judgments.  Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as
preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of
forum law.
Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a
sister State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the exclusive
province of that other State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering
State had no authority.  Thus, a sister State’s decree concerning land ownership
in another State has been held ineffective to transfer title, although such a decree
may indeed preclusively adjudicate the rights and obligations running between
the parties to the foreign litigation.
522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (citations omitted).
124. I take Professor Kramer to be making a similar observation in his approach to
choice of law when he argues that, “[f]rom an analytical standpoint, . . . both ‘choosing’
and ‘applying’ [law] entail the same process of interpretation.”  Kramer, Rethinking, supra
note 112, at 289.  In both types of situation, Kramer observes, a court must determine R
“whether a party has a claim (or defense)” in light of the inherent limits on the ability of a
legislature to specify the precise situations that its laws are designed to govern.  Id.
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taches to the court’s judgment.  Consider the legislative parallel once
again.  A legislature’s inability to identify the actual disputes to which its
laws will apply does not call into question its ability to prescribe the scope
of those laws in a meaningful fashion.  Similarly, a court’s inability to pre-
determine the future cases in which the preclusive effects of its judgment
will play a determinative role does not call into question the ability of the
court to exert other types of influence in prescribing the judgment’s
scope.  There are some important respects in which these situations are
not strictly parallel.  A court operates under prescriptive limitations that a
legislature does not.  But the broad assertion that is implicit in the ubiqui-
tous preclusion maxim—that a court’s inability to predetermine the pre-
cise role that its judgment will play in resolving future disputes is indica-
tive of a deeper inability of the court to play any meaningful or
authoritative role in determining the preclusive effect of that judgment—
is logically and descriptively incorrect.
The preclusion rules of a jurisdiction can best be understood as a
source of authorization for a court to attach prescriptive force to its judg-
ment, along with a set of default rules that determine the extent of that
prescriptive force in the absence of any express statement by the render-
ing forum.125  A court cannot give its judgment prescriptive force in ex-
cess of that authorized by the applicable preclusion rules—it cannot pro-
claim that the judgment in a particular case will be available as a future
rule of evidence through offensive nonmutual issue preclusion, for exam-
ple, if the applicable law does not authorize offensive issue preclusion in
the absence of mutuality.  This is one respect in which a rendering court
has considerably less freedom than a legislature, which can assign a differ-
ent prescriptive scope to every law it passes, if it wishes.  Within the pa-
rameters established by the applicable preclusion doctrine, however, the
rendering court has many tools at its disposal through which to shape the
course of the proceedings and control the positive effects of its judgment.
The most important such tools, for present purposes, are those
through which the rendering forum can impose constraints—that is, the
mechanisms by which it can employ less than the full extent of the au-
thorization that the applicable preclusion doctrine provides in attaching
prescriptive force to its judgment.  Perhaps the most familiar tool that a
rendering court can use to constrain the positive legal effect of its own
judgment in this manner is the dismissal without prejudice, governed by
Rule 41 in the federal system.  Rule 41 expressly grants federal courts the
authority to designate any dismissal as “an adjudication [not] upon the
125. I deliberately invite a parallel here with Kramer’s description of choice of law
rules as providing default “rules of interpretation for questions of extraterritorial scope” in
determining the prescriptive reach of a legislative enactment.  See Kramer, Renvoi, supra
note 112, at 1011; see also Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 112, at 289–311 (developing an R
approach based on statutory interpretation for determining whether a law is “prima facie
applicable” to a multistate dispute).
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merits” or “without prejudice.”126  As the Supreme Court’s Semtek deci-
sion has confirmed, such a designation deprives a dismissal of any preclu-
sive force as a rule of decision in subsequent proceedings.
The Semtek case called upon the Court to decide what source of au-
thority governs the preclusive effect of a judgment issued by a federal
court sitting in diversity, and what role Rule 41 plays in prescribing that
effect.  The Court held that federal common law governs the preclusive
effect of all federal judgments, but that it is ordinarily appropriate to in-
corporate state preclusion standards as a rule of decision when determin-
ing the prescriptive effect of a diversity judgment, rather than imposing
an independent federal standard.127  In keeping with that holding, the
Court imposed a restrictive definition on Rule 41.  Rather than serving as
an independent source of authority for developing a federal rule of deci-
sion on the preclusive impact of judgments, the Court found a dismissal
“upon the merits” under Rule 41(b) speaks only to the ability of the par-
ties to refile their claim in the same federal district court in which the
dismissal was issued.128  A federal diversity court, in other words, receives
no authority from Rule 41 to make an independent determination about
the affirmative prescriptive force that a dismissal on statute of limitations
grounds, or any other basis, should have in future proceedings.  Rather, it
must depend upon the authority that a state court in the same forum
would exercise in identifying the preclusion rules that apply to its
judgments.129
Even in setting forth these restrictive conclusions about the sources
of a federal diversity court’s preclusion authority, however, the Supreme
Court confirmed the continuing ability of a district court to decline to
exercise that authority to its fullest extent.  While Rule 41(b) does not
authorize a court to develop an independent standard for determining
the affirmative “effect that must be accorded federal judgments by other
courts,”130 the Court explained, a dismissal “upon the merits” under that
provision “is undoubtedly a necessary condition, [even though] not a suf-
126. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (“Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision . . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits.”
(emphasis added)); id. 41(a)(2) (“Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.” (emphasis added)).
127. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506–09 (2001).  While
the Court cited the work of Ronan Degnan in setting forth this result, id. at 508, it actually
embraced Professor Burbank’s prescriptions.  Degnan had argued for a uniform federal
standard in assessing the preclusive effect of federal diversity judgments, while Burbank
urged that federal common law adopt state preclusion rules in most such cases.  Compare
Ronan Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741, 755–73 (1976) (calling for
uniform federal rule), with Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 7, at R
736–39 (urging incorporation of state standards in federal common law of preclusion).
128. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504–06.
129. Id. at 506–09 (calling for federal reference to state preclusion law in determining
effect of federal diversity judgment, at least in absence of exceptional circumstances
implicating strong federal interest).
130. Id. at 503; see also id. at 505–06 (construing Rule 41(b)).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 46 28-MAR-05 13:53
762 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:717
ficient one, for claim preclusive effect in other courts.”131  A dismissal
without prejudice or “not upon the merits,” in other words, is not merely
a “factor” that a recognizing forum would look to in deciding whether to
accord preclusive effect to a judgment.  Such a dismissal has a determina-
tive impact upon the prescriptive scope of a judgment, depriving the
judgment of a necessary condition for serving as a rule of decision in
other courts.132  Professor Burbank has characterized this tool of limita-
tion as a necessary corollary to any regime in which federal judgments
must be respected.133
This particular mechanism for predetermining the preclusive effect
of one’s own judgment is a common one.  Courts regularly issue dismis-
sals without prejudice with the expectation that their judgments will
neither impose any immediate mandate upon the parties nor serve as a
rule of decision in future cases.134  Indeed, in the case of claim preclu-
sion, the Restatement has formally recognized such designations as an
appropriate basis for permitting a plaintiff to “split” her claims between
multiple proceedings.135  Nonetheless, even the efficacy of a dismissal
131. Id. at 506.
132. This approach to preclusion analysis is consistent with the posture that the Court
has adopted in other important interjurisdictional cases.  In Marrese, for example, the
Court reaffirmed the primacy of the rendering court’s policies in determining the
preclusive effect of a judgment, even when the F1 proceeding involves a state law claim in a
state court and the F2 proceeding involves an exclusively federal claim in a federal court.
See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380–82 (1985).  Given
the powerful federal interest embodied in the grant of exclusive jurisdiction, the Court
might have concluded that the preclusive effect of the prior judgment should be
determined by federal law in the federal proceeding, with the outcome contemplated by
state law merely constituting one factor for consideration.  See id. at 387–91 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in judgment) (calling for federal preclusion rule with only minimal
consideration of state law in such a case).  Instead, the Court found that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and its implementing statute “generally allow States to determine the
preclusive scope of their own courts’ judgments” in the first instance.  Id. at 385.
133. Burbank writes:
Save for any constitutional constraints, neither validity nor finality need play a
part in domestic preclusion law.  But if, as it appears, there is a federal common
law obligation not to disregard federal judgments [across jurisdictions], it
requires as a corollary that the federal courts have the power to define the
conditions precedent to status as a “judgment” having the potential for preclusive
effect.  Moreover, the need here is not simply for federal law-in-reverse, acting
only as a check against hostile or inconsistent state law.  The nature of the
problem demands a uniform, and uniformly federal, solution.
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 7, at 764. R
134. See, e.g., Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bradford Builders, Inc., 174 So. 2d
44, 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (“To support a defense of res judicata, it must be clear that
the court in the previous action intended that the disposition there was to be without right
to further proceedings by the plaintiff.”).
135. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(b) (1982) (“[T]he general rule
[against claim splitting] does not apply [when] . . . [t]he court in the first action has
expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action.”); see also id.
§ 26(1)(b) cmt. b (discussing application of this proposition to dismissals “without
prejudice”).
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without prejudice is sometimes challenged, as happened in the Cooper
case.  When the district court refused to allow the Baxter class members
to intervene and press their individual claims for damages in the original
action in Cooper, it issued an order that carved those claims out of any
subsequent preclusive effect that might flow from the action.136  In other
words, the district court imposed a constraint upon the prescriptive scope
of its judgment as a rule of decision in the future resolution of those
claims.  While it is unclear how such a constraint would have applied to
the issue preclusive effects of the judgment—a question that I address in
the next subpart—the court’s intention to prevent the judgment from
having claim preclusive effect in the form of a subsequent defense of
merger or bar was clear.  Even so, the Fourth Circuit disregarded this
feature of the district court’s order, dismissing it as “plain dictum”137 and
reaffirming the misguided instinct that rendering courts cannot exercise
such control over their own judgments.138
That misguided instinct is particularly out of place in a class action
proceeding.  Rule 23 grants district courts the authority to multiply the
binding effect of their proceedings enormously, sweeping in huge num-
bers of absent plaintiffs who will be subject to the court’s mandate and
bound to the rules of decision embodied in the court’s judgment.  As a
consequence, Rule 23 is hedged about with elaborate protections aimed
at ensuring that the court will exercise that authority only to an extent
consistent with the interests of the absentees.  The Rule makes certifica-
tion discretionary, not mandatory, as a confirmation of the court’s role in
exercising its own judgment as to whether and to what extent a case
should move forward on a classwide basis.  Rule 23(d) even makes ex-
press provision for the court to “make appropriate orders . . . requir-
ing . . . that notice be given [to the class] . . . of the proposed extent of
the judgment”139 in setting the conditions for certification, reiterating
the role of the court in prescribing the contours of the action.  To urge a
court to exercise restraint when invoking its authority to bind absentees
to a judgment, but then to deny the court the ability to control the
preclusive effect of its judgment as one such tool of restraint, is both
anomalous and illogical.140  The role of the rendering court as an exposi-
136. Cooper Record, supra note 23, at 288a–89a (copy of order denying motion for R
leave to intervene).
137. EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 675 (4th Cir. 1983),
rev’d sub nom. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
138. It is worth noting that the Fourth Circuit did not engage in a substantive review
of the district court’s designation of its order as “without prejudice.”  Rather, it dismissed
that designation as ineffectual.  A ruling that the district court should not have allowed the
Baxter intervenors to maintain separate individual actions would have been quite different
from the Fourth Circuit’s statement that the district court was powerless to do so once
having certified the class.
139. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
140. One might express Rule 23’s concern over constraining the scope of class
proceedings as a question of the court’s institutional legitimacy, as well as a concern over
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tor of positive law in the certification process is broad enough to cover
both functions.
In his canonical article addressing the source and content of the ob-
ligation to grant interjurisdictional recognition to judgments, Professor
Burbank offers a broad observation that nicely captures the dilemma that
litigants increasingly face when attempting to navigate the threat of pre-
clusion during the certification process.
[B]roadly preclusive trans-substantive rules are tolerable only to
the extent that they are sufficiently nonformal, or contain suffi-
cient qualifications or exceptions, to permit the avoidance of
preclusion in circumstances where it would be unjust.  But the
characteristics that may make modern preclusion law tolerable
in the administration of substantive law are the very characteris-
tics that bedevil litigants, who desire clear and certain rules in
planning litigation strategy.
These considerations suggest that a court administering a
modern domestic body of preclusion law must be alert to the
loss of substantive rights caused by the failure of that body of law
to provide fair notice of its implications for a particular context
or by the failure of the jurisdiction’s law as a whole to afford a
fair opportunity to pursue claims of substantive right.  Moreo-
ver, both concerns are more pressing when the preclusion law is
not only trans-substantive, but trans-systemic.141
In the special circumstance of representative litigation, where the
principle of litigant autonomy is not available to reinforce the moral au-
thority of harsh or imperfect outcomes, these sentiments are more press-
ing still.142  The most effective means of providing class members with the
the rights of affected parties.  Professor Nagareda makes this point in his discussion of the
class action as a regulatory device.
The claim preclusive effect of class settlements is what carries the potential to
push them perilously close to civil justice reform legislation.  It is because class
counsel do not have nearly the kind of institutional legitimacy as legislators do to
alter the rights of the populace that class settlements cannot do all that Congress
might by way of legislation—whether to impose a compressed bureaucratic
damage schedule or any other type of civil justice reform that one might consider
desirable on instrumental grounds.
Nagareda, supra note 2, at 174. R
141. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 7, at 815–16. R
142. Owen Fiss has discussed this feature of representative litigation as embodying the
difference between a “right of participation” and a “right of representation.”  Fiss, supra
note 65, at 970–71.  As Fiss correctly observes, representation and participation offer R
overlapping but distinct theoretical justifications for binding individuals to adjudicatory
outcomes—justifications with very different practical implications in hard cases.  One’s
assessment of the importance of participation as a means of reinforcing the dignity and
worth of the individual in a given adjudicatory context, as opposed to its importance as a
proxy for ensuring adequate representation of interests, may dictate one’s view as to
whether the costs of imperfect or harsh outcomes should fall upon unlucky individuals or
should be spread more broadly as a systemic cost by permitting collateral challenge or
relitigation.  See id. at 978–79 (discussing varying importance of individual participation in
different contexts); see also Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral Disputes, 78
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clarity and certainty that Burbank has urged is the prospective imposition
of constraints upon the preclusive effects of class judgments.
3. Settlement and Preclusion. — The assertion that a trial court has the
authority to place constraints upon the preclusive effect of its own judg-
ment that are calibrated to the needs of a particular class proceeding may
sound unfamiliar.  In fact, however, that authority has a close cousin that
occupies a well-established position in the doctrinal landscape of repre-
sentative litigation:  the class settlement.
In most circumstances, a settlement between two individual litigants
is a simple contract.  While such agreements are always made against a
backdrop of sovereign authority, the active participation of the state gen-
erally is required in a settlement agreement between individuals only
when a party seeks assistance in enforcing its terms.143  The same is not
true of a class settlement.  A settlement in a class action binds all the
members of the class, just as a judgment would, even though absent class
members never manifest the sort of individual consent or agreement that
contract law would ordinarily require.  This result is possible only because
a class settlement constitutes an exercise of judicial authority, just as a
judgment does.  It is through the issuance of a certification order that a
court acquires the power to bind absentees to a settlement agreement—a
fact reinforced by Rule 23(e)’s requirement that a court provide further
process to class members and then review and approve any settlement
before such an agreement can take effect.144  These features of the class
settlement lie at the heart of the Court’s pronouncement in Amchem that
the requirements of Rule 23, and the due process principles to which
they give voice, “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the
settlement context.”145  Individuals can compromise their interests in all
kinds of foolish ways when they act on their own behalf, but class repre-
sentatives act with the authority of the state when they compromise the
interests of absentees and they must act within the limitations of that
authority.146
Iowa L. Rev. 1011, 1020 (1993) (identifying individual notice and opportunity to
participate as “the essence of due process”).
143. The standard illustration of the relationship between contractual arrangements
and state authority centers around the Court’s treatment of racially restrictive covenants.
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14–23 (1948).  The classic discussion of Shelley is Louis
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:  Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1962),
wherein Professor Henkin explores the broad implications of finding “state action” in the
state’s enforcement of obligations between private citizens.
144. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) (“The court must approve any settlement,
voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.”);
id. 23(e)(1)(B)–(4)(B) (detailing process that court must provide before approving class
settlement).
145. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
146. In this connection, the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Matsushita that some
jurisdictions might treat class action settlements as “a question of pure contract law,” if
taken literally, is incoherent.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 n.6
(1996).  “Pure contract law” speaks only to the circumstances under which an individual
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Settlement agreements almost always contain some form of release,
and this is equally true of class settlements.  A release is, in effect, the
contractual version of claim preclusion:  an agreement not to assert speci-
fied claims against one’s adversary in any future proceeding.147  Like
claim preclusion, a settlement release is invoked as an affirmative defense
if a covered claim is asserted in a subsequent lawsuit.148  Unlike claim
preclusion, however, a settlement release typically specifies, often in great
detail, the claims to which it will apply.  Naturally, parties sometimes ar-
gue, and litigate, over whether the terms of a release in an earlier settle-
ment apply to a newly raised claim.  Even when disagreements emerge as
to the proper interpretation of a release in a particular dispute, however,
no one doubts the ability of two contracting parties to make meaningful
prospective choices about what claims they will include in such an
agreement.
When a release is contained in a settlement that has been approved
by a court on behalf of a class, it is the sovereign authority of the court
that binds the absentees to the surrender of future claims.  Thus, courts
regularly use their authority to place carefully calibrated constraints upon
the extent to which a class action will compromise the claims of class
members in future proceedings.149  They simply do so through the device
of an order approving a settlement agreement, rather than an order lim-
iting the preclusive effect of a judgment terminating a fully litigated
action.
binds her own person to a voluntary obligation.  When individuals can bind others through
their actions, another juridical category is at work.  Agency law, family law, the law of
business organizations, and the law of representative litigation all describe circumstances
under which one individual might bind another to a contractual obligation.  Each of those
juridical categories possesses its own set of internal doctrinal requirements, and each must
abide by external constitutional constraints.  A jurisdiction might well choose not to adopt
any special canons of construction for a class settlement, relying only on general contract
principles to interpret the settlement’s terms.  This appears to be how some courts have
construed Matsushita’s footnote.  See, e.g., In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 200
F.3d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Matsushita footnote and interpreting “pure contract
law” approach to mean that “a settlement will be enforced according to its terms” without
reference to broader class concerns).  But when a lead plaintiff and her counsel exercise
the authority to bind absentees to a settlement agreement, something more than “pure
contract law” is at work.
147. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 reporter’s note to cmt. e (1982)
(“A stipulation or consent judgment may have preclusive effect in a subsequent action if
the parties have so agreed.  In such a case the effect results not from the rule of this
Section but from an agreement manifesting an intention to be bound.” (citations
omitted)).
148. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively . . . release [and] res judicata . . . .”).
149. See, e.g., Trotsky v. L.A. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 Cal. Rptr. 637, 646 (Ct. App.
1975) (holding that court should exercise caution in approving settlement that includes
general release of claims not raised in complaint or litigated in action, even though it has
power to do so).
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Indeed, the capacity to specify in precise detail the scope of the re-
lease that a settlement will include is one of those features of a settlement
that is clearly “relevant” to the certification calculus, as that term was used
in Amchem.150  A settlement-only class action can greatly reduce the po-
tential conflicts of interest that preclusion doctrine might otherwise intro-
duce, precisely because it allows class counsel to remove much of the un-
certainty associated with preclusion and to predetermine how the claims
of class members will be affected in future lawsuits.  The constraints on
the preclusive effects of the judgment in a litigated action that I advocate
here aim to resolve potential Rule 23 problems in the same manner.
To be clear, there are important differences between a court-ap-
proved settlement agreement and the judgment that results from a liti-
gated action, on both a formal and a practical level.  In particular, preclu-
sion doctrine sometimes gives voice to institutional values that are not
implicated by settlement, even in the case of a class proceeding.  The
contours of a judgment’s preclusive effect—and the permissible forms of
the constraints that a rendering forum can impose upon it—may differ
markedly from the typical scope of a negotiated release.  I discuss these
issues in Part III.  My point here is a more basic one.  The aggressive
reading that so many courts have given to the ubiquitous preclusion
maxim appears to be founded upon a belief that rendering courts oper-
ate under some inherent disability when it comes to placing meaningful
or effective constraints upon the preclusive effect that their own judg-
ments will have in future cases.  In the last subpart, I demonstrated that
there is no logical or theoretical basis for such a belief.  Commonly ac-
cepted practice in the approval of class action settlements further demon-
strates that, in fact, courts regularly disprove the existence of any such
categorical disability on the imposition of preclusion constraints by using
their sovereign authority to achieve the same result in a closely analogous
manner.151
150. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619–20 (explaining that decision to proceed as a
settlement-only class action is relevant to those elements of certification calculus that are
inherently dependent upon the fact of litigation, like the manageability of the action).
151. Cook offered a trenchant observation in setting forth the “scientific” method
that he employed in his challenge to traditional choice of law analysis that is equally apt
here:
We shall therefore undertake to formulate general statements as to what the ‘law’
of a given country ‘can’ or ‘cannot’ do in the way of attaching legal consequences
to situations and transactions by observing what has actually been done.  In
making our observations we shall, however, find it necessary to focus our
attention primarily upon what courts have done, rather than upon the
description they have given of the reasons for their action.  Whatever
generalizations we reach will therefore purport to be first of all an attempt to
describe in as simple a way as possible the concrete  judicial phenomena
observed, and their ‘validity’ will be measured by their effectiveness in
accomplishing that purpose.  In other words, they will be regarded as ‘true’ only
in so far as they enable us to handle effectively the concrete materials with which
we must deal.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 52 28-MAR-05 13:53
768 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:717
B. Tools of Limitation in Class Action Proceedings
It is not difficult to offer a basic description of the tools by which trial
courts might constrain the preclusive effects of their own judgments in
appropriate cases.  Indeed, rendering courts already employ such tools in
isolated instances.152  It is only the threat of the ubiquitous preclusion
maxim that dissuades courts from incorporating these constraints into
the regular administration of class action proceedings, even when doing
so is obviously the most sensible course.  One decision from a Wisconsin
appellate court, Milwaukee Women’s Medical Service, Inc. v. Scheidler,153
nicely captures the tenor of the response that many trial courts must ex-
pect when they attempt to incorporate such limitations into the orders
that they craft.  I begin here with a brief account of that case as a re-
minder of the judicial mindset that has prevented the simple steps that I
describe from being widely implemented.
The Milwaukee Women’s Medical Service decision involved a pair of law-
suits:  one a federal class action, the other an individual litigation brought
in state court.  The federal proceeding was a nationwide class action initi-
ated in the Northern District of Illinois in 1986 on behalf of all women
seeking reproductive health services.154  The plaintiffs in the federal ac-
tion included a trio of Wisconsin-based women’s health care providers
collectively referred to as “Summit,” while the defendants included Jo-
seph Scheidler, an anti-abortion activist whom the plaintiffs accused of
engaging in racketeering activities in the early 1980s in order to intimi-
date and threaten women away from clinic entrances.155  In 1997, when
the federal action was in its eleventh year, Summit brought a separate,
individual lawsuit against Scheidler and fifty-two other defendants in Wis-
consin state court on the basis of more recent protests that the defend-
ants had targeted at the plaintiffs’ local facilities.  In that action, Summit
requested an order to keep the defendants from blocking their Wisconsin
clinic entrances or harassing their patients.  After failing to secure a pre-
liminary injunction, Summit settled the state action with the defendants
and joined in a stipulation of dismissal.156
The stipulation, and the court’s attendant order, included a care-
lessly worded release broadly providing that “all claims against [the de-
fendants] relating to conduct which occurred prior to the signing of this stipula-
Cook, supra note 104, at 8. R
152. Wright, Miller, and Cooper appear to assume the propriety of utilizing such
constraints in discussing the use of narrow definitions of class certification, though they
neither identify that analytic step expressly nor offer a defense for the propriety of its use—
an unfortunate omission.  See supra note 72 (quoting 18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra R
note 2, § 4455, at 461, 459 & n.15). R
153. 598 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
154. The federal action eventually gave rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
155. Id. at 252–53.
156. Milwaukee Women’s Med. Serv., 598 N.W.2d at 590–91.
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tion are hereby dismissed [as to Summit], with prejudice . . . .”157
Although Summit sought to settle only the claims in the Wisconsin ac-
tion, the broad release appeared to encompass the pending RICO claims.
Seeking to capitalize upon Summit’s mistake, Scheidler took the stipula-
tion to the federal proceeding and sought to have Summit dismissed as a
named plaintiff on collateral estoppel grounds.158  In response, Summit
then returned to the state trial court and asked for a modification of the
stipulation and order, arguing that the broad language in the release was
an error and did not reflect the more limited intentions of the parties.
The trial court agreed, amending the order and stipulation so that it re-
leased only claims “asserted in the [state court] Complaint.”  To reinforce
the limited scope of its amended order, the court added:  “[I]t is not the
intent of this court that this order have any effect upon National Organi-
zation for Women, Inc., et al. v. Joseph M. Scheidler, et al., Case No. 86 C
7888 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, Eastern District.”159
The Wisconsin appeals court rejected the amendment to the stipula-
tion and vacated the amended order.  The appellate court spent much of
its decision discussing the standard for granting relief from a final judg-
ment under Wisconsin’s equivalent of Federal Rule 60(b), which is not
pertinent here.  As an alternative ground, however, the appellate court
also categorically repudiated the trial court’s effort to place constraints
upon the effects of its order of dismissal.  The appellate court discarded
the trial court’s limiting clause as dicta, explaining that a rendering court
does not have “power” to impose such constraints—a proposition that it
explained solely through an invocation of the ubiquitous preclusion
maxim.160  A concurring judge, seeking to place an additional gloss upon
this holding, further explained that the trial court “could not affect how
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois . . .
will interpret or apply the parties’ stipulation or the trial court’s order
based on that stipulation.”161
The series of steps by which the Wisconsin appellate court reached
its result form a roadmap of the errors of reasoning in preclusion doc-
157. Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 590–91.  Actually, the proper basis for Scheidler’s motion was presumably
release, not collateral estoppel, since the two lawsuits dealt with different protesting
activities separated by more than a decade and the state proceeding did not finally resolve
any factual issues.
159. Id. at 591–92.
160. The entire passage reads:
Finally, we note that the circuit court’s attempt to narrow the legal effect, if any,
of its second order by adding language explaining the circuit court’s own intent
that the order not “have any effect upon [the federal action]” amounted to dicta.
A court rendering a first judgment does not have the power to determine that
judgment’s effect; the successor court will make its own decision.
Id. at 593 (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 594 (Fine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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trine discussed in this Article.  The trial court’s dismissal was only an or-
der implementing a stipulated settlement, not a judgment following an
adjudication, so there should have been little problem in placing limita-
tions upon the terms of its negotiated release—assuming, as the trial
court did, that it was proper as a matter of contract law to revisit the
stipulation’s language.162  As for the pure claim preclusive effect of the
order, a 1997 judgment in the state court action should not have affected
the claims raised in the federal suit at all.  The two sets of claims arose
from facts separated in time by a span of years, presumably bringing them
comfortably outside any impact that the state court judgment might have
on transactionally related claims.  Thus, the “constraint” that the trial
court imposed upon the claim preclusive effect of its order did not de-
tract from any effect that would actually have resulted had the state law-
suit been litigated to judgment.  Finally, the appellate court’s explanation
for rejecting the trial court’s order in the face of these facts concisely
exemplifies the failure of understanding that has perpetuated the reign
of the ubiquitous preclusion maxim.  The majority and concurrence
opined that the trial court had no “power” to “affect how [another court]
will interpret or apply” the stipulation and order.163  That is quite true—
and entirely irrelevant to the power of the trial court to enter the order
that it did.  As the last section explained, neither legislatures nor courts
can control the manner in which the rules of decision that they enact will
come to be applied in future cases.  They can, however, place constraints
upon the prescriptive scope of those rules of decision.  The state trial
court was not attempting to issue an order mandating the federal district
court to “interpret or apply” its judgment in a particular fashion.  It was
seeking to clarify the positive legal effect of the consent judgment so that
the federal court would know exactly what rule of decision it was being
called upon to interpret and apply.  In rejecting that attempt, the appel-
late court chastised the trial court for an error that it did not make.
When trial judges must fear such categorical repudiation as the
thanks for exercising sensible restraint, it is small wonder that even dili-
gent courts have not yet begun to implement the simple and straightfor-
ward steps that might allow them to resolve preclusion problems during
class certification.
1. Constraining a Judgment’s Preclusive Effect. — When a court appre-
hends a preclusion problem at the outset of a proposed class action,
there are two questions that it must ask:  What constraints on the pre-
scriptive scope of a judgment in this action would ameliorate the prob-
lem; and would those constraints be permissible, and appropriate, under
the preclusion and joinder policies that apply to the dispute?  The second
question is the subject of Part III, and I leave it to one side for now.  In
this subpart, my focus is the forms of the constraints that a court can
162. See id. at 592–93 (analyzing trial court’s amendment of stipulation under
principles of contract law).
163. Id. at 593–94.
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impose upon a certification order and judgment in addressing ex ante
preclusion problems.
a. Constraints Relating to a Parallel Proceeding. — The narrowest type
of preclusion constraint that a court can impose is one that identifies a
particular proceeding for which the court does not wish its judgment to
have claim or issue preclusive effect.  The attempt by the trial court in
Milwaukee Women’s Medical Service to amend its earlier judgment so as not
to interfere with the pending RICO case offers an example of such a con-
straint, and also of the type of situation where it is most likely to be perti-
nent—where two parallel actions involving related claims are being liti-
gated simultaneously.
Parallel class action proceedings are not unusual, particularly where
federal law creates a cause of action with close analogs among the laws of
the various states, as in the regulation of anticompetitive activities or cer-
tain types of corporate malfeasance in publicly traded companies.164
When a nationwide class action is initiated in federal court on federal
claims, follow-on class actions in state court are often not far behind.
Class counsel in these state actions typically assert only state law claims in
order to avoid having the cases removed to federal court and consoli-
dated with the original action through the Multidistrict Litigation Panel.
These stay-in-state-court suits may raise claims that could not have been
certified in the federal action because of choice of law complications, or
they may be entirely duplicative, with class counsel hoping to race ahead
of the federal action to judgment or settlement.  Either way, a judgment
in such an action carries a risk of compromising the claims of plaintiffs in
the federal suit through claim or issue preclusion, even where there is
exclusive jurisdiction over the federal claims.165
A diligent state court might conclude that some follow-on class ac-
tions of this description are suitable for certification and would serve the
interests of the class—as, for example, in the case of a statewide suit seek-
ing to raise valuable state law claims that could not be asserted in a na-
tionwide federal action.  At the same time, the state court might conclude
that it would be inappropriate for a judgment in a state proceeding to
compromise federal claims that are being thoroughly litigated in a fed-
164. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 Antitrust L.J. 925,
940–43 (2001) (discussing parallel federal and state antitrust regimes and capacity of state
officials to enforce federal antitrust laws, and arguing for broad federal preemption and
elimination of state parens patriae actions).
165. As Wright, Miller, and Cooper explain:
Difficult choices must be made . . . if the plaintiff knowingly chose a court of
more limited jurisdiction when a court of broader jurisdiction was available, or
chose a narrower remedy over a broader remedy.  It has been urged that the
plaintiff should be required to seek out the most comprehensive proceeding
available, so that the dimensions of the claim are measured by that possibility.
18 Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4412, at 277–78. R
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eral forum.166  Where there is exclusive jurisdiction over the federal
claims, a straight application of preclusion doctrine might provide pro-
tection from merger or bar through the “jurisdictional competency” ex-
ception that some states employ,167 but the exception is not firmly estab-
lished in every state168 and does not generally apply to issue preclusion in
any event.169  As a consequence, a state court must always think about the
preclusive consequences of certifying such a parallel proceeding.
Cases of this description appear to be particularly good candidates
for the imposition of a constraint on the prescriptive scope of the state
court’s judgment.  Following the lead of the Wisconsin trial court in Mil-
waukee Women’s Medical Service, the court could provide in its certification
order that nothing in any judgment or dismissal of the action it has certi-
fied would have any preclusive impact upon the parallel action currently
pending in federal court.  Such an order would have the added benefit of
helping to focus the attention of the court on the propriety of any global
release (i.e., one including federal claims) that the parties might attempt
to incorporate into a proposed settlement—a mechanism by which class
counsel in parallel state proceedings sometimes seek to entice the de-
fendants to settle quickly, to the benefit of class counsel’s fee award but
not always to the benefit of the class.170
b. Constraints Relating to a Specific Cause of Action. — Where no paral-
lel action exists, or where an order specifying a particular lawsuit would
166. In his first Epstein opinion, Judge William Norris adopted this limitation as a
federal common law constraint on the capacity of state court class settlements to
compromise exclusively federal claims.  See Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein I), 50 F.3d 644,
662–66 (9th Cir. 1995) (arguing that state courts do not have “the power to extinguish
exclusively federal claims by approving a class action settlement that could have been
extinguished by adjudicating the class action”), rev’d sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
167. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c) (1982) (describing general
rule that preclusion should not attach where “plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain
theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of
the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts”).
168. See, e.g., In re Heckert, 272 F.3d 253, 258–60 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that West
Virginia law demands that prior state court judgment exert claim preclusive effect upon
subsequent federal bankruptcy proceeding, despite exclusive federal jurisdiction in
bankruptcy proceedings); In re Genesys Data Techs., Inc., 245 F.3d 312, 314–15 (4th Cir.
2001) (same for prior state court judgment from Hawai‘i).
169. See, e.g., Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1142 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2003) (observing that California does not apply claim preclusion where exclusively
federal claims could not have been raised in initial action, but conducting issue preclusion
analysis even so because that doctrine continues to apply).
170. Judge Friendly’s observation on this score remains one of the most cogent.  See
Nat’l Super Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 18 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J.)
(“If a judgment after trial cannot extinguish claims not asserted in the class action
complaint, a judgment approving a settlement in such an action ordinarily should not be
able to do so either.”).  It was a global release in a parallel state court proceeding that
produced the dispute which ultimately gave rise to the Court’s decision in Matsushita. See
516 U.S. at 369–72 (recounting case history); Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein II), 126 F.3d
1235, 1251–55 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).
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not resolve the preclusion problem, a court might consider carving a par-
ticular cause of action out of the preclusive impact of the proceeding it is
certifying.  Such an order might limit itself to preserving the right of class
members to raise certain types of claims in any future proceedings with-
out fear of merger or bar, or it might also place limits on the issue preclu-
sive effect of the court’s judgment.  The choice would depend upon the
nature of the preclusion problem that the court sought to address.
An order of the first type might be appropriate for some stay-in-state-
court civil rights litigation.  A state court might decide that it is desirable
for a civil rights suit raising important and novel questions under the
state’s constitution to be heard in state court.  In such a case, the court
could view the decision of class counsel not to plead federal grounds for
relief in order to eliminate the possibility of removal as wholly legitimate.
At the same time, the court might conclude that members of the class
should not have to forgo any possibility of federal relief in order to obtain
a state forum for their state claims.  The court could thus provide in its
certification order that any judgment in the case would have no impact
through merger or bar upon the ability of class members to pursue fed-
eral relief in a future case, even though the federal claims could have
been asserted on a classwide basis in the state forum.  It would not be
necessary, and probably would not be appropriate, to extend the effect of
that exception to issue preclusion, since the state court is presumably as
competent as any federal court to resolve contested issues of fact.  The
preclusion dilemma in this case arises from the court’s desire to preserve
a state forum for important state claims without categorically depriving
the class of a federal cause of action.  An exception that is limited to
merger and bar would accomplish that goal.
In contrast, such an order would not eliminate the problems associ-
ated with conflict of interest cases where class members who possess high-
value damages claims have much more to lose from the issue preclusive
effects of an adverse judgment than do class members who are only able
to benefit from injunctive relief.  Consider the Title VII case that the dis-
trict court refused to certify in Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Production,
Inc.171 The Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper already made it clear that
merger and bar would not operate in a disparate impact case to compro-
mise the class members’ individual claims of discriminatory treatment
when those claims could not have been certified in the original action, a
fact that the Zachery court understood.172  But issue preclusion would still
threaten to compromise the high-value claims of those individuals, giving
them a much stronger incentive to settle for a lesser form of injunctive
relief rather than litigating through to judgment, thus placing them in
conflict with the rest of the class.  Where the rendering court concludes
that it is desirable for the disparate impact suit to proceed on a classwide
171. 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
172. Id. at 243 (discussing Cooper and claim preclusion).
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basis, it would have to specify that its certification order and judgment are
without prejudice from either claim or issue preclusion to the ability of
individual class members to pursue individual damages claims alleging
discriminatory treatment.  Once again, the nature of the preclusion prob-
lem—here, a conflict of interest arising from the threat of issue preclu-
sion—dictates the scope of the order needed to ameliorate that problem.
c. Constraints Relating to the Entire Action. — Exempting a particular
cause of action from the prescriptive scope of a future judgment in a
certified class sometimes will not suffice, or will not be practicable, in the
effort to eliminate an ex ante preclusion problem.  Where this is so, a
court may have to consider the imposition of a broader limitation that
will restrict the preclusive effect of its judgment in any future action—the
type of constraint that is the most likely to raise concerns under the
broader policies embodied in the forum’s preclusion doctrines, as the
next Part discusses.
Actions seeking to pursue defective product claims on behalf of a
class of consumers—which are becoming increasingly common, despite
the many barriers to certification that they present—might present pre-
clusion problems redressable only through such broad measures.  When
a defective product is released into the market, it will generally give rise
to two types of claims:  the economic damages associated with the re-
duced value of the product, which will often be readily calculable on a
classwide basis; and the consequential damages that occur when the de-
fect actually causes the product to fail, which may include claims for per-
sonal injuries and property damage that will be unsuited for class treat-
ment.  In the Bridgestone/Firestone litigation, for example, the economic
harm that consumers suffered when the tires they had purchased were
revealed to be defective was not an inherently difficult claim to resolve on
a classwide basis.173  The personal injuries and property damages of con-
sumers who actually experienced a tire failure, however, would have en-
tailed highly individualized determinations of causation, comparative
fault, and damages, which would be unsuited for class treatment.  None-
theless, a plaintiff seeking to pursue only economic damages would have
to establish certain elements, like the defective nature of the tires or the
inadequate level of care exhibited by the defendant in their manufacture,
that are shared in common with the more valuable claims.  As a result, a
class certified to resolve only the economic damages claims would raise a
serious conflict between the absentees who want maximum value for their
unusable tires and the absentees who possess valuable claims for conse-
173. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone/Firestone I ),
288 F.3d 1012, 1014–16 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing claims for economic harm).  The
Seventh Circuit concluded that a nationwide class on these claims was nonetheless
impossible because of the multiple state law regimes that would apply to the dispute and
the diversity of tire models encompassed in the omnibus action.  Id. at 1018–20.
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quential damages and would not want to risk an adverse judgment on
such a relatively insignificant item.174
This is not to say that high-stakes claimants would derive no material
benefit from an economic damages class action in a defective products
case.  The aggregate recovery in such a suit would be large enough to
focus substantial energy and resources upon the issues common to both
types of claim, and high-stakes claimants would benefit from those efforts.
Nonetheless, a serious conflict of interest would remain when the deci-
sion arose whether to litigate or settle, and it would be necessary to re-
strict the issue preclusive effects of the judgment in order to remove that
conflict.  The range of individual claims that might be compromised by
the class suit, however—personal injury, wrongful death, loss of consor-
tium, property damages to the vehicle, and so forth—would not lend it-
174. Instead of acknowledging and confronting the conflicts of interest that
preclusion doctrine created within the class, the Seventh Circuit finessed the issue by
accepting the assertion of class counsel that all individuals possessing high-value damages
claims were “sure to opt out and litigate independently,” id. at 1016, and hence could
safely be assumed away in considering class certification.  This is a remarkable proposition.
While it is probably true that most individuals who suffer serious injury or harm would
consider pursuing litigation on their own, it is quite another matter to assume breezily that
all those individuals will in fact exercise their right to opt out and hence require no further
consideration by the certifying court.  Many people do not pay attention to the notices that
they receive, and some people who do receive a notice may make unwise or uninformed
decisions, either from a failure to understand the consequences of not opting out or from
a simple lack of good judgment.  See Debra Lyn Bassett, Implied “Consent” to Personal
Jurisdiction in Transnational Class Litigation, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 619, 626–28
(describing challenges that recipients of notice frequently experience in understanding its
meaning).  As I discuss at greater length in Part II.B.3.b, notice and opt out are poor
proxies for the type of robust litigant autonomy that justifies binding individuals to bad
litigation choices.
One rather suspects that Judge Easterbrook would have been less cavalier about the
status of the high-stakes class members had their presence in the suit been dispositive of
the certification analysis.  In fact, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion makes much more sense if
one reads into it an implicit recognition that no class could be certified in an action of this
type unless it was understood to include a constraint on the issue preclusive effect that any
judgment would have upon the high-value claims of injured absentees.
The Seventh Circuit, per Judge Easterbrook, recently passed up another opportunity
to address the conflicts of interest that issue preclusion can generate.  In Allen v.
International Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.), the
court reversed a district court’s denial of certification in a Title VII case.  The district court
had found that it was impossible to certify a suit seeking only injunctive relief on behalf of
a 350-person class because the divergent facts surrounding the individual damages claims
in the case would make the lawsuit unmanageable.  Id. at 470–71.  The Seventh Circuit
reversed on the manageability finding and sent the case back.  Id. at 471–72.  It did not,
however, address the divergent settlement interests that employees with high-value
damages claims and those without such claims would apparently possess.  Since the court
ruled, following its decision in Jefferson v. Ingersoll International Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th
Cir. 1999), that the class members must have an opportunity to opt out in a bifurcated
action of this sort, its failure to address the divergent settlement interests of class members
may proceed from the same instinct that apparently informed Judge Easterbrook’s opinion
in Bridgestone/Firestone II:  the assumption that class members with high-value claims will opt
out when doing so is necessary to protect their interests.
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self to the type of specific delineation that resolved the conflict between
disparate impact and disparate treatment claims in the Title VII context.
Here, the court would need to impose a broader constraint, providing
that any judgment in the certified action would be without prejudice, ei-
ther from issue preclusion or from merger or bar, to the ability of class
members to pursue any claims not raised in the complaint itself.  In es-
sence, such an order would restrict the action from having any preclusive
effect upon the class beyond the final resolution of the claims actually
raised therein.
These three forms of limitation—constraints relating to a parallel
proceeding, to a specific type of claim, and to the entire action certified
for class treatment—are tools with which a court might be able to elimi-
nate the ex ante problems that preclusion doctrine can pose to the certifi-
cation of a class.  There may be legitimate objections to the use of these
tools in some cases, as they might be inconsistent with the broader preclu-
sion policies that govern the action.  Those potential objections are the
subject of Part III.  If a court determines that these “negative” or con-
straining applications of preclusion doctrine are not available to it, and
that no alternatives exist for addressing an ex ante preclusion problem,
then it may be justified in concluding that a class action is not appropri-
ate.  But the posture of vague powerlessness toward preclusion problems
that some courts have adopted in refusing to certify a class action can no
longer be tolerated.
2. The Seventh Amendment and Reexamination. — It is worth taking a
moment to discuss the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause,
since the same error that led the Fifth Circuit to make its confused state-
ment about reexamination and preclusion in Allison might also lead a
certifying court to have misplaced concerns about the use of preclusion
constraints like those discussed above.175  The Clause provides that “no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”176  The
amendment has not been incorporated against the states and so applies
only to federal courts,177 though a few states have similar provisions in
their own constitutions.178  In some of the cases explored above in which
a preclusion constraint might be appropriate—for example, a class action
175. See supra notes 51–60 and accompanying text. R
176. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
177. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (holding
that Seventh Amendment “governs proceedings in federal court, but not in state court”).
The Reexamination Clause does apply to federal court review of state court jury findings,
however.  See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508
n.27 (1984).
178. See, e.g., S.C. Const. art. V, § 5 (“[The Supreme Court of South Carolina] shall
have appellate jurisdiction only in cases of equity, and in such appeals they shall review the
findings of fact as well as the law, except in cases where the facts are settled by jury and the
verdict not set aside.”); W. Va. Const. art. III, § 13 (“No fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise reexamined in any case than according to rule of court or law.”).
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for economic damages in which some absentees possess related claims for
personal injuries—the initial proceeding will be tried before a jury.  Sup-
pose that the class loses before the jury in such a case on an explicit find-
ing that it had failed to prove a key factual issue, and a class member then
sought to pursue his individual claim for personal injuries in a subse-
quent suit, taking advantage of the preclusion constraint imposed by the
court in the initial action.  The question might arise whether the second
suit, by raising a factual issue that the jury in F1 decided adversely, would
run afoul of the Seventh Amendment’s prohibition on reexamination.
The Court has often said that the Seventh Amendment “preserve[d]
the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791.”179  While this formulation has
at times been read to impose a “static” limitation demanding strict adher-
ence to the jury practices of the late eighteenth century, that mode of
interpretation has given way to a “dynamic” approach that preserves the
basic prerogatives of the jury but allows for procedural innovation.180  In
Gasperini, the Court applied that dynamic mode of interpretation to the
Reexamination Clause, rejecting the view that “the meaning of the Sev-
enth Amendment [was] fixed at 1791” and formally acknowledging that
procedures “not in conformity with practice at common law when the
Amendment was adopted” remain consistent with the Clause when they
are “necessary and proper to the fair administration of justice.”181  Thus,
in framing a Seventh Amendment inquiry, it is useful to ask whether a
procedural innovation is inconsistent with a core function of the civil jury
as it functioned at common law, and also what role the proposed innova-
179. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
180. See Woolley, Reexamination Clause, supra note 53, at 502–06 (describing R
development of the Court’s Seventh Amendment doctrine).
181. 518 U.S. at 435, 436 n.20.  In an early commentary on the Seventh Amendment
and the reform of civil procedure in American courts, Professor Austin Scott embraced this
“dynamic” interpretive approach to the amendment when discussing the many variations
among the jury practices of early American courts.  He wrote:
First.  Whatever was an incident or characteristic of trial by jury in a
particular jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the constitutional guaranty
in that jurisdiction is not thereby abolished.  In determining what is meant by trial
by jury under the Seventh Amendment, inasmuch as the practice was different in
the different colonies, the federal courts look to the common law of England
rather than to the law of any particular colony; and incidents of trial by jury,
known in England at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, are
not done away with by its adoption.
Second.  Although the incidents of trial by jury which existed at the time of
the adoption of the constitutional guaranty are not thereby abolished, yet those
incidents are not necessarily made unalterable.  Only those incidents which are
regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial
by jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature.  The question of the
constitutionality of any particular modification of the law as to trial by jury
resolves itself into a question of what requirements are fundamental and what are
unessential, a question which is necessarily, in the last analysis, one of degree.
Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev.
669, 671 (1918) (citation omitted).
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tion will play in promoting other adjudicatory values.  Much of this Arti-
cle is devoted to addressing the second of these inquiries.  As to the first,
it would be exceedingly difficult to argue that the type of preclusion con-
straint that I have suggested here derogates from the common law pre-
rogatives of the jury, or from the purposes animating the Reexamination
Clause.
When American courts received the common law from England,
pleading practice in civil proceedings still required conformity with the
traditional forms of action.  In English law courts, a bundle of claims that
we would now describe as “transactionally related” had long required the
issuance of separate writs in order to obtain different types of judicial
remedy.182  This requirement migrated to the American colonial courts
and persisted through the eighteenth century.  As Professor Millar has
explained, with rare exception, the common law limited the “joinder of
causes of action [in early American courts] . . . to the case where all fell
within the same form of action.”183  In a judicial system shackled by such
constraints, claims for economic harm and personal injury, or contract
and tort, frequently could not be joined in a single proceeding.  When an
individual suffered a harm that sounded in more than one form of ac-
tion, she would thus need to bring multiple suits with multiple juries to
obtain complete relief.184  It was only with the enactment of the amended
Field Code of 1852 that a court system in the United States expressly per-
mitted the joinder of all claims that “arise out of the same transaction, or
transactions connected with the same subject of action,” before a single
jury.185  Even then, this innovation was slow to spread from New York to
182. A rich account of the writ system may be found in Sir John Baker, 6 The Oxford
History of the Laws of England, 1483–1558, at 323–49 (2003) [hereinafter Baker, Oxford
History].  While Baker writes exclusively of the Tudor period in this volume, the relevant
structural features of the writ system remained essentially unchanged through the end of
the eighteenth century.  See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 37–51
(4th ed. 2002) (describing evolution of English common law courts).  As Baker explains,
the diverse array of original writs “had come to be regarded not only as ‘the foundation of
every suit’ but as the foundations of the law itself, on which the whole law depended.”
Baker, Oxford History, supra, at 323 (citation omitted).  “The writs exerted their dominion
not only over procedure but over the common-law mind.  If there was no writ, there was no
remedy.” Id.
183. Robert Wyness Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective
111 (1952) [hereinafter Millar, Historical Perspective].
184. See id. at 112.  Millar states,
“[U]nless there existed the common origin indicated, it would not permit, for
example, the joinder of a claim in contract with one in tort, or one for injury to
character with one for injury to the person, or one for the recovery of real
property with one for the recovery of personal property.”
Id.
185. Id. at 111 (quoting Act of Apr. 16, 1852, ch. 392, 1852 N.Y. Laws 655).  The Field
Code, which was first enacted into law in New York in 1848, was named for David Dudley
Field, “one of [the code’s] chief architects and certainly its most ardent supporter.”
Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute:  Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10 n.13 (1989).
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other states during the eighty-six years that elapsed before the adoption
of the Federal Rules.186
These rigid rules of common law pleading and joinder were com-
bined with concomitantly narrow rules of preclusion.  A judgment in one
action would preclude parties from relitigating the same legal theory, ap-
plying what we would call a “direct estoppel”187 that marked the proceed-
ings as final.  But judgments did not attach the sort of transproceeding
finality to factual determinations that we associate with modern issue pre-
clusion.  “Estoppel by record”—the closest analog to modern issue pre-
clusion in actions at law—was grounded in a desire to protect the integ-
rity of the initial proceeding as manifest in the written record.  The
preclusive effect that attached to that determination was such as was nec-
essary to prevent an unsuccessful party from undermining the integrity of
that record.  Estoppel by record thus prohibited a second attempt to ob-
tain the same form of relief that was once denied, which would constitute
an affront to the verdict recorded in the first proceeding.  It also prohib-
ited a party’s disavowal of the sworn testimony and admissions that he
offered in a prior proceeding, which would attack the integrity of the
original testimonial record.  The first concern was not implicated when
parties brought successive suits for different forms of relief under prop-
erly distinct forms of action.  The second is a species of concern that we
now police through perjury laws, judicial estoppel, and the use of incon-
sistent testimony for impeachment.  Our current concerns over ineffi-
cient relitigation and the value of repose, and our tendency to place spe-
cial reliance upon the view of the facts propounded by the first tribunal
to hear a dispute between parties, were not the motivating purposes be-
hind the estoppel employed by common law courts.188  While the “ver-
186. See Millar, Historical Perspective, supra note 183, at 113–14 (describing gradual R
liberalization of joinder standards in other states before adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 18).
187. Woolley, Reexamination Clause, supra note 53, at 523 (“The rules [of direct R
estoppel] are designed to prevent a party from relitigating facts decided between the same
parties on the same cause of action.”).
188. As one commentator writes:
Originally, parties were permitted to relitigate issues.  Indeed, common law
writ systems invited such multiple litigation.  The litigation followed a certain
hierarchy, however.  A litigant might sue first for possession of property, later for
a sort of ownership.  The parties could not deny the matters in the record of a
suit; they were estopped from doing so.  Until recently, that concern could be
found reflected in the frequent use of “estoppel by record” to refer to issue
preclusion.  The record consisted of matters that had been sworn to by witnesses
in testimony or by the jury in delivering its verdict.  At first, one might conclude
that the record, therefore, included only matters of fact.  To modern legal minds,
juries consider questions of fact alone, leaving any decision on the relevant law to
the judge.  Such distinctions result from a [more] developed legal system than
that which devised estoppel. . . . 
. . . Even in America, the distinction between questions of law and fact only
developed after the colonial period.  Estoppel by record, therefore, was not a
doctrine regarding facts but concerned court decision-making both of fact and
law.
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dict” of a jury could serve as the basis for an estoppel in appropriate
cases,189 that estoppel by record bore little relationship to modern pre-
clusion doctrine.190  As Professor Millar has put it, “the ghost of [com-
mon law estoppel] may still occasionally walk, . . . but it would be difficult
to maintain that it preserves today its corporeal identity.”191
When the Seventh Amendment established a constitutional prohibi-
tion on reexamination, it did not supersede or alter the need to bring
multiple, separate actions to vindicate multiple rights.  Concern over suc-
cessive actions was not the motivating force behind the amendment.
Rather, as Professor Woolley explains, the amendment sought to guard
against the possibility that federal judges might usurp the role of the jury
within a given proceeding,192 particularly in the case of the Supreme
Court and its capacity to exercise appellate jurisdiction “both as to Law
and Fact” under Article III.193  Indeed, Alexander Hamilton’s oft-quoted
Estoppel by record had little to do with relitigation and ignored any
distinction between law and fact.  Instead, the doctrine sought to protect the
integrity of the court.  Other courts, presented with different causes of action,
might come to different conclusions, both of the law and the facts.  However, in
each court (it is too early to talk of jurisdiction), there existed a record, and that
record bound the parties to the court’s findings.  Those notions of independent
court determinations and of court integrity play large roles in unraveling the
present state of the issue preclusion doctrine.
Colin Hugh Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues of Law:  A Doctrinal Framework Based on
Rules of Recognition, Jurisdiction and Legal History, 24 Hous. L. Rev. 875, 877–79 (1987)
(citations omitted); see also Joseph H. Koffler & Alison Reppy, Handbook of Common Law
Pleading 406 (1969) (“The Ground upon which the Estoppel rests . . . is a determination of
the Merits of the Action, which, by Reason of the Admitted Facts shown upon the Record,
the Unsuccessful Party is precluded from again bringing into question.”).
189. See, e.g., Robert Wyness Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to
Res Judicata, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 41, 47–49 (1940) (describing historical forms of pleading
preclusion by reason of former judgment).
190. Most importantly, estoppel by record did not depend upon the existence of a
final judgment on the merits.  See id. at 55 (“[I]t is clear that the only part played by the
judgment in the realm of estoppel was in perfecting, confirming and authenticating the
record of the antecedent episode of the proceeding which constituted the estoppel.  The
judgment, itself, operating under the principle of res judicata, was quite another thing.”).
A judgment was necessary to mark the termination of the prior suit (and delimit the
content of the record available for estoppel), but the content of that judgment was
immaterial.  Id.
Professor Millar points out that a more modern, transproceeding style of estoppel was
sometimes available in equity courts, where the resolution of an issue “plainly decided as a
step toward the award or denial of the relief sought by a plaintiff might foreclose the re-
litigation of the same question in a later suit, though this was other than a repetition of the
earlier.”  Id. at 56.  But, he explains, this form of preclusion operated only “outside the
peculiar sphere of common-law estoppel.”  Id.  The chancery derived authority for this
form of preclusion “not from the common-law principle, which it did not know, but . . .
from the Roman principle of res judicata.”  Id.
191. Id. at 59.
192. See Woolley, Reexamination Clause, supra note 53, at 508–10. R
193. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
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reassurance on this score, from The Federalist No. 81, offers the possibility
of a second trial by jury as the innocuous alternative to the concentration
of unaccountable federal authority that direct judicial review of jury find-
ings threatened.194  It is thus unclear whether the Seventh Amendment
should ever place limitations on the maintenance of successive suits, at
least in the absence of a blatant attempt to usurp the function or integrity
of the jury.195
What is more, the Amendment clearly does not operate to foreclose
successive jury trials where mutuality of parties is absent.196  How should
one view a class proceeding against this requirement of mutuality?  Noth-
ing remotely resembling the modern class action—with its shadowy ab-
sentees who are bound by the judgment but never fully embodied as par-
ties in the lawsuit—existed in a world of common law forms of action,
power-based personal jurisdiction, and the capias ad respondendum. To
argue that the sparse words of the Reexamination Clause should be read
categorically to foreclose successive class action proceedings with some
areas of factual overlap—as Judge Posner did in his much noted Rhone-
Poulenc opinion, which imposed significant Seventh Amendment obsta-
the Congress shall make.”).  Justice Scalia emphasizes the primacy of this concern in his
Gasperini dissent:
The desire for an explicit constitutional guarantee against reexamination of jury
findings was explained by Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice in 1812, as having
been specifically prompted by Article III’s conferral of “appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact” upon the Supreme Court.  “[O]ne of the most powerful
objections urged against [the Constitution],” he recounted, was that this
authority “would enable that court, with or without a new jury, to re-examine the
whole facts, which had been settled by a previous jury.” United States v. Wonson, 28
F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (CC Mass.). . . .
. . . The Reexamination Clause put to rest “apprehensions” of “new trials by
the appellate courts,” Wonson, 28 F. Cas., at 750, by adopting, in broad fashion,
“the rules of the common law” to govern federal-court interference with jury
determinations.
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 450–51 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Hamilton wrote:
If . . . the re-examination of a fact once determined by a jury should in any case be
admitted under the proposed Constitution, it may be so regulated as to be done
by a second jury, either by remanding the cause to the court below for a second
trial of the fact, or by directing an issue immediately out of the Supreme Court.
The Federalist No. 81, at 489 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
195. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), could be read as support for
that proposition.  See supra note 54 (discussing Parklane’s holding that a prior action can R
exert dispositive preclusive effect upon a jury trial without violating the Trial by Jury
Clause).
196. Mutuality of parties was, of course, a consistent and ubiquitous prerequisite for
preclusion at common law.  Justice Traynor recounts this historical requirement in his
famous Bernhard opinion, even as he condemns it as “facile” and formally disavows it.  See
Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Assoc., 122 P.2d 892, 894–95 (Cal. 1942).
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cles to the use of issue-only classes in complex cases197—is simply not
sustainable.198
As I discuss in Part III, a jurisdiction’s preclusion policies may some-
times embody systemic commitments that will counsel against imposing
certain types of constraint upon the preclusive effects of a class judgment.
But, as Professor Woolley has aptly stated, “there is no basis for conclud-
ing that the burden inherent in requiring parties to present evidence
more than once raises an issue of constitutional dimension.”199  This is all
the more true where the specific manifestation of that burden—permit-
ting parties to bring multiple actions in order to secure multiple forms of
relief—was one of the defining features of the common law system in
force when the Seventh Amendment was ratified.200
3. Alternative Mechanisms for Addressing Preclusion Problems. — Impos-
ing constraints upon the preclusive effect of a judgment is not the only
mechanism that a court can employ in seeking to address ex ante preclu-
sion problems.  When the problem is a conflict of interest arising from
the different risk structures that the threat of adverse preclusion conse-
quences appears to present to different groups within a class, the creation
of subclasses might sometimes form part of an appropriate response.
More broadly, some courts have invoked notice and opt-out rights in ana-
197. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303–04 (7th Cir. 1995).  Judge
Posner has shown a willingness to entertain issue-only class actions where, to use the
Seventh Circuit’s distinctive turn of phrase, the issue may be “carv[ed] at the joint” in such
a way as to prevent factual overlap with successive actions.  See, e.g., Mejdrech v. Met-Coil
Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911–12 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (affirming district court’s
certification of issue-only class in pollution case where class treatment of common issue will
not need to be revisited in individual damages determinations).
198. Professor Scott makes a similar point in discussing the Trial by Jury Clause:  “The
question, it is submitted, should be approached in a spirit of open-mindedness, of
readiness to accept any changes which do not impair the fundamentals of trial by jury.  It is
a question of substance, not of form.”  Scott, supra note 181, at 671. R
199. Woolley, Reexamination Clause, supra note 53, at 533. R
200. I therefore disagree with the American Law Institute’s seemingly uncompro-
mising view on reexamination in its forthcoming statement on the principles of aggregate
litigation.  In discussing the role of the Reexamination Clause, the current draft of the ALI
report takes the position that
aggregation should not occur if a jury determination made in the aggregate
proceeding would, as a practical matter, have to be reconsidered in subsequent
individual proceedings.  This concern implicates the foundational point . . . that
the determination of a common overlapping issue on an aggregate basis should
have preclusive effect, a stance implying that putative aggregation that would lack
preclusive effect should not be pursued.
Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.08 cmt. a, at 55
(Preliminary Draft No. 1, Aug. 13, 2004); see also id. at 56 (“[A]ggregation should not
occur where the relationship of issues under applicable substantive law is such as to create
a need for reconsideration in subsequent proceedings of the determination of a given
issue made in the aggregate proceeding.”).  In my view, this is a vast overstatement of the
role that the reexamination inquiry should play in the certification decision, both as a
matter of constitutional mandate and as a matter of remedial policy.  I discuss the latter
issue infra Part III.
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lyzing the preclusive reach of a class action judgment, though these de-
vices are less likely to bear upon the appropriate ex ante response to a
preclusion problem.
a. Subclasses. — Subclassing has been one of the first responses that
diligent certifying courts have considered to apparent conflicts of interest
since the Supreme Court gave the practice prominent and approving
treatment in Amchem and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.201  When claim and issue
preclusive effects create widely varying risk structures for the members of
a class, those variations translate to different incentives to settle the action
or to prosecute it vigorously, and so may render it impossible for the class
to receive adequate representation in a single, unitary action.  Creating a
subclass with separate representation for each distinct interest group
might help to cure this adequacy problem.
But there are practical impediments to the use of subclasses to allevi-
ate preclusion-related conflicts.  Foremost among these is a potentially
serious ascertainability problem.  Rule 23 contains an implied require-
ment that the members of a class or subclass be specifically identifiable
through the use of some objective criteria and that the process of identifi-
cation be administratively feasible.  Ascertaining the identities of class
members with potentially meritorious individual claims might be prohibi-
tively difficult.  Objective criteria might be available in some circum-
stances, as in the MTBE case, where levels of MTBE contamination might
have served as a reliable proxy for the identification of class members
with positive-value damages claims.202  In other cases, however, such iden-
tification would not be possible.  Consider a Title VII disparate impact
suit in which some of the class members have viable claims for intentional
discrimination.  In many instances, the only facts by which one could
identify the class members with high-value claims would coincide with the
proof required to establish the elements of those same claims—for exam-
ple, through a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent when some
adverse employment action has been taken against them.  Where it is nec-
essary to make complicated evidentiary findings or to employ state of
201. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).  In both cases, the Court reversed proposed class action
settlements, offering the trial court’s failure to create separately represented subclasses for
each distinct interest group as one explanation for why the right of class members to
adequate representation was not satisfied.  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 627 (1997) (“The settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with no
structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and
individuals affected.  Although the named parties alleged a range of complaints, each
served generally as representative for the whole, not for a separate constituency.”); see also
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846–48 (applying holding of Amchem to (b)(1)(B) limited-fund class
action and criticizing failure to certify subclasses with separate representation for each
distinct interest group in conflicted class).
202. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D.
323, 349–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing relationship between damages claims and
exposure levels).
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mind or other subjective criteria in order to identify the members of a
vital subclass, it may be inappropriate, or impossible, to proceed.203
Subclasses might also turn out to be of limited use in addressing one
of the most frequent manifestations of a preclusion-related conflict of in-
terest:  divergent incentives on the part of class members in the choice
between settling and litigating through to judgment.  Conflicts of this sort
often arise in cases like those discussed in Part I where plaintiffs’ counsel
seek to pursue equitable relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and carve out indi-
vidual damages claims that are not suitable for class treatment.  The pri-
mary purpose of subclassing in such a case is to ensure that members of
each interest group receive separate representation in the decision
whether to settle the case or risk the issue preclusive effects of an adverse
judgment.
The problem is that settlement with only part of the class might be of
little use to the defendant in a (b)(2) action, where a demand for equita-
ble relief from the remaining subset of the plaintiffs might still require
the defendant to take actions that would benefit the entire group.  Such
non-atomizable relief is, after all, the defining feature of a class action
under Rule 23(b)(2).204  Having separate representation will be of con-
siderably less benefit to risk-averse class members if the defendant has no
incentive to negotiate a separate settlement with them.205  Separate coun-
sel may serve an informational function, helping to ensure that the court
will take the potential threat to damages claims into account when assess-
ing whether a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable.206  But that is a
limited benefit.
Finally, subclassing is a cumbersome business.  If done properly, it
involves the introduction of a greater number of wholly independent law-
203. See, e.g., id. at 337 n.20 (explaining that class definition requiring plaintiffs to
“prevail on the merits in order to qualify as a class member . . . ‘would preclude
certification of just about any class of persons’” (quoting Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994
F.2d 1101, 1104–06 (5th Cir. 1993))); Zapka v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 99 CV 8238, 2000 WL
1644539, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2000) (refusing to certify class where membership is
defined in terms of state of mind regarding advertising).
204. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (authorizing certification of class where “the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole”).
205. Patrick Woolley makes a similar point in discussing his proposal that absentees
be granted robust intervention rights in class action proceedings.  See Patrick J. Woolley,
Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 571, 617 (1997)
(“Because individual structural reform claims can be inextricably intertwined with each
other, defendants have no incentive to agree to a partial settlement.”).
Silver and Baker explore other types of free-rider problems in their discussion of
plaintiff incentives in complex class actions.  See Silver & Baker, supra note 57, at 1528–30. R
206. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C) (“The court may approve a settlement, voluntary
dismissal, or compromise that would bind class members only after a hearing and on
finding that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.”).
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yers into a class action, with all the attendant increase in paper and pos-
ture that multiple class counsel can bring.  As Professor Issacharoff has
observed:
In an extreme form, this [pro-subclass] reading of Amchem
would create a spiral of subclasses and sets of counsel that would
not only swamp the incentive to invest in bringing a class action,
but would impose tremendous transactional costs on an already
vulnerable procedure that turned heavily on its ability to realize
economies of scale.207
The conflicts of interest that can arise from preclusion problems in
class litigation are both real and serious, but it will often be the case that
only a small portion of a class will be at risk of losing valuable individual
claims.  Where this is so, the expense and inefficiency that subclassing
threatens to introduce make that procedure less attractive.
There may be some cases in which subclassing will provide an ade-
quate or superior method of dealing with intraclass conflicts arising from
preclusive effects.  In most instances, however, it will make more sense
simply to impose constraints upon the preclusive effects themselves.
b. Notice and Opt Out. — Notice and opt-out rights are even less good
candidates for ameliorating the adverse consequences that can flow from
preclusion doctrine in class litigation.  When offered as a means of ad-
dressing potential sources of unfairness to class members in an ongoing
proceeding, notice and opt out operate on the presumption that absen-
tees will read the contents of a notification and possess the capacity to
make a meaningful decision about how best to protect their own inter-
ests.208  The level of sophistication that an absentee would have to exhibit
in order to make an informed decision about the risk that preclusion
doctrine poses to her individual claims, however, would make notice and
opt-out poorly suited to the protection of those interests, even, or per-
haps especially, if the notice were to include a detailed description of the
nature of the doctrinal risk.209  To the extent that notice and opt-out
207. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 337, 380 [hereinafter Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy].
208. Rule 23 now contains prolix requirements for the contents of class notice in a
(b)(3) action:
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), . . . [t]he notice must concisely
and clearly state in plain, easily understood language:
• the nature of the action,
• the definition of the class certified,
• the class claims, issues, or defenses,
• that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member
so desires,
• that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion,
stating when and how members may elect to be excluded, and
• the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
209. See 18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 486 (“The R
opportunity to opt out of a state class action is only as good as the clarity of the notice and
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rights have played a role in the reported decisions addressing these is-
sues, that role has instead related to the ex post consideration of a class
judgment’s preclusive impact.
Individual notice and opt-out rights serve two distinct functions in a
class proceeding.  The first function is jurisdictional.  In a class action
that spans multiple states or otherwise involves absent plaintiffs who have
no minimum contacts with the rendering forum, notice and the opportu-
nity to opt out provide the minimal manifestation of consent that is nec-
essary for the rendering forum to bind the absentees to its judgment.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, which is
so frequently cited for the proposition that notice and opt-out rights are a
constitutional requirement in a damages class action, dealt almost exclu-
sively with the function of those procedures in conferring personal juris-
diction where it would otherwise be lacking.210
The second function that opt-out rights serve is to reintroduce an
element of litigant autonomy into an ongoing class action.  In theory,
notifying the absentees about developments in a class proceeding (like a
proposed settlement), and giving them the opportunity to opt out, pro-
vides a check on the adequacy of class counsel’s representational efforts
and reinforces the moral authority of binding absentees to the result.211
The reiteration of the court’s discretion to provide opt-out rights during
settlement that is contained in the recent revisions to Rule 23 aims at
such process-reinforcing goals.212
In practical terms, these two functions often have very little to do
with each other.  The constitutional requirements of personal jurisdiction
aim primarily at protecting litigants against inconvenience and expense.
Even in that capacity, personal jurisdiction rules exhibit a highly formal
structure and a fetishistic treatment of state boundaries that often make
them better as gatekeepers for the substantive law that will apply to a
dispute than as protection against inconvenience.  These constraints on
choice of forum, which were the primary concern in Shutts, have little
relation to the fairness or integrity of an ongoing proceeding.  The mani-
festation of consent that Shutts requires is a blunt instrument that seeks
only a “yes” or “no” answer best suited to the threshold question of forum
choice.  The established place that notice and opt out occupy in the certi-
fication process as a means of establishing jurisdiction thus says little
the sophistication and incentives of class members.  In realistic terms, the opt-out
opportunity provides no real protection to many members of many classes.”).
210. 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).
211. Professor Fiss makes a similar point in his discussion of representation and
individualism.  See Fiss, supra note 65, at 977 (“Notice is provided to members of the class, R
but only as a way of checking on the adequacy of representation, not to protect the
individual’s right to participation.”).
212. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B), (e)(3) (requiring that court provide notice to
class members before approving settlement and reaffirming power of court to order
second opt-out opportunity in (b)(3) cases).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 71 28-MAR-05 13:53
2005] PRECLUSION IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 787
about the usefulness of those devices in reinforcing process values once
the action is underway.213
Those few courts that have concluded that notice and opt-out rights
are of central importance in analyzing preclusion in class action litigation
have tended to conflate the jurisdiction-conferring and process-reinforc-
ing functions of those devices.  A few such courts, for example, have held
that a class action for equitable relief, certified without individual notice
and opt-out rights, can never extinguish the individual damages claims of
class members through merger or bar because notice and the opportu-
nity to opt out are threshold constitutional requirements for the extin-
guishment of damages claims in representative litigation.214  When the
equitable proceeding in question presents no personal jurisdiction
problems, however,215 opt-out rights have little constitutional relevance
to the claim preclusive effect of the judgment, and there is little reason to
think that providing notice and opt-out rights to the members of an equi-
table class action would give them a meaningful opportunity to decide
whether to place their individual damages claims at risk.216
Notice and opt-out rights function best when they present class mem-
bers with relatively straightforward choices:  Do you wish to have your
claims litigated in this class proceeding; or do you think this settlement
offers you fair value for the injuries you have suffered?  They are not well
suited to operate as a proxy for robust expressions of litigant autonomy
213. See Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy, supra note 207, at 369 (“The ability R
to opt out rises to constitutional dimensions only with [Shutts], in which the ability to opt
out is considered a mild signifier of consent to jurisdiction—although not to adequacy of
representation—in a forum that otherwise had no contact with the injuries claimed by
some portion of the absent class members.”).
214. See, e.g., Jahn ex rel. Jahn v. ORCR, Inc., 92 P.3d 984, 987–92 (Colo. 2004) (en
banc) (holding that action certified under Rule 23(b)(2) can never have claim preclusive
effect on individual damages claims).  The Seventh Circuit suggests as much in Jefferson v.
Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897–99 (7th Cir. 1999).
215. See Jahn, 92 P.3d at 985 (describing scope of class, which includes only residents
from a single nursing home in Colorado).
216. Commentators differ greatly as to the need for and utility of opt-out rights, even
in the case of damages claims where class members have no contact with the proposed
forum.  Compare David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class
Actions:  Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 19–24 (criticizing utility of opt-out
rights in settlement of damages class actions), David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation
Class Action:  The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 896–97 (2002)
(issuing broad call for binding class actions without opportunity to opt out), and David L.
Shapiro, Class Actions:  The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 950–60
(1998) [hereinafter Shapiro, Class Actions] (arguing against mandatory opt-out rights
where class may properly be treated as independent entity rather than aggregate of
individual claims), with John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:  Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 370, 371–80 (2000)
(endorsing opt-out rights as appropriate opportunity for exit where ability of class
members to count upon loyalty of their representatives or voice their interests effectively
are compromised), and Issacharoff, Preclusion, supra note 1, at 1073–80 (urging that opt- R
out rights be provided in high-stakes cases where individual litigants are more likely to
make meaningful individual choices).
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on complicated doctrinal matters like those associated with preclusive
effects.217
4. The Incentives of Counsel and the Need for Judicial Supervision. —
There is a practical impediment to identifying and confronting preclu-
sion problems during certification:  It will sometimes be the case that
neither plaintiffs’ counsel nor the defendant will have a clear incentive to
raise the issue.  Where this is so, the court will have to be diligent in
recognizing potential preclusion problems on its own initiative.
The natural party to bring preclusion problems to the attention of
the court in a litigated action might seem to be the defendant, since a
preclusion analysis might expose conflicts of interest within the class that
could defeat certification.  The problem is that it will often be necessary,
in making a convincing argument on this score, to accentuate the impor-
tance and viability of the class members’ unpled claims.  That may be a
very unattractive prospect for a defendant.  While there may be nothing
illogical about attacking the merits of the classwide claims while at the
same time pointing out the theoretical existence of meritorious individ-
ual claims, one can easily imagine many defense lawyers deciding that the
potential benefit of raising the argument is outweighed by the potential
harm to their credibility.  This is particularly true in light of the fact that
the result of conducting a preclusion analysis at the outset of a class pro-
ceeding might be an order expressly constraining the effects of the judg-
ment, rather than a denial of certification.  Unless the merits of plaintiffs’
claims are undeniable and the viability of any constraining order in seri-
ous doubt, there may be little reason for defendants to place preclusion
issues before the court.
Class counsel is also an imperfect agent here.  In theory, of course,
class counsel would have a duty to bring any preclusion problems to the
court’s attention in order to avoid potential harm to the absentees’ future
interests and resolve a potential impediment to class certification by re-
questing a constraining order that would expressly avoid those bad re-
sults.  In practice, many plaintiff lawyers may be dissuaded from doing so
by the risk that a court will respond by denying certification rather than
imposing a curative constraint.  Indeed, even responsible class counsel
might sometimes conclude, whether rightly or not, that any threat to the
interests of individual claimants within a class would be outweighed by
the benefits of the class action and could possibly be addressed by a sub-
sequent forum in any event.218  While some class counsel would undoubt-
217. See 18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 486 (concluding that R
“[i]t requires extraordinary faith to rely on the opportunity to opt out to justify preclusion
without actually adequate representation in any setting” and noting that “[t]o rely on the
opportunity to opt out from litigation in a state court that could not command personal
jurisdiction over absent class members for any other purpose is even more extraordinary”).
218. Some state courts have demonstrated a greater willingness than is usually evident
in the federal system to allow class counsel to certify broad actions, particularly for low-
value claims, and allow any problems to be sorted out in subsequent challenges to the
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edly be willing to risk their own fees to protect the interests of the class,
Rule 23 must also guard against less responsible actors.
The responsibility thus falls to the certifying court to inquire into the
preclusive effects of a class proceeding, even if neither party raises the
issue as an initial matter.  Such an independent duty of judicial supervi-
sion has become a more broadly acknowledged feature of class litigation
since the Supreme Court proclaimed it to be indispensable in the review
of settlement-only proceedings.219  The responsibility is a more modest
one here, for the parties should have every incentive to litigate the threat
of adverse preclusion effects vigorously once the issue is before the court.
III. HARMONIZING JOINDER AND PRECLUSION POLICIES
It remains to be determined when the tools set forth above should be
put to use—in other words, how joinder and preclusion policies should
be harmonized—in a complex class action.  When attempting to bring
together two concepts, one of which is quite familiar and one largely
unexplored, there is a natural tendency to place the more familiar con-
cept in the dominant position and then attempt to bring the less familiar
concept into conformity with it.  That tendency could offer a powerful
temptation in the present context.  We have a rich vocabulary for discuss-
ing the familiar requirements for certifying a class action, while the role
of preclusive effects in that calculus has received only scant and superfi-
cial attention.  Having recognized the threat that preclusion doctrine can
pose to certification, it would be easy to take the theoretical and doctrinal
tools laid out in Part II and frame a preclusion analysis solely in terms of
the most expedient way to overcome preclusion problems so as to enable
a class action to proceed.  Indeed, this tendency is already discernible
among those authorities that have attempted to navigate the issue.
Wright, Miller, and Cooper, for example, offer the following exhortation
where the claim preclusive effect of an injunctive class action is
concerned:
The basic effort to limit class adjudication as close as possible to
matters common to members of the class frequently requires
that nonparticipating members of the class remain free to pur-
sue individual actions that would be merged or barred by claim
preclusion had a prior individual action been brought from the
relief demanded in the class action. . . . [A]n individual who has
judgment.  See, e.g., Cartt v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 382–85 (Ct. App. 1975)
(permitting negative-value class action to proceed despite problems in providing notice on
theory that aggrieved class members can challenge adequacy of notice in subsequent
proceedings).  But see S.W. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000) (rejecting
“approach of certify now and worry later” and requiring Texas state courts to adhere
strictly to class action requirements).  I discuss the role of the rendering forum in policing
the preclusive effects of class judgments infra Part IV.
219. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621–22 (1997) (describing
danger that settlement proponents will not fairly represent downsides of proffered bargain
to court, and concomitant need for court to be independently vigilant).
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suffered particular injury as a result of practices enjoined in a
class action should remain free to seek a damages remedy even
though claim preclusion would defeat a second action had the
first action been an individual suit for the same injunctive
relief.220
As Part I discusses, this proposed solution to the treatment of injunc-
tive class actions represents the dominant approach among the few courts
that have considered the issue, and it may well be the best course in most
cases.  But Wright, Miller, and Cooper frame the analysis in an oversim-
plified manner, assuming without analysis that preclusion doctrine
should give way to certification when the two come into conflict.
The clarification of preclusion doctrine’s ex ante impact upon the
certification process, and the demystification of the rendering forum’s
role in managing that impact, need not and should not equate to the
subordination of a forum’s preclusion policies to all competing concerns.
The question “How should preclusion doctrine be managed in order to
permit a class action to be filed?” could as easily be met with the rejoinder
“Which class actions should be prohibited in order to give proper expres-
sion to the principles underlying the forum’s preclusion doctrines?”
When a court considers the imposition of constraints upon its judgment
in order to eliminate a preclusion problem that might prevent class certi-
fication, it must also assess the impact of those constraints upon the juris-
diction’s preclusion policies and determine whether joinder or preclu-
sion should take precedence when the two come into conflict.
A. Preclusion Policies
The task of assessing how a proposed constraint on the preclusive
effect of a class proceeding should be measured against a jurisdiction’s
policy commitments in that field requires one to look beyond the simple
rules of the doctrine to examine the systemic preclusion values that the
jurisdiction has embraced.  In a trivial sense, every decision by a court to
place limitations upon the preclusive effect of a class judgment will run
contrary to the ordinary practice of the jurisdiction.  That observation is
not helpful in seeking to determine the acceptable metes and bounds of
such constraints.  Rather, the goal must be to identify those doctrines that
reveal a considered and definite choice between competing values.
When a jurisdiction has placed particular emphasis on one or more sys-
temic values in crafting the preclusion rules for its judicial system, a certi-
fying court should be hesitant to impose a constraint that operates in
derogation of those values.
220. 18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 461–62.  The omitted text R
consists mostly of a discussion of the Cooper case.  See also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000) (“To determine whether damages predominate, a court
should certify a class on a claim-by-claim basis, treating each claim individually and
certifying the class with respect to only those claims for which certification is
appropriate.”).
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One such systemic value relates to the imperative to choose the most
efficient forum when initiating a lawsuit.  Some jurisdictions adopt pre-
clusion doctrines that threaten plaintiffs with harsh penalties if they fail
to select a forum in which all of their claims can be litigated in a single
proceeding.  In states that have refused to adopt the “jurisdictional com-
petency” exception, for example, a plaintiff who initiates a suit in a court
of limited subject matter jurisdiction may find himself precluded from
filing a related claim later on, even if that claim could not have been
brought in the original action due to the limitations of the forum.221
Some courts have penalized plaintiffs for “splitting” claims when they util-
ize a small claims court or other specialized tribunal of limited jurisdic-
tion and then attempt to file a related claim in a court of general jurisdic-
tion.222  In the context of exclusive federal jurisdiction, Marrese offers the
possibility that a plaintiff who brings a state claim in state court may for-
feit his right to assert exclusively federal claims in a subsequent federal
proceeding, though the opinion also does hint that there may sometimes
be a sufficient interest in preserving a federal forum for such claims to
override state policy when this situation arises.223  One court has even
adopted a similar rule in supplemental jurisdiction cases, holding that
when a federal court declines to hear related state law claims in a federal
question suit, the plaintiff must nonsuit the federal claims and refile the
entire suit in state court or else lose the chance to assert the state law
claims.224  New Jersey’s much-noted experiment with the “entire contro-
221. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. R
222. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Tharaldson Enters., 95 F.3d 624, 626–27 (7th Cir. 1996)
(precluding plaintiff from raising federal discrimination claims where plaintiff chose to
litigate related claims in a state administrative tribunal, even though tribunal could not
have heard federal claims, because more convenient forum was available).  Indeed, the
Restatement offers this result as the expected outcome when a plaintiff has access to a
court of general jurisdiction but chooses to file in a limited forum:
The same considerations apply when the first action is brought in a court which
has jurisdiction to redress an invasion of a certain interest of the plaintiff, but not
another, and the action goes to judgment on the merits. . . . The plaintiff, having
voluntarily brought his action in a court which can grant him only limited relief,
cannot insist upon maintaining another action on the claim.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. g (1982).
223. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386 (1985)
(“Resolution of this question will depend upon the particular federal statute as well as the
nature of the claim or issue involved in the subsequent federal action.”); supra note 168 R
(citing cases where court of appeals found state judgments to have claim preclusive effect
on subsequent bankruptcy proceeding despite exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts).
224. A California appellate court adopted this harsh policy in Mattson v. City of Costa
Mesa:
The initial choice by the plaintiff to file suit in federal court will not necessarily
result in splitting his cause of action, because the federal court may well exercise
pendent jurisdiction over the non-federal claim.  However, when the federal
court has been requested to and has declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction
over the non-federal claim, the plaintiff is presented with a new choice.  He may
proceed to trial on the federal claim or, usually, he may elect to dismiss the
federal claim without prejudice and litigate both claims in the state court.  Once
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versy” doctrine, which subjected plaintiffs to nonmutual claim preclusion
for failing to join all available defendants on transactionally related
claims, might also be characterized as embodying a strong policy in favor
of having all related claims heard in a single proceeding.225
Jurisdictions that embrace such policies assign a higher value to the
repose for defendants, consistency of result, and responsible behavior by
plaintiffs that come from requiring a single, comprehensive adjudication
than they ascribe to the expertise and comity associated with preserving a
specialized forum for the adjudication of certain types of claims.  A certi-
fying court that imposed a preclusion constraint intended solely to pre-
serve the benefits of a specialized forum—as, for example, with the stay-
in-state-court civil rights suit described in Part II.B—would be acting in
derogation of that policy decision.  If the jurisdiction has made a clear
choice in its preclusion policies to elevate repose, consistency, and re-
sponsible litigation choices over the benefits of specialized fora, the certi-
fying court might have to conclude that those policies militate strongly
against the use of preclusion constraints to enable a class of civil rights
plaintiffs to bring state claims in a state forum while also preserving the
right of individuals to seek federal relief.
Another body of preclusion policies relates to what might be called
equality of downside risk.  The doctrine of offensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusion most clearly implicates these concerns.  When a defendant suffers
from broad liability exposure to a large number of potential claimants,
the threat of an offensive use of issue preclusion with no requirement of
mutuality makes every lawsuit a high-stakes proposition.  While any indi-
vidual plaintiff may stand to gain only a modest recovery from a victory in
such a case, the defendant might stand to lose a fortune from any defeat.
This imbalance in the downside risk of litigation can strengthen the
plaintiff’s hand significantly in settlement negotiations.226  Some jurisdic-
tions reject the use of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion because they
it is known that the federal court will not exercise pendent jurisdiction over the
state claim, plaintiff’s proceeding to trial in the federal court on the federal claim
alone will necessarily result in splitting the plaintiff’s cause of action, and that fact
should be apparent to the plaintiff.
164 Cal. Rptr. 913, 921–22 (Ct. App. 1980) (citations omitted).  This unusual holding
probably does not survive the Court’s opinion in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 531 U.S. 491 (2001). The federal court’s dismissal under § 1367 in this case was a
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction—albeit one involving the special case of a
discretionary jurisdictional grant.  The federal courts treat such a dismissal as “without
prejudice” for the refiling of those claims, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), and Semtek confirms
that such a designation has dispositive effect in a subsequent proceeding, see supra notes
126–133 and accompanying text. R
225. See generally Allan R. Stein, Commentary:  Power, Duty and the Entire
Controversy Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L.J. 27 (1996) (describing entire controversy doctrine
and benefits and disadvantages of such aggressive joinder policies).
226. See Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its
Promise:  An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 141, 207–16
(1984) (enumerating costs to fairness values associated with use of nonmutual offensive
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conclude that the unfairness to the defendant resulting from this imbal-
ance in downside risk outweighs the benefits—of efficiency, consistency
of result, or integrity of judgments—that the doctrine promises.227
Such a policy determination might be relevant to a certifying court
faced with a conflict of interest of the type that a defective products case
may pose.  As Part II.B explains, when a class wishes to pursue a claim for
economic damages or equitable relief in a defective products case with-
out compromising the ability of injured class members to pursue more
valuable individual claims, the certifying court will likely need to impose a
constraint upon its judgment that would remove all prejudice to the class
from issue preclusion or merger and bar outside of the claims actually
litigated in the action.  Such an order—which, in practical terms, would
prohibit the defendants from invoking the class action version of “non-
mutual” defensive issue preclusion in subsequent suits by absentees—
would serve to eliminate the conflict in settlement incentives that the
class would otherwise experience.  But it would also have the effect of
shifting disproportionate risk to the defendant, who would face the threat
of widespread offensive issue preclusion by individual plaintiffs if the class
secured a favorable judgment but would enjoy no preclusion benefits if
the class lost.228
In a jurisdiction that has chosen to forgo offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion in order to avoid imposing the unfairness of unequal down-
side risk upon defendants, these consequences would militate against the
issuance of such broad constraints upon the preclusive effects of a class
action judgment.  If a class cannot be certified on claims for economic
damages or equitable relief in a defective products case (or similar tort
suit) without the use of these constraints, the court might have to con-
clude that the applicable preclusion policies foreclose the resolution of
those claims on a classwide basis.  Indeed, even in jurisdictions that do
not place determinative weight on inequality of downside risk when set-
ting their mutuality requirements, these concerns about fairness to the
defendant would surely be recognized as legitimate.229  Thus, the extra
burden to the defendant that would flow from imposing broad, unilateral
issue preclusion in mass tort litigation and calling into serious question concomitant
benefits).
227. See Shapiro, Preclusion, supra note 35, at 110–16 (discussing offensive R
nonmutual issue preclusion in light of these systemic preclusion values).
228. Such an arrangement is somewhat reminiscent of the “premodern class actions”
in which “absent class members could, in effect, join into the lawsuit” only after a
representative plaintiff achieved a victory while suffering no detriment in the event of a
loss.  Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy, supra note 207, at 364–65.  There is a key R
difference, of course, in that class members in the above scenario would be bound by the
resolution of the certified claim.  But in a case where the certified claim is of low value and
the individual claims are large, the impact upon the defendant is not dissimilar.  The
Bridgestone/Firestone cases probably fit this description.  See supra notes 173–174 and R
accompanying text.
229. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330–33 (1979) (discussing
fairness concerns that offensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion introduces).
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constraints on issue preclusion in a defective products case will likely be a
consideration in almost any certification analysis.  In a suit for economic
damages under Rule 23(b)(3), for example, the need for the defendant
to bear disproportionate risk from issue preclusion in order for the suit to
proceed should factor into the superiority determination.
A court could mitigate these consequences by extending its broad
constraint on issue preclusion to benefit the defendant as well as the
class.  But a bilateral constraint of this kind would raise its own set of
concerns.  For starters, it would eliminate all efficiency benefits from the
class action beyond the resolution of the certified claim itself.  It would
also significantly amplify the likelihood of inconsistent factual determina-
tions—on the same issues and between the “same” parties—across multi-
ple suits.  In the case of a unilateral constraint, inconsistent determina-
tions would, by definition, be possible only if the defendant prevailed in
the class suit, since the absentees could invoke the judgment as an offen-
sive estoppel if they prevailed in the first action.  In the case of a bilateral
constraint on issue preclusion, in contrast, every individual suit would
present an opportunity for a finding inconsistent with the class judgment,
regardless of the outcome in the first proceeding.  For a jurisdiction that
places particular weight upon preserving the integrity of its judgments
and avoiding inconsistent resolutions—policies that might find expres-
sion in a liberal doctrine of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion—this
type of bilateral constraint on the preclusive effects of the class judgment
would be disfavored.230
In short, in a defective products or other tort suit where some class
members possess substantial damages claims that are not suitable for
classwide treatment, any attempt to use constraints on the preclusive ef-
fect of the judgment to eliminate the conflicts of interest within the class
is likely to operate in tension with the jurisdiction’s broader preclusion
policies, regardless of what configuration of policies the jurisdiction em-
braces.  When the use of such constraints is the only way to make any part
of a complicated tort case suitable for class treatment, class counsel
should be required to offer a convincing argument as to why certification
is nonetheless desirable.
As with any form of governmental interest analysis, these inquiries
into the values underlying a jurisdiction’s preclusion doctrine could be
subject to manipulation231—though perhaps less so than in other fields,
230. In his monograph on preclusion doctrine, Professor Shapiro, for one, has taken
the position that “the virtues of [nonmutual issue preclusion] exceed the defects so long as
the limitations are marked with sufficient clarity and uniformly applied by all tribunals
within the jurisdiction.”  Shapiro, Preclusion, supra note 35, at 115. R
231. The debate about such manipulation in the choice of law field is fully joined.
See Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis:  A House Without Foundations, 46
Ohio St. L.J. 459, 466–76 (1985) (issuing broad critique of interest analysis in choice of law
as devoid of constraints and excessively malleable); Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 112, at R
299–301 (arguing that criticisms of governmental interest analysis apply with at least some
force to all instances where courts must interpret and apply laws in cases presenting
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given the relatively concise vocabulary of concepts that tends to be uti-
lized in preclusion analysis.232  Still, one might argue that placing a pow-
erful new tool in the hands of a rendering forum and then offering policy
analysis as the principal restriction on that tool is an invitation for aggres-
sive courts to certify ever more inappropriate class actions.  It seems more
likely, however, that any court that is strongly inclined to certify at all
costs will simply continue the dominant practice of ignoring preclusion
concerns altogether.  The proper audience for this discussion, at least for
the present, is made up of those rendering courts—and also those recog-
nizing courts, as I discuss in Part IV—that diligently seek to balance the
ability of plaintiffs to obtain effective relief against the other important
policies that a jurisdiction has adopted.  For those courts, the form of
policy analysis described in this section provides a practicable method for
determining which constraints will operate in tension with a jurisdiction’s
broader preclusion commitments.
B. Sources of Law and the Rules Enabling Act
If a class action cannot be certified without the use of a preclusion
constraint that the jurisdiction appears to disfavor, the certifying court
must determine whether the plaintiffs’ interest in proceeding as a class is
nonetheless strong enough to justify the use of the constraint.  The spe-
cific responsibility of the court in such a case is to determine the policy
that the forum has embraced for making aggregate relief, as opposed to
individual relief, available to the class of claimants before it.  The Rules
Enabling Act, with its proviso forbidding any application of a rule of pro-
cedure that would “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,”233
makes the task of assessing that policy interest more complicated.234  Al-
“unforeseen or uncontemplated circumstances”); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis as the
Preferred Approach to Choice of Law:  A Response to Professor Brilmayer’s “Foundational
Attack”, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 483, 483 (1985) (defending interest analysis as best option for
securing fairness to litigants and reasonable outcomes); Patrick J. Borchers, Professor
Brilmayer and the Holy Grail, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 465, 476–89 (reviewing Lea Brilmayer,
Conflict of Laws:  Foundations and Future Directions (1991)) (criticizing the alternatives
that Brilmayer has offered to interest analysis as equally subject to manipulation).
232. See Shapiro, Preclusion, supra note 35, at 13–18 (discussing range of interests R
generally associated with preclusion doctrine).
233. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).  Many states have a parallel provision to the Act that
includes a reservation clause for substantive rights.  See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 22.004(a) (Vernon 2004) (stating that Texas Supreme Court cannot “abridge, enlarge,
or modify the substantive rights of a litigant” using its rulemaking power); Tex. R. Civ. P.
815 (stating that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure cannot abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right).  As Professor Burbank has explained, there may be significant
theoretical and practical differences between the application of this proviso in the federal
system and in a state court.  See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 120, at 1091–92. R
Nonetheless, I will treat the Rules Enabling Act and its state counterparts as
interchangeable, a simplifying gesture that is adequate for the broad discussion of joinder
policy that follows.
234. Professor Burbank has demonstrated that those who drafted the Rules Enabling
Act likely viewed subsection (a) of the statute, which granted authority to prescribe only
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though Rule 23 occupies a central position as the tool by which broad
joinder is effectuated in representative litigation, it is not an appropriate
authority to look to for the type of robust interest in aggregate relief that
is necessary here.
Seventy years after the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, there is
still no general agreement concerning the proper interpretation of the
statute’s “substantive rights” proviso.  The two dominant approaches
come to us from John Hart Ely and Stephen Burbank.  Ely set forth the
view that the limitations contained in the Act are primarily an expression
of federalism values.  He therefore advocated an interpretive approach
that would treat substantive state policies as “trumps,” available on a rov-
ing basis to override otherwise applicable Federal Rules.235  Burbank, in
contrast, has argued that the Act is primarily an embodiment of separa-
tion of powers principles—specifically, a judgment that decisionmaking
authority for matters of substantive policy should ordinarily be reserved
to Congress rather than the federal courts.  Burbank would interpret the
proviso to impose more unitary limitations upon the Rules, branding as
ultra vires any interpretation that would have predictable and identifiable
effects of the type normally reserved for substantive lawmaking, but other-
wise not bowing to contrary state policies, “substantive” or otherwise.236
Although the Act’s proviso appeared to lapse into partial desuetude
for some time following the narrow construction that the Court placed
upon it in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,237 it has recently received renewed
“general rules of practice and procedure,” as the primary source of limitation contained in
the Act, with the proviso of subsection (b) serving merely to confirm that limited authority.
See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 120, at 1077–90; see also 28 U.S.C. R
§ 2072(a)–(b).  Nevertheless, since the second subsection has become the primary focus of
judicial attention in discussing limitations on the Federal Rules, I will follow the more
common convention.
235. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 718–38
(1974) (suggesting that substantive state law should prevail over federal procedural rules).
236. See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 120, at 1025 (“[T]he famous first R
two sentences of the Act . . . were intended to allocate power between the Supreme Court
as rulemaker and Congress and thus to circumscribe the delegation of legislative
power . . . .”); id. at 1122–25 (criticizing manner in which Ely frames “substantive rights”
question which improperly places federalism values at center of analysis and produces
interpretations of Federal Rules that can vary across jurisdictions).
237. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). Sibbach involved an application of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 35, the provision that authorizes physical and mental examinations of persons.
The plaintiff in the case, who was asserting personal injury claims, was ordered to undergo
a physical examination during discovery, and she argued that this application of Rule 35
violated her right to privacy.  Id. at 7–8.  The Court rejected the argument and adopted an
interpretation of the Enabling Act proviso under which a party could assert an abridgment
of her substantive rights only when a Rule imposed a mandatory requirement upon her
that impacted her primary, extralitigation activities.  Since the plaintiff in Sibbach could
have chosen not to comply with the discovery order, the Court held, she had no basis for
arguing that the application of Rule 35 had infringed her substantive rights.  See id. at
13–14 (explaining that test for such rules is whether they truly regulate procedure).  The
fact that this refusal would have resulted in a discovery sanction, such that the plaintiff’s
“choice” lay between complying with the order or losing the right to pursue her claim, did
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attention in a pair of cases that happen to address the two halves of the
present doctrinal inquiry: Ortiz and Semtek. In Ortiz—the class action
case in which the Court invalidated a limited fund variation on the asbes-
tos settlement previously rejected in Amchem—the settling parties had at-
tempted to misuse Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as a device for reducing the total
amount of monetary relief that would be available to class members by
manufacturing a “limited fund” of available assets by stipulation.238  The
majority invoked the Act’s substantive rights language in rejecting this
attempt and cautioned against any interpretation of Rule 23 that would
dramatically limit the relief available to class members under the applica-
ble liability regime.239  In Semtek, the Court invoked the Act in explaining
its refusal to read an independent set of preclusion doctrines into Rule
41(b), suggesting that an interpretation of the Rule that would eliminate
a remedy otherwise allowed by the applicable preclusion law might consti-
tute an “abridgement” of rights under the proviso.240
These recent statements imply that the remedial expectations that a
party enjoys under a given preclusion regime constitute one of those
“substantive rights” that the Federal Rules cannot alter.  In extreme cases,
where a Federal Rule threatens to extinguish or dramatically limit a form
of relief that a claimant would otherwise enjoy, that result is intuitively
satisfying and probably in accord both with Ely, who would identify such
remedial expectations as substantive policies sufficient to trump an other-
wise applicable rule, and with Burbank, who has already expressed the
view that preclusion doctrines exceed the regulatory authority of the fed-
eral rulemakers when they “dramatically affect the ability of litigants to
enforce their substantive rights.”241
Now, it would be a mistake to overestimate the relevance of the sub-
stantive rights language in interpreting Rule 23, even following these sug-
gestive dicta.  At this late date, it is untenable to urge a reading of the
Rules Enabling Act that would prohibit Rule 23 from having any impact
whatsoever on the ability of class members to employ the full range of
not change the Court’s assessment of the Rule’s nonmandatory character.  See
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964) (applying Sibbach’s holding to
defendant); Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 120, at 1176–84 (arguing that Sibbach R
was rightly decided, though wrongly explained, in light of purposes originally animating
Rules Enabling Act).
238. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 850–53 (1999).
239. Id. at 845.
240. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001) (“In
the present case . . . if California law left petitioner free to sue on this claim in Maryland
even after the California statute of limitations had expired, the federal court’s
extinguishment of that right (through Rule 41(b)’s mandated claim preclusive effect of its
judgment) would seem to violate this limitation.”).
241. Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 120, at 1128 (“Clearly preclusive R
doctrines like a statute of limitations, laches, or res judicata dramatically affect the ability of
litigants to enforce their substantive rights and . . . determine in a practical sense whether
those rights exist at all, at least when viewed from the point in time at which they are
asserted.” (citation omitted)).
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remedial options that would be available to them in individual litigation,
and neither Ortiz nor Semtek compels that result.242  Indeed, the Court’s
suggestion in Semtek that a jurisdiction’s preclusion rules constitute one
of the substantive rights protected by the Act’s proviso clearly cannot be
read too literally.  Taken to its logical conclusion, this proposition would
seem to foreclose a federal court from designating a dismissal as without
prejudice whenever a state court would not do likewise, since allowing the
plaintiff another bite at the apple would presumably “enlarge or modify”
his remedial rights.  The Semtek Court itself rejected this result, however,
when it reaffirmed the ability of a federal court to utilize the without
prejudice designation in Rule 41 to dispositive effect.243
Nonetheless, these passages do have some bearing upon the present
question.  They suggest that, when a proposed constraint on the preclu-
sive effect of a class action judgment derogates from a jurisdiction’s
broader preclusion policies, a court cannot rely upon its joinder rules
alone to serve as an independent counterweight in analyzing the propri-
ety of the proposed constraint.  Rather, the court will have to rely upon
more clearly “substantive” sources of law—in particular, the liability re-
gime that applies to the dispute—in determining the extent to which the
benefits of aggregate relief can serve to offset any burden that the con-
straint places upon preclusion values.244  This observation is particularly
important in the case of a federal diversity court.  When a diversity court
considers a proposed constraint upon the preclusive effect of a class ac-
242. The Court said as much in one of its earliest interpretations of the Act:
Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may and
often do affect the rights of litigants.  Congress’ prohibition of any alteration of
substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental
effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of
procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice and
procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their
rights.
Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946).  Professor Woolley argues that
certain Federal Rules can entail the articulation of supporting preclusion doctrines that
will survive the Rules Enabling Act.  See Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal
Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 527, 590–91 (2003) (arguing that
“preclusion rules [aimed at] enforcing procedural obligations [lie] within the scope of the
REA”).  But see Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506 n.2 (flagging the possibility that a district court’s
“‘dismissal upon the merits’ [in a diversity action] under circumstances where a state court
would decree only a ‘dismissal without prejudice,’” might conceivably “abridge[ ] a
‘substantive right’ and thus exceed[ ] the authorization of the Rules Enabling Act”);
Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1027, 1042 n.66 (2002) (discussing this passage).
243. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505–06.
244. Burbank makes a similar point in his discussion of the federal common law
origins of preclusion doctrine for federal judgments.  See Burbank, Interjurisdictional
Preclusion, supra note 7, at 766 (“So long as preclusion law affects substantive rights, there R
is a federal interest in the definition of the federal rights adjudicated in a federal
judgment.”); see also id. at 790 (discussing the importance of “disciplining the process by
which federal policies finding expression in the permissible legal sources are considered,
as against competing policies, in determining whether federal common law applies”).
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tion judgment that would burden preclusion commitments under state
law, the court cannot look to Rule 23 as an independent source of au-
thority to counterbalance that burden.245  It must rely instead upon the
state liability regime.246
There are many situations in which a jurisdiction’s liability rules will
have something to say about the desirability of liberal joinder rules in a
class action proceeding.  The circumstance that has received the most
attention in this respect is the negative-value claim, where aggregate liti-
gation may represent the only economically viable opportunity for ob-
taining relief.  The Supreme Court has thus far resisted the argument
245. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, might
complicate the analysis.  As an independent federal statute, the CAFA is not bound by the
proviso of the Rules Enabling Act, and any independent joinder policies that the CAFA
entails are available to influence or control assessments about the propriety of employing
particular constraints on preclusion to facilitate class certification.  It is unclear, however,
what independent policy it would be appropriate to read into the statute in this respect.
On the one hand, the CAFA aims to curb the abuses of overly ambitious state court actions,
which might suggest that the statute would be cautious about replicating such actions in
federal court.  See § (2)(a)(1)–(4), 119 Stat. at 4–5 (criticizing certification practices in
state and local courts).  On the other hand, that very concern over state court abuses might
counsel in favor of reading broad joinder policies into the statute so that the maximum
number of claims coming within its jurisdictional provisions could be adjudicated in a
federal forum.
246. Professor Burbank makes a similar point in his discussion of the sources of
authority for preclusion rules in federal diversity court:
If the Constitution or acts of Congress, fairly read, provide for or require federal
common law, state law does not apply [in a federal diversity court].  The same is
true whether a uniform federal rule is called for or a particular state rule is found
to be hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests.  In other cases where the
Constitution does not so ordain, state law applies, not “of its own force” and not
by judicial grace or borrowing, but because Congress has borrowed it.
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 7, at 762. R
Burbank has also suggested the possibility that Federal Rules might embrace a broader
set of federal common law interests where such interests are pertinent to their proper
spheres of regulatory concern:
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can thus serve as sources of federal common law,
not only by leaving interstices to be filled but also by expressing policies that are
pertinent in areas not covered by the Rules.  Even when legal regulation in a
certain area is forbidden to the Rules, the policies underlying valid Rules may
help to shape valid federal common law.
Id. at 774; see also id. at 773 (“In authorizing the Court to promulgate Federal Rules,
Congress must have contemplated that the federal courts would interpret them, fill their
interstices, and, when necessary, ensure that their provisions were not frustrated by other
legal rules.”).  But that power is a limited one that must be tied to legitimate sources of
regulatory authority.  See id. at 789–90 (“Federal courts are not free to conjure up
‘interests’; rather, they must tie them to policies already articulated in, or at least
articulable from, valid legal prescriptions.”).
Rule 23 does not embody a policy in favor of the broadest joinder possible.  Rather, it
is hedged about with many qualifications aimed at constraining its potentially far reaching
effects.  In Burbank’s terms, there is no federal interest in a “uniform . . . decisional law” of
broad joinder that would “displace particular state law rules in areas untouched by the
Federal Rules.”  Id. at 773.
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that negative-value suits should enjoy more permissive treatment under
mandatory Rule 23 requirements like notice and adequacy of representa-
tion.247  When a court must decide whether to impose a discretionary
constraint on the preclusive effect of a class action judgment, however,
the question is different.  The purpose of such a constraint is to bring a
class action into compliance with the mandatory requirements of the
Rule, not to circumvent them.  The relevant question is whether liberal
joinder is consistent with the constellation of remedial policies that apply
to the dispute.248  In a small-stakes suit, where recovery would be effec-
tively impossible without aggregation, that exigency alone militates in
favor of employing a preclusion constraint in order to eliminate a conflict
of interest that might otherwise make certification impossible.249
Particular liability schemes may speak even more directly to the pro-
priety of liberal joinder.  Consider the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The ex-
press purpose of Congress in passing the Act was to expand the remedies
available to individuals who suffer from employment discrimination.  The
Act was enacted against an acknowledged backdrop of class litigation as
the primary vehicle for obtaining relief for employees.250  And, as Part
I.B.1 discusses, the statute had the unintended consequence of complicat-
ing the certification calculus in those cases where class members might
have viable claims for individual damages.  When a certifying court in a
Title VII case wishes to employ a preclusion constraint in order to permit
a class action to go forward without compromising the claims of individ-
247. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (“There is nothing in
Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of
particular plaintiffs. . . . Rule 23 speaks to notice as well as to adequacy of representation
and requires that both be provided.”).
State courts have not always followed the Court’s lead in this regard.  In his innovative
opinion in Cartt v. Superior Court, for example, Justice Kaus rejected the Court’s reasoning
in Eisen and found instead that a court is justified in applying looser notification standards
to a negative-value consumer class action suit where doing so is necessary to make any
recovery available to class members and the likelihood of subsequent challenges to the
adequacy of the notice is remote.  124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381–85 (Ct. App. 1975).
248. In this vein, Wright, Miller, and Cooper suggest that “[w]hen the only realistic
opportunity to litigate is an aggregated opportunity, whether called a class action or
something else, it is not difficult to adopt a new conception of the underlying claim.  The
claim is not so much an individual claim as a share in a class claim.”  18A Wright, Miller, &
Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 486; see also Shapiro, Class Actions, supra note 216, at R
923–25 (discussing “entity” theory of class litigation and attractiveness of that theory in
negative-value class action).
249. Some commentators have argued that the same exigencies that warrant
flexibility in the certification of negative-value class actions also warrant stricter adherence
to finality, and fewer opportunities for collateral attack, following the close of the
proceeding.  See 18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 486–87 (“This view R
[of limited collateral attack opportunities] is particularly beguiling with respect to
individual claims that would not in fact be litigated individually.”).
250. Cf. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 7, at 815 (“It seems R
unlikely that legislatures often think about preclusion law when they are enacting schemes
of substantive rights.  But they do legislate against a background of judge-made preclusion
law.”).
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ual class members, the 1991 Act must be read to embody a substantive
joinder policy in favor of permitting that step.  Such a policy is a natural
concomitant to the statute’s remedial purposes.
A state law regime that assigns damages among multiple defendants
on an actuarial basis—like market-share liability—is another example of a
liability rule that would embody a clear preference for liberal joinder in
the face of potential preclusion problems.  The more comprehensively an
actuarial liability rule is applied in adjudicating claims, the more accurate
the apportionment of damages will be among the defendants.251  The
broad application of such a liability rule to the claims that it properly
embraces will promote fairness and avoid overdeterrence.252  Where
preclusive effects would prevent the certification of an otherwise desira-
ble class action in the absence of an ex ante constraint, an actuarial liabil-
ity rule should thus be read to include a policy in favor of broad joinder
and hence in favor of using the constraint.
Thus, the MTBE court was correct when it voiced its instinct that the
nature and source of the liability rule might be relevant to the resolution
of a preclusion problem in class litigation.253  The court was also correct
in concluding that precedents from the civil rights arena might not speak
directly to the preclusion problems posed by a massive, multi-incident
tort suit.  In a civil rights dispute like the prison riot cases that the MTBE
court distinguished away, any injunctive suit would be frustrated and its
relief undermined by the possibility of multiple inconsistent adjudica-
tions.  A policy in favor of broad joinder is substantively related to the
underlying rights being vindicated in a civil rights action seeking institu-
tional reform.  This is the classic example of a “true” class action, where
providing a benefit to one class member necessarily redounds to the ben-
efit of the others.254  When an ex ante constraint is required in such a
251. I take Professor David Rosenberg to be making a similar point in his discussion
of aggregate litigation and risk based claims.  See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and
Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 210, 236–44
(1996).
252. There may be other reasons for caution in applying such a liability rule broadly
in aggregate litigation.  In the case of “immature” claims, for example, it might be difficult
to achieve a high level of confidence in the scientific evidence for causation, or the proper
measure of damages, without the benefit of a large number of fully litigated individual
actions.  In such a case, the precipitous certification of a class, or the broad use of
nonmutual preclusion, might be contraindicated.  See, e.g., Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 482
N.E.2d 63, 66–70 (N.Y. 1985) (discussing availability of issue preclusion following test cases
in DES litigation, where scientific evidence for causation was disputed); see also
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy, supra note 207, at 342–43 (describing asbestos R
claims as the quintessential “mature” tort because strengths and weaknesses of the science,
valuation of claims, and litigation options are now so well established).
253. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D.
323, 339–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. R
254. See Hazard et al., supra note 20, at 1921–23 (describing treatment of “true” and R
“spurious” class actions prior to enactment of Rule 23); Issacharoff, Governance and
Legitimacy, supra note 207, at 359–63 (characterizing such actions as “compelled R
participation cases whose coerced quality is justified by the inability for any legal resolution
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case to preserve the damages claims of individual class members from
adverse preclusive consequences and to eliminate conflicts of interest
within the class, the underlying liability rule militates in favor of employ-
ing the constraint.  In a multi-incident tort suit like MTBE, in contrast,
the relief sought by the plaintiff class was not interdependent and contin-
gent; rather, it was highly atomized.255  The liability regime thus included
no special imperative that would have favored the use of ex ante con-
straints to overcome preclusion problems and ensure class certification.
Such constraints might still have been allowable, but they enjoyed no spe-
cial preference.
Since the MTBE court was operating under the baleful influence of
the ubiquitous preclusion maxim, it failed to set forth these distinctions
with any precision.  The court’s core instinct, however, was sound.  When
a certifying court would have to impose a constraint on the preclusive
effect of its judgment in order for certification to be proper, and the
requisite constraint would operate in clear derogation of a jurisdiction’s
broader preclusion commitments, the court must look to substantive join-
der policies like those embodied in certain liability rules in order to de-
termine whether it should employ the constraint or, instead, decline to
certify the class.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE RECOGNIZING FORUM
Any discussion of the proper theoretical and doctrinal treatment of
class litigation would be of limited utility if it did not make allowance for
the inevitable fact that its suggestions would frequently be disregarded.
Classes that should not be certified routinely are.  The push for ever
more ambitious classwide resolutions of personal injury and other highly
individualized claims has easily kept pace with the rate at which the legal
community has internalized the norms of limitation that should apply to
such actions.  Indeed, the primary reason for the intense focus on the
binding effect of class action judgments that I referred to in the introduc-
tion to this Article has been the failure of rendering courts to pay careful
enough attention to the adequacy of representation afforded to absen-
tees, particularly as it relates to conflicts of interest within the class.256
There is a more robust dialogue between academy, bench, and bar in the
to proceed absent complete resolution”).  The standard work on the history of
representative or aggregative litigation is Yeazell’s.  See Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval
Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action (1987) (tracing history of representative or
aggregative litigation); see also Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms:
Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 213, 236–38
(1990) (reviewing Yeazell and characterizing suits involving contingent relief, as in many
civil rights actions, as involving “general right”).
255. In re MTBE, 209 F.R.D. at 342–45 (discussing individualized nature of injunctive
relief).
256. See Klonoff, supra note 23, at 677–89 (conducting broad empirical study of R
adequacy analysis by certifying courts and concluding that slipshod analysis is more the
norm than the exception).
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field of complex litigation than in many others, owing to such institutions
as the Rules Advisory Committee and the Federal Judicial Conference,
and also in part to the growing practice of soliciting expert testimony
from legal academics during the certification hearing.257  Even so, any
proposal for reform in the standards that rendering courts should apply
to the certification process must anticipate gradual and incomplete ac-
ceptance, at best.
As a consequence, recognizing fora will continue to play an impor-
tant role in defining and enforcing the proper scope of a class judgment’s
preclusive effects.  While a subsequent tribunal cannot undo the effect of
an improper denial of certification of the type that has occurred in recent
Title VII litigation,258 it will sometimes be able to mitigate an initial
court’s failure to consider the impact of preclusion on the interests of
absentees following entry of judgment when a class action does move for-
ward.  The appropriate means for undertaking such mitigating efforts is
through scrutiny of the adequacy of the representation that class mem-
bers were afforded in the first action.
It remains a matter of serious dispute whether an F2 court may rec-
ognize a full-scale collateral attack and set aside a class judgment on ade-
quacy grounds.  The Supreme Court recently failed to answer the ques-
tion in Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson,259 the circuits remain split,260 and
commentators divide sharply between those who would err in favor of
ensuring that class members have a reliably fair opportunity to recover261
and those who fear that permitting collateral attacks would harm all
plaintiffs by fatally undermining the finality of judgments, thereby dis-
suading defendants from settling.262  The form of adequacy analysis that I
contemplate here, however, is much less disruptive than a full-scale collat-
eral attack would be.  It is, in essence, a more nuanced form of the pre-
clusion analysis that is already an accepted part of a recognizing court’s
role in reviewing prior judgments.
In addition to the familiar limitations on claim and issue preclusion
that F2 courts already apply,263 a court that is asked to give effect to a
257. See, e.g., West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002)
(instructing district courts to resolve competing opinions of experts on question of
certification).  The apparent willingness of some law professors to attest to the propriety of
certifying the most wildly overreaching class actions has itself become a focus of critical
inquiry within the academy, and properly so.
258. See supra Part I.B.1.
259. 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003) (per curiam) (dividing four to four on appeal from
Second Circuit opinion that permitted collateral attack by Agent Orange victims on
grounds of inadequate representation in initial class proceeding).
260. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. R
261. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1200–02; Patrick J. Woolley, The R
Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 Tex. L.
Rev. 383, 389–97 (2000) [hereinafter Woolley, Availability] (arguing in favor of permitting
collateral attack upon showing of inadequate representation).
262. See, e.g., Kahan & Silberman, Inadequate Search, supra note 1, at 779. R
263. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 28–29 (1982).
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class action judgment may need to ask what prospective constraints the
rendering court should have imposed upon the judgment in order for
the representation of all class members to have been minimally adequate
in the initial proceeding.  Where the failure of the F1 court to apply such
a constraint has resulted in the inadequate representation of class mem-
bers’ interests, the F2 court should limit the preclusive effect of the judg-
ment as if the initial tribunal had acted properly.  The F2 court would not
reopen claims actually adjudicated in the first action, as in a full-scale
collateral attack.  Rather, the court would constrain the judgment’s effect
upon the claims not litigated in that action to the extent necessary to
cure the prejudice that the absentees would otherwise suffer from the
inadequate representation of their interests.264
Many recognizing courts have already embraced this role in cases
involving damages claims brought by individuals who were members of
an earlier injunctive class action.  While certifying courts can still be skit-
tish about the issue, subsequent courts have been fairly consistent in
holding that a judgment from an equitable class proceeding should not
preclude individual damages claims that were not litigated in the first
action.  Some courts have simply invoked the “could not have been
brought” language in explaining why claim preclusion does not apply to
such cases,265 but others have explained their holding under the rubric
of adequacy of representation.266  What I am suggesting here is a more
generalized application of the rule implicit in that practice.267
The most difficult problem that a rendering court is likely to face in
this posture involves the issue preclusive effect of a prior judgment.  Con-
sider a class action for equitable relief in which some members of the
264. Wright, Miller, and Cooper speak in favorable, if general, terms of this form of
adequacy analysis:
The conduct of a class action may often create conflicts between the best interests
of non-participating class members and the substantive or procedural arguments
that seem best calculated to maintain the momentum of the class action itself.
Such conflicts may often be difficult to identify, and may not always warrant
denial of preclusion.  They should not be ignored, however, and at least should
be considered in attempting to apply the more objective requirement that the
class have been adequately represented in fact.
18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, at 474. R
265. See, e.g., In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases, 568 F. Supp. 869, 891–93 (E.D.
Mich. 1983) (permitting inmates to assert individual claims that could not have been
brought in prior class proceeding).
266. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 816 P.2d 134, 138–39 (Alaska 1991)
(invoking adequacy as one basis for refusing to preclude inmate from litigating individual
claim arguably precluded by prior injunctive class proceeding).
267. The Restatement captures some elements of this more generalized application
when it allows for issue preclusion to be withheld from a judgment when “the party sought
to be precluded, as a result of . . . special circumstances, did not have an adequate
opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.”
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(c).  One could thus interpret the analysis that
follows as an explanation of when the Restatement’s qualification is properly implicated in
class litigation.
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class also possess substantial damages claims.  As should now be second
nature, such an action will often create an ex ante conflict of interest
between the absentees with no damages claims, who would have less to
lose from an adverse judgment and hence would adopt a tougher negoti-
ating position on settlement, and those possessing high-value claims, who
would be risk averse and eager to settle the equitable proceeding cheaply.
Suppose that the initial tribunal certifies the class without acknowledging
the interests of the absentees who possess high-value claims or otherwise
taking any steps to protect them.  The case is then fully litigated and re-
sults in a judgment for defendant.  The rendering court in this case has
failed to ensure adequate representation for the class members with high-
value claims.  Instead, their interest in avoiding an adverse judgment that
would compromise their damages claims has been subordinated to the
interest of other class members in maximizing the benefits from the equi-
table suit.268  To resolve this conflict, the rendering court should have
imposed an ex ante constraint that would have prevented its judgment
from having issue preclusive effect on individual damages claims.  To
cure the first court’s error, the F2 court must now impose an ex post
constraint to the same effect.
A stay-in-state-court case—where class counsel forgoes a federal
claim in order to defeat removal—might call for a different kind of ade-
quacy analysis.  If a class member in such a case seeks to raise the aban-
doned federal claim in an F2 forum, there is no conflict of interest to
point to in the initial proceeding, since by hypothesis the class was af-
fected uniformly by class counsel’s decision to pursue only state law relief.
And when the federal claim is one that could have been raised in the
state court—or, in the case of exclusively federal claims, when the entire
action could have been filed in federal court—traditional claim preclu-
sion doctrine may offer no obvious basis for avoiding merger or bar.
Here, the adequacy analysis undertaken by the recognizing forum must
focus upon the limits of counsel’s representational role in a class pro-
ceeding.  The court must ask whether it constituted a legitimate strategic
decision for class counsel in F1 to trade the federal claim for a state fo-
rum on behalf of the class.269  The line of Sixth Amendment decisions
that federal courts have developed in assessing adequacy of representa-
268. This conflict of interest recalls the one between asbestos claimants seeking
immediate payments and those wanting to ensure the availability of funds for future relief,
which the Court found fatal in Amchem. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 626 (1997) (“[F]or the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate
payments.  That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an
ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.”).
269. Professor Issacharoff appears to recognize the need for adequacy review of
strategic decisions in class litigation.  See Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy, supra
note 207, at 385–86 (discussing methods by which class counsel can “overtly” and “covertly” R
make allocation decisions on behalf of a class, including the decision “to forgo some
claims” or “not to prosecute individual-based damages” claims that might prevent
certification, and recognizing need for both leeway and limitations).
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tion in the criminal context—and, in particular, in assessing decisions by
counsel to abandon certain claims or defenses—would likely be an im-
portant source to draw upon in such an inquiry.270
If the answer is no—if counsel acted incompetently in eschewing the
federal claim or else was acting from selfish or nefarious motives—then
the F2 court should permit the federal claim to proceed.271  Class coun-
sel’s actions would constitute inadequate representation in such a case,
and the recognizing forum should cure the error that the rendering fo-
rum committed when it allowed the suit to proceed without imposing a
preclusion constraint.  But if responsible counsel could have chosen to
relinquish federal claims in favor of a state forum in F1—for example, if
the relief that the federal claim offered was largely duplicative and the
benefits of preserving a state forum were substantial—then the F2 court
might have to conclude that merger and bar apply.  This result may seem
counterintuitive, as it appears that class members are being penalized for
having competent counsel in the first proceeding.  Indeed, if class coun-
sel in such a case never even requested that the certifying court impose a
constraint upon its judgment that would preserve the federal claims, the
absentees might be able to challenge that decision itself as inadequate,
counsel’s legitimate strategic motives notwithstanding.272  But if the F1
court considered and rejected such a constraint—perhaps concluding
that it would be inconsistent with the jurisdiction’s broader preclusion
commitments—and class counsel made a legitimate strategic decision in
continuing to litigate in state court nonetheless, there would seem to be
270. Those cases articulate a strict standard for challenging “strategic” decisions.  See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (requiring a showing that counsel’s
advice “was not ‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases’”
(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))); id. at 690–91 (“[S]trategic
choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation
are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the
limitations on investigation.”).  In applying this standard, the Court has tended to rely
heavily upon an assessment of the diligence that counsel exhibited in arriving at a strategic
decision and to shy away from second guessing the wisdom of decisions that are well
informed.  See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523–29 (2003) (finding defense
attorney’s investigation of mitigating evidence in capital case to be inadequate and, hence,
his decision not to put on mitigation case was inadequate and entitled to little deference).
271. Wright, Miller, and Cooper appear to endorse this form of collateral adequacy
attack for certain unpled claims.  See 18A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 2, § 4455, R
at 474 (discussing Haas v. Harris, 436 F. Supp. 279 (D.R.I. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Haas v.
Howard, 579 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1978)) (offering favorable account of district court opinion
that limited res judicata effect of earlier judgment where class counsel’s failure to raise
argument rendered representation inadequate).  Some courts disagree.  See, e.g., Nathan
v. Rowan, 651 F.2d 1223, 1227–28 & n.8 (6th Cir. 1981) (barring federal claims that went
unpled in state class action, apparently through inadvertence, under “‘might have been
offered’ aspect of res judicata”).
272. But see Nathan, 651 F.2d at 1227–28 (refusing to recognize failure of plaintiff in
state class action to seek leave to amend complaint and add federal claims as constituting
inadequate representation).
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no basis for invoking adequacy of representation to prohibit a subsequent
merger or bar.273
In each of these cases, the question for the F2 court is no longer
whether a class action should have been certified at all in light of its im-
pact upon preclusion values in the initial forum.  Rather, the question is
what preclusion constraints the rendering forum would have had to apply
in order to afford constitutionally adequate representation to the absen-
tees, given the class that was actually certified.  This modest form of ade-
quacy based collateral challenge, which leaves intact the claims actually
litigated in the original action, poses none of the threats to finality and
predictability that are associated with full-scale collateral attacks.  It
merely constitutes a variation on the type of retrospective interpretation
of judgments that the ubiquitous preclusion maxim—even in its properly
limited form—already warns parties to expect.
CONCLUSION
Many of the doctrinal proposals set forth in this Article are new.  The
insights that lie at their core, however, should sound familiar.  The power
of a court to constrain the preclusive effects of its own judgment in a class
proceeding rests on the same theoretical foundation as the court’s power
to enter a prosaic dismissal without prejudice, or to approve a class settle-
ment containing a narrowly tailored release of claims.  As courts confront
requests to certify increasingly ambitious class actions, and as class coun-
sel increasingly tailor the causes of action that they assert in an effort to
comply with the other requirements of certification, the threat of adverse
preclusive effects will require courts to employ that power with care and
precision.  It is a testament to the tenacity of the ubiquitous preclusion
maxim that most courts consistently fail to consider the threat of preclu-
sion at all, while those few that do make the attempt frequently throw up
their hands in helplessness.
Improving upon this inadequate state of affairs will require a more
thoughtful and realistic description of the array of interests possessed by
the members of a class outside the four corners of the complaint.  We
have seen the need for this type of reform many times.  An example from
a related juridical context makes the point succinctly.  Linda Silberman
273. In some cases, this mode of analysis might implicate the continuing debate over
whether a rendering court can conclusively determine the adequacy of the representation
that class members have received in a proceeding before it—a question that collapses into
one variant of the collateral attack problem.  See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman,
Matsushita and Beyond:  The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive
Federal Claims, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 219, 262–66 (concluding that “adequacy of
representation should be raised directly, and not be permitted to be raised collaterally,”
provided that class members had a “fair opportunity to raise the issue”); Woolley,
Availability, supra note 261, at 389–97 (arguing against ability of rendering forum to issue R
conclusive determination of adequacy, at least where class members lack minimum
contacts or other jurisdictional nexus with forum).
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has famously noted that a judge who places more weight upon a litigant’s
forum contacts when analyzing personal jurisdiction than when analyzing
choice of law operates under the mistaken assumption that an accused
cares more about “where he will be hanged than whether.”274  The quip
brilliantly captures the manner in which a misguided, formalistic doctri-
nal myopia can lead judges to misdescribe reality and unwittingly harm
the interests of litigants.  A similar danger is becoming manifest in the
treatment of preclusion in class litigation.  When a court fails to consider
the consequences of certification for the unpled claims of absentees, its
attempt to uncover hidden treasure for the class may wind up digging the
hole for a premature burial.  Choice of law has now begun to assume its
proper place as a regular inquiry at the threshold of the certification pro-
cess.  Preclusion should not be far behind.
274. Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner:  The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 88
(1978).
